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Abstract 
This explanatory sequential thesis examined the Minerals Energy Complex (MEC) as a 
network of policy stakeholders in South Africa’s beneficiation policy adopted in 2011. The 
MEC is a set of well-developed industries and institutions that have developed around the 
mining, energy and financial sectors of the South African economy. The MEC, as Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996, p. 5) see it, evolves over time depending on the balance and distribution of 
power amongst stakeholders in the mineral sector. This thesis found evidence that the MEC as 
it exists 2014 has evolved into a policy network of participant stakeholders in the beneficiation 
policy. The thesis employed network analytic techniques by combining qualitative and 
quantitative research methodologies. The combination of the two methodologies allows a 
researcher to utilise findings from different data sets; thereby increasing the comprehensiveness 
of the study, as pointed out in the literature by Fischer (2011). As Coviello (2005) has 
illustrated, policy networks can be meaningfully examined with a bifocal lens that integrates 
both qualitative and quantitative analytic techniques relevant to understanding network 
structure, relationships between network participants and dynamics of these relationships. The 
data results derived from research methodology unpacked how the MEC as a policy network 
of stakeholders is constituted and operates in terms of the resources exchanges around the 
beneficiation policy. Since the research proposition argued that stakeholders in possession of 
highly valued resources in the MEC policy network are likely to exercise higher levels of 
influence in the implementation dynamics of the beneficiation policy, the results generated 
revealed a limited number of influential stakeholders in the MEC policy network. Against this 
background, the thesis detailed the type of influence stakeholders may exert, along with their 
level of interest in the implementation of the beneficiation policy.  
Keywords: Beneficiation policy, mineral energy complex, policy networks, policy network 
stakeholders  
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The mineral energy complex and the beneficiation policy 
1.1. Introduction 
Mining and mineral extraction have been the backbone of the South African economy. Since 
the 19th century mineral revolution, the sector provided the “historical thrust that enabled the 
economy to lift off in classical Rostovian fashion to self-sustained growth” (Wilson, 2001, p. 
103). As a crucial sector in the economy, mining is a significant contributor to the twin 
objectives of employment creation and macro-economic development of the government 
(Garg, Van Tonde & Joubert, 2007). The sector not only contributes approximately 18.6 per 
cent to South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)1, and an estimated one third of export 
revenues, but it is also a significant employer of labour. South Africa possesses approximately 
US$2.5 trillion of non-energy in situ2 mineral wealth (Citibank 2010 report in Leeuw, 2012), 
making it a resource rich economy ‘par excellence’ (Bell & Farrell, 1997). Among resource 
rich economies in the world, South Africa holds the largest reserves of strategic industrial 
resources such as chrome, vanadium, gold, manganese, and the platinum-group metals (PGMs) 
(Department of Mineral Resources, 2011).   
Arguably, the strength of the South African economy lies in what Fine and Rustomjee (1996) 
term the Mineral Energy Complex (MEC).  According to the authors, the MEC is “at the core 
of the South African economy, not only by virtue of its weight in economic activity but also 
through its determining role throughout the rest of the economy” (Fine & Rustomjee 1996, p. 
5). The MEC is a set of industries in the mining, energy and financial sectors of the South 
African economy. Similarly, the MEC represents institutions centred on mining and mineral 
extraction bound together through the interactions of the state and domestic corporate capital. 
                                                             
1 8.6 per cent direct and 10 per cent indirect. Direct contribution refers to the value-added by the sector consisting 
of the sum of wages and salaries, gross profits of mining companies and taxes. Indirect contribution refers to the 
value added generated through upstream and downstream linkages (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004) 
2 This refers to the ores as they are found in nature and in original position within the host rock (Bise, 2013, p. 
536). 
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Furthermore, it has evolved as a particular system of accumulation whose economic linkages 
gave rise to key networks that exercise profound effects on the development and 
industrialisation path of South Africa (Freund, 2009; Roberts & Rustomjee, 2009). These 
networks and the linkages between  the mining activities of the participants provided the state 
with revenue to invest in the creation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)3 such as the South 
African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (Sasol), the South African Iron and Steel Corporation 
(Iscor), as well as the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) (Leeuw, 2012). 
Despite the maturity of the industry, well developed infrastructure, and comparative advantage 
in resource endowment, South Africa has failed to develop a matching manufacturing industry 
of significant scope and scale and produce more beneficiated products down the mineral value 
chain (Turok, 2013). Rather, the country has emerged as a major producer and exporter of raw 
materials, alloys, ores, and metal-ingots. It imports manufactured goods from countries such as 
India, Brazil, and China. These countries have developed effective policy strategies that 
diversified away from traditional economic activities into more advanced products in the 
mineral value chain (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). Arguably, a central feature 
attributed to the economic success of these three countries arose through the promotion of 
economic linkages between the mineral sectors and industrial sectors, which in turn sustained 
industrial development in these counties (Morris, Kaplinsky & Kaplan, 2011). 
Faced with an unemployment rate  of 24.7 per cent in terms of the narrow definition, and 35.6 
per cent based on the broader definition (Statistics South Africa, 2013), coupled with a trade 
deficit of R 15.02 billion4 (South African Revenue Services, 2013), the need to transform the 
economy has become more apparent to policymakers and various stakeholder groupings. In an 
attempt to engender structural transformation, the Cabinet of South Africa adopted the 
Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa in 2011 as a policy framework 
premised on greater processing of natural resources in South Africa (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2011). In general, the policy prioritises the mining value chain as one of the key 
economic activities in the creation of employment and diversification of the economy. It seeks 
to provide an enabling environment for leveraging on the resource endowment of the country 
                                                             
3 As per Chapter One, Section A of the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008, SOEs in line with the Public Finance 
Management Act No. 1 of 1999 and the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2009, SOEs are referred to as State 
Owned Companies. 
4 This amount is attributed to exports of R 65.43 billion and imports of R 80.45 billion. 
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to stimulate structural transformation and production led growth (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2011).  
The policy succinctly calls for a “paradigm shift in mineral development” necessitating the 
need of transforming comparative advantage into a national competitive advantage 
(Department of Mineral Resources, 2011). In essence, the beneficiation imperative argues that 
profit from mining activity and its related activities stay in the country to benefit local 
communities and contribute to the twin objectives of the government: namely industrialisation 
and employment creation. According to Robinson and Van Below (1990), the final stage of the 
mineral value chain is labour-intensive in contrast to the first three stages, which are capital-
intensive. Similarly, Baartjes (2011) illustrates that the potential for employment creation is far 
greater at the downstream end of the metals beneficiation pipeline.  
Figure 1:  The mineral value chain and the potential for employment creation 
 
Source: Baartjes (2011) 
In addition, a 2008 report commissioned by the Department of Labour (DOL) maintains that 
employment opportunities are high at semi-manufacturing and final production stages. Here, 
Lundall, Maree, and Godfrey (2008) present data for the carbon steel pipeline, which they argue 
is the most important pipeline in terms of volumes produced.  The findings presented by 
Lundall et al. (2008) illustrate the potential benefits of increasing the levels of beneficiation in 
South Africa given that (Lundall et al., 2008, p. 9): 
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Stages 2 and 3 are very capital intensive, with investments of R1.5 million to R8.5 million 
required per job. The employment-output ratio is also extremely low with only 1 to 7 people 
employed per 1000 ton of steel produced. On the other hand Stage 4, the finished product 
and machine building stage, is much more labour intensive. Investment per job ranges from 
only R0.1 million to R0.6 million while employment per 1000 ton of steel output ranges from 
75 to 150. 
 
While the South African beneficiation strategy is strategically aligned to a number of national 
policies and programmes, it targets eleven commodities that possess the most potential in 
maximising value extraction (Department of Mineral Resources, 2011). These commodities as 
identified by the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR, 2011) are chromium, manganese, 
coal and uranium, nickel, diamonds, platinum, gold, titanium, iron-ore, and vanadium. 
Furthermore, the ten commodities have been clustered according to the following value chains 
(Deloitte, 2011, p. 9): 
 Energy commodities such as coal, uranium, and thorium; 
 Iron and steel value chain includes iron-ore, chromium, and manganese; 
 Pigment and titanium production includes titanium, and vanadium; 
 Autocatalytic converters and diesel particulate filters with a specific focus on platinum; and 
 Jewellery fabrication focussing on diamonds, gold and platinum. 
 
Beneficiation is a highly complex process as it tends to vary depending on the mineral 
concerned. As a result, each value chain requires specific policy interventions. In 2013 the 
DMR sought to develop the Consolidated Implementation Framework (CIF) in order to 
uncover constraints to beneficiation, as well as unpack supply-side constraints. At the time of 
writing (March 2014), the DMR has yet to release the CIF. However, the department indicates 
the CIF aims to prioritise and accelerate local mineral beneficiation. Emphasis is placed on 
strengthening the synergies between the CIF and existing beneficiation interventions in order 
to maximise the development impact of the policy (Department of Mineral Resources, 2013). 
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1.2. Background to the study 
The debate around beneficiation has witnessed divergent viewpoints from stakeholders in the 
policy landscape. It reflects the polarisation between capital, organised labour and government 
and policy analysts over the merits and demerits of beneficiating minerals in South Africa. For 
example, some claim the prevailing policy lacks an integrated approach that considers the true 
competitiveness of the downstream beneficiation sectors, the availability of infrastructure, 
access to local and international markets, and the shortage of industry specific skills (Dobreva 
& Schoer, 2007; Rossouw & Baxter, 2011). Anthony Butler (2011) maintains the concept is 
popular leftist rhetoric, which incorrectly assumes abundant minerals lead to a virtuous circle 
of growth and economic prosperity. A common trend in this argument assumes that the 
exploitation of commodities and industrial development “do not go hand in hand” (Morris, 
Kaplinsky & Kaplan, 2011, p.6).  
 
For Morris et al. (2011), this view reasons that the exploitation of natural resources undermines 
industrial development due to the resource curse and the related Dutch Disease as claimed by 
Auty (2001)5. The resource curse thesis reasons that resource rich economies fail to promote 
diversification and competitive manufacturing sectors due to corruption, maladministration and 
rent-seeking behaviour. It is advised the state “takes a back seat as a night-watchman, leaving 
the solutions of resource governance to Adam Smith’s invisible hand” (Yeung, 2000, p. 134). 
For similar reasons, Joffe, Kaplan, Kaplinsky and Lewis (1995, p. 31) opine that the 
government ought to reconsider the promotion of beneficiation since the market mechanism 
remains the most efficient allocator of resource rents. The benefits that arise from the mineral 
sector, as Joffe et al. (1995) observe, ought to be utilised in sectors that are unrelated to the 
resource sector. Simply put, Joffe et al. (1995) claim that government intervention causes 
misallocation of resource rents in the sector. 
 
                                                             
5 The resource curse thesis as per Auty (2001), argues that countries endowed with minerals have lower growth 
rates than non-mineral-rich countries. In some African countries, resource endowment has caused internal 
conflicts and wars as societies compete over resource allocation and resource use. Related to this is the Dutch 
disease thesis, which proposes that the exploitation of natural resources affects the viability of non-mineral sectors 
in an economy due to the large inflows of foreign currency earnings and foreign direct investment (FDI). The 
large inflows and FDI lead to the strengthening the local currency while reducing the costs of importing 
beneficiated and/or manufactured goods. As a result, the viability of the local manufacturing industry is adversely 
affected and de-industrialisation occurs. 
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Kumba Iron Ore6, a major stakeholder in the iron ore value chain, insists the beneficiation 
policy needs to carefully evaluate the economic rationale underpinning beneficiation, given 
that demand for commodities such as iron ore is driven by international steel production rather 
than domestic consumption (Kumba Iron Ore, 2011). Secondly, Kumba asserts that the costs 
of transporting beneficiated goods are significantly higher than transporting unbeneficiated 
iron ore. In relation to higher transportation costs is the fact that South Africa is geographically 
distant from major end-user markets and shipping routes, as observed by Walsh (2013). 
Because of this, analysts contend that with all the will in the world benefit from local 
beneficiation is doubtful. Such deterministic conclusions, in view of Morris et al. (2012), echo 
a long standing tradition in the natural resource governance literature on the role of mineral 
resource endowments in the industrialisation of developing countries in Africa.  
 
Above all, they capture the sentiments of stakeholders who believe beneficiation is an 
inappropriate policy option for South Africa since the country lacks competitive advantage in 
manufacturing and resource based industrialisation. On the other hand, organised labour argues 
that the ownership structures of the industry remain major impediments to the transformation 
of the mineral industry. Mindful of this, the Congress of South African Trade Unions’ 
(COSATU) affiliates, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Union of 
Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA), call for state ownership of the industry to drive the 
beneficiation policy objectives (COSATU & NUM, 2005; NUMSA, 2012). Representing the 
spirit of militant populism, the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) 
vehemently argues that beneficiation would “never” happen due to the industry structure and 
ownership patterns (ANC Youth League, 2009).  
 
The debate concerning the mineral sector became politicised further when the ANCYL rallied 
around the politically contentious idea of nationalising the commanding heights of the South 
African economy (Butler, 2013). In particular, the ANCYL lamented inadequate 
transformation had taken place within the mining industry since democratisation in the country 
and thus nationalisation would enhance benefit from mining activity. Against a highly 
politicised environment, the African National Congress’s National General Council (NGC) 
commissioned a study to investigate state intervention in the mineral sector (Jourdan, Pillay & 
Chitiga-Mabugu, 2012). Among the terms of reference for the study was an analysis of 
                                                             
6 Hereafter referred to as “Kumba” 
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nationalisation, potential and actual upstream and downstream sectors; mineral related 
logistics; state assets in the sector, as well as a review of the legislative and regulatory 
frameworks governing the sector. The study titled, State Intervention in the Mineral Sector 
Report (SIMS), rejected nationalisation at market value on the grounds that it would be 
“unaffordable” (Jourdan et al., 2012, p. 352).  
 
Drawing on the ANCYL’s suggestion of acquiring a 60 per cent stake from the mining 
companies, Keeton and Beer (2011) point out that nationalisation would cost the South African 
government an estimated R 25.7 billion per annum. Such promulgation in their estimation 
would compel the government to reduce expenditure or it would need to borrow or possibly 
raise taxes to finance the fiscal deficit (Keeton & Beer, 2011, p. 36). Similarly, the authors of 
the SIMS report recount that while nationalisation with compensation at less than market value 
would comply with the Constitution, it would breach South African obligations under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs)7. In addition to this, the SIMS report reasons that nationalisation 
without compensation would require Constitutional change and might cause near collapse of 
foreign investment and access to finance, as well as widespread litigation by foreign investors 
who signed BITs with South Africa (Jourdan et al., 2012). 
 
With this in mind, the SIMS report concludes that the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development (MPRDA) Act No. 28 of 2002 nationalised mineral resources in South Africa. 
This, according to the authors, occurred through the conversion of old-order private rights to 
new-order state rights. The authors then recommend that the state classify certain minerals as 
strategic since South Africa has producer dominance (Jourdan et al., 2012, p. 353). Following 
the recommendations and findings of the SIMS report, during the 2012 ANC elective 
conference in Mangaung, the nationalisation debate abated as the governing party opted for 
policy resolutions that favoured beneficiation. In particular, the ANC resolved to strategically 
target particular mineral value chains to optimise their developmental impact in the economy. 
The ANC elective conference then adopted resolutions favouring strategic engagement with 
                                                             
7 BIT is an agreement between foreign investors and contracting companies domiciled in another the territory of 
another state. It includes a terms and conditions between contracting parties where nation states agree to maintain 
predictable and secure investment climates, fair and equitable treatment of investors. Importantly BITs make 
provision for dispute resolution and protection of investors in the event of expropriation and nationalisation 
(Dolzer & Stevens, 1995, p. 6). 
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various stakeholders such as mining companies, organised labour and state institutions in order 
to advance developmental goals of the ANC led government (ANC, 2012; Sergeant, 2013).  
 
In many respects, nationalisation is largely the result of activism against mining companies 
(Bourgouin, 2011). This activism manifests itself as resource nationalism and is characterised 
as “the tendency of states seeking direct or increasing control of economic activity in their 
natural resource sectors.”(Ward, 2009, p. 5) Similarly, resource nationalism encompasses 
regulatory or contractual measures (Leon, 2010) taken by resource-rich nations to shift political 
and economic control of their energy and mining sectors from foreign and private interests to 
domestic and state controlled companies (Bremmer & Johnston, 2009). While the sentiments 
driving resource nationalism vary from country to country and mineral to mineral, Solomon 
(2012) proposes that at the heart of resource nationalism is the popular frustration at the 
perceived lack of broad-based benefit from the mining industry and the associated uneven 
distribution of wealth. 
1.3. Problem statement 
As the discussion above illustrates, the debates on the beneficiation strategy are highly 
politicised and ideological in presentation. Dichotomising the state, private capital and labour 
ignores the fact that all stakeholders are integral actors operating as parts of a whole in a 
complex MEC network. To understand the nature of the relationship, it is critical to identify 
the underlying interests and power relations shaping their interactions. Although the MEC is 
widely cited in the literature of policy-making in South Africa, it has not been explored in 
relation to network analytic techniques. In particular, analyses have not analysed the MEC as 
a network of policy stakeholders. As an approach to conducting policy analysis, policy network 
analysis states that policy emerges through collective action and the interactions of state and 
non-state actors with separate interests, goals, and strategies (Matland, 1995; Hill & Hupe, 
2006). 
 
1.4. Purpose statement 
Against this background, the thesis seeks to contribute to the debates on the beneficiation policy 
through an exploratory study of the MEC as a policy network. In doing so, the thesis employs 
network analytic techniques. It does this in an effort to increase scholarly insights into the 
structure of the policy network as it exists in 2014. Additionally, the thesis seeks to explore the 
perceptions of the stakeholders in relation to the beneficiation policy. To achieve the stated 
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objectives, the study combined qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. The 
combination of the two methodologies allows a researcher to utilise findings from different 
data sets; thereby increasing the comprehensiveness of the thesis, as pointed out in the literature 
by Fischer (2011). As Coviello (2005) has illustrated, policy networks can be meaningfully 
examined with a bifocal lens that integrates both qualitative and quantitative analytic 
techniques relevant to understanding network structure, relationships and dynamics.   
1.4.1. Rationale and justification for the research 
It is appropriate to locate the beneficiation policy within scholarly debates. Through network 
analytic techniques, the researcher will gather data on the structure of the MEC policy network 
and the locations of the actors within the policy network. Secondly, in its analysis, the thesis 
seeks to identify the policy preferences and perceptions of these actors with the aim of 
uncovering their level of interest in the beneficiation policy. The literature on mineral policy 
development is replete with examples of policies that have failed because inadequate attention 
was given to powerful stakeholders and their economic interests and objectives. In the words 
of Grimble and Wellard (1997, p. 185), “policies have failed because their objectives have been 
perceived to be adverse by one or more stakeholder groups and have therefore led to non-
cooperation or even open opposition by these stakeholders.” The discussion on the Australian 
experience of implementing a resource rent tax by Sarker (2011) highlights the role that 
stakeholders play in policy processes.  
The Australian government introduced a resource rent tax to increase the efficiency of the 
resource taxation system and allow for the redistribution of wealth gained from mining to less 
resource-rich areas (Sarker, 2011). However, as a result of this legislation, political upheaval 
occurred due to the Australian government announcing the tax as a complete package without 
engaging and negotiating with the powerful stakeholders, such as the mining companies. This, 
according to Sarker (2011), caused political chaos, including the removal of the democratically 
elected prime-minister: Alan Rudd of the Labour Party. Therefore, anticipating stakeholder 
interests is crucial for improving policy design and implementation. In this regard, policy 
analysts agree that understanding the perspectives of key actors provides information regarding 
stakeholder perspectives on policy. Secondly, their concerns and expectations related to the 
policy can highlight the manner in which those stakeholders must be involved in the policy 
(Grimble & Wellard, 1997; Beilin & Gilmour, 2007).  
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1.5. Research questions 
As conceptualised by Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2006), research questions reflect the problem 
that the researcher is investigating by providing a framework for conducting the study, helping 
the researcher to organise the research and giving it relevance, direction, and coherence 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2006).  
Consequently the research questions that frame the study are: 
Primary research question  
 What roles do the stakeholders in the MEC policy network play and what complex 
relationships prevail amongst them? 
Through network analytic techniques, this question seeks to establish who explore the powerful 
and influential actors in the policy network are. It will also explore how these actors relate to 
the interrelations and resource exchanges in the network. 
Secondary research question 
 What do the central stakeholders in the MEC policy network perceive as advantages 
and disadvantages of the beneficiation policy? 
Through stakeholder analytic techniques, this question seeks to probe actors’ interests and 
positions regarding the beneficiation policy. This question is informed by the knowledge that 
policy-related interactions are often closely linked to perceived influence (or potential 
influence) on the policy subject matter. 
Following the research questions and the purpose statement indicate, the thesis combines 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies in a single study. The combination of the 
two methods is known as ‘mixed methods’: a methodological orientation that evolved as a 
pragmatic way of combining the information from quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Since qualitative data is the dominant method employed in the 
research, the current research methodology is symbolised as: QUAL										quan 
The definition of qualitative dominant mixed methods research as defined by Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007, p. 124) is “the type of mixed research in which one relies on 
a qualitative research process, while recognising that the addition of quantitative data and 
approaches are likely to benefit the research project”. Table 1 illustrates the research questions 
to be addressed in the thesis. 
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Table 1: The research design of the thesis 
Phase Qualitative Quantitative Research question to be addressed 
1   -  Who are the actors that have been involved in all the 
policy processes of the beneficiation policy? 
  - In terms of resource exchanges, what complex roles 
prevail amongst the stakeholders? 
  - Which organisations/individuals/institutions do you 
exchange material and non-material resources such as 
information with? 
  - Which stakeholders have the ability to influence the 
implementation of the beneficiation policy? 
2 -   What is their level of interest in the successful 
implementation of the policy? 
-   What is their level of influence in the implementation of 
the policy? 
-   What does your organisation perceive to be potential 
advantages and disadvantages in implementing the 
beneficiation policy? 
 
1.6. Research proposition 
The ability to influence the implementation of beneficiation policy depends on the resources at 
the disposal of the stakeholders in the MEC policy network as it operates in South Africa. Thus, 
stakeholders located at the core of the network tend to exhibit higher levels of influence due to 
the number of ties they maintain with other actors in the network. Such stakeholders, known 
as central stakeholders, occupy influential positions in the network. Centrality is defined by 
Rowley (1997, p. 898) as the position an actor occupies relative to others. Therefore the 
research proposition in this thesis hypothesises: 
 
Stakeholders exhibiting high levels of centrality in the MEC policy network are likely to 
exercise higher levels of influence and power in the implementation dynamics of the 
beneficiation policy. 
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1.7. Conceptual framework 
A series of inter-related concepts help inform the study. In this section, I define and elaborate 
on key concepts such as mineral beneficiation, perceptions, interests, influence, and power. 
Mineral and metals beneficiation 
The terms value addition, forward linkages, downstream beneficiation, further processing, 
upgrading, refining, and enrichment tend to be used interchangeably to describe mineral 
beneficiation. In the discussion that follows the term beneficiation is used throughout to signify 
local (in South Africa) beneficiation. 
From a technical perspective beneficiation is defined as (Eob Choi, 2010, p. 7):  
A variety of purposes whereby extracted ores from mining are reduced to particles that can 
be separated into mineral and waste where the former is suitable for further processing or 
direct use. 
 
Section 1 of the MPRDA Act No. 28 of 2002, as amended by the MPRDA Amendment Act 
No. 49 of 2008, defined beneficiation as follows: 
 Primary stage, which includes any process of the winning, recovering, extracting, 
concentrating, refining, calcining, classifying, crushing, screening, washing, reduction, 
smelting, or gasification thereof; 
  secondary stage, which includes any action of converting a concentrate or mineral 
resource into an intermediate product; 
  tertiary stage, which includes any action of further converting that product into a refined 
product suitable for purchase by minerals-based industries and enterprises; and 
  final stage, which is the action of producing properly processed, cut, polished or 
manufactured products or articles from minerals accepted in the industry and trade as fully 
and finally processed or manufactured and value added products or articles 
 
Subsequently, the MPRDA Amendment Bill No. 15 of 2013 simplified the definition in order 
to remove ambiguities within the MPRDA Act No. 28 of 2002, to define beneficiation as: 
Transformation, value addition or downstream beneficiation of a mineral and petroleum 
resource (or a combination of minerals) to a higher value product, over baselines to be 
determined by the Minister, which can either be consumed locally or exported 
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In the White Paper on Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa (1998), beneficiation 
represents 
The successive processes of adding value to raw materials from their extraction through to 
the sale of finished products to consumers. These include large-scale and capital-intensive 
operations like smelting and technologically sophisticated refining as well as labour-
intensive activities such as craft jewellery. 
 
Thus, a production process where value is added at each stage entails mineral beneficiation. 
Accordingly, the value extraction process can be represented in diagrammatic form to illustrate 
the four sequential stages involved in beneficiation (see Figure 2). Based on this, Robinson & 
Van Below (1990) indicate that for chromium, the ore is smelted into ferrochromium, which is 
then melted with iron and other alloys to produce fabricated alloys such as stainless steel 
products. In the final stage, the flat-rolled products are fabricated producing consumer products 
or intermediate products (Robinson & Van Below, 1990, p. 92) 
Figure 2: The typical stages involved in beneficiation 
 
 
Source: Robinson and Van Below (1990) 
Following Robinson and Van Below, Lundall et al. (2008) confirm: 
 Stage 1 involves the primary action of mining and producing an ore or concentrate. 
 Stage 2 converts the concentrate into an intermediate product such as a metal or alloy, 
where the value added to the original ore increases significantly.  
 In Stage 3 the intermediate good is refined into a semi-fabricated product suitable for 
activities that take place in manufacturing. 
 In Stage 4 the converted metal from stage three is further transformed or fabricated into a 
finished product for sale and subsequent inclusion in a variety of different applications. 
1. 
MINING
2. 
PROCESSING
3. 
REFINING
4. 
FABRICATION
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Noting the stages involved in mineral development, James (1985, p. 314) articulates that: 
 
Beneficiation refers to the process or series of processes by which an ore containing a metal 
or mineral as it is found in nature is converted into a product containing a progressively 
higher concentration of the metal or mineral concerned. The final result is achieved when 
the metal or mineral reaches the highly beneficiated or chemically pure form required by 
the end-user. Beneficiation ends and manufacturing begins when the mineral commodity 
has been converted into a final usable product.  
 
Central to the definition offered by James is the separation of mining and manufacturing. 
Following Figure 2, stages 1–2 involve mining activities where companies extract natural 
resources from the ground and transport the raw material to a processing plant usually close to 
the mine. The process of value addition continues as the materials are converted into ores and 
alloys. While these stages transform the chemical composition of the raw materials (Robinson 
& Van Below, 1990, p. 92), stages 3-4 typically involve manufacturing where the physical 
shape of the alloys is transformed into intermediate components or usable products. While 
cognisant that beneficiation occurs in South Africa, albeit at low level in comparison to the 
resource endowment of the country, this thesis takes beneficiation as the interface between 
mining and manufacturing. Thus, from a policy perspective, beneficiation entails an activity 
beyond the mineral extraction and where value is added to minerals through various 
manufacturing processes. 
The mineral value chain and production linkages 
The discussion above on beneficiation and the illustration of the production processes is known 
as the mineral value chain. The term ‘value chain’ was originally coined by Michael Porter 
(1990) as a means of presenting the chain of activities involved in the generation of value from 
raw material to the final consumption of a product. The main thrust of his concept argued that 
a range of supporting activities (direct and indirect) is responsible for value generation in 
production stages. These supporting activities are known as ‘production linkages’, which arise 
“from the capabilities developed as suppliers provide inputs into the commodities sector and 
as they develop the capabilities to use the outputs of the commodities sector” (Kaplinsky, 2011, 
p. 20). In mineral economics, these linkages are commonly referred to as backward, forward, 
and horizontal linkages. Figure 3 illustrates these production linkages. 
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Figure 3: The production linkages and the mineral value chain 
 
Source: Adapted from Economic Commission for Africa (2011) 
 
Figure 3 illustrates that backward upstream linkages arise from the linkages between a mine 
and its suppliers. The linkages to a mine form part of the supply chain of a mine including 
specialised manufactures, input providers, agents, distributors and service suppliers (Walker, 
2005). Horizontal/sidestream linkages are generated from inputs such as financial services, 
communications, research and development (R&D), and other critical inputs required by 
mining companies. Forward/backward linkages include activities engaged in further processing 
and beneficiation of minerals and metal resources (Economic Commission for Africa, 2011). 
Influence and power 
Political theorists and scholars alike have written extensively on the concepts of power and 
influence. Both concepts have produced divergent viewpoints on the two constructs. While this 
may be the case, it is generally agreed that power varies in relation to the level of analysis and 
is shaped by specific contexts (Agupusi, 2011). In this respect, there are two streams of thought 
on the conceptions of influence and power; one that considers influence as a conception of 
power and the other that argues the concepts are not interchangeable. Those analysts, who 
approach the two concepts as different yet closely related concepts, argue that neither is a 
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substitute of the other. Morriss (2008, pp. 8-9) begins by distinguishing the grammatical 
differences between the two, illustrating that the word influence is both a verb and noun, while 
power is only a noun. 
In explaining the differences between the two constructs, Morriss (2008) defines influence as 
the ability to affect a phenomenon. Power, in his typology, refers to the ability to effect 
something or anything with might vigour, energy, force and the possession of control or 
command over others, domination, authority (Morris, 2008, p. 10).  Drawing on Morriss (2008), 
it seems that power and influence do not overlap conceptually and that both concepts cannot 
be used as synonyms in reference to social relationships. This distinction is similar to Scott 
(1994) for whom influence, in practise, exists only in and through processes of consensus and 
agreement. Views rooted in this stance tend to emphasise that influence differs from power in 
the manner in which compliance is evoked. Where power is coercive; influence is voluntary 
since it entails the capacity to obtain compliance without relying on formal actions, rules or 
force (Liebler & Mc Connell, 2012). 
Consider the example below by Willer, Lovaglia, and Markovsky (1997, p. 571) who illustrate: 
A boss with a legendary work ethic asks an employee to stay late to complete an important 
proposal. The employee agrees and cancels her plans for the evening.  
 
While power might be implicit in the actions of the boss, Willer et al. (1997) suggest the boss 
used her influence to convince the employee to stay, doing this without a threat. Here, influence 
is a socially induced modification of a belief, attitude or expectation.  If, however, the boss 
suggested the employee stay late and that in doing so she (the boss) would recommend her 
promotion, the boss would have exercised her power to induce the compliance from the 
employee.  According to Willer et al. (1997, p. 573) the boss offered a reward in exchange for 
the compliance and implied a threat if the employee failed to comply. The illustration presented 
by Willer et al. (1997) seeks to clarify that power involves changing behaviour through the 
threat of force and sanction. Therefore, the main thrust is that power refers to the possession of 
control whereas influence is an exercise or application of power but not the possession of power 
(Willer et al., 1997). 
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Scholars who conflate power and influence maintain power involves the ability to influence 
certain behavioural outcomes (Scott, 1994; Lunenburg, 2012). In particular, Knoke (1990) 
adopts a definition of power that asserts all power relationships are combinations of influence 
and domination. Knoke (1990, p. 3) provides the following illustration:  
 A physician who advises a patient to avoid a heart attack by giving up smoking and taking 
up jogging can be said to exercise influence if the patient accepts the recommendation and 
complies with the advice. 
 
Since the physician exerts greater control over the behaviour of the patient, Knoke (1990) used 
the above example to illustrate that power represents the ability to influence behaviour. As 
Knoke (1990) contends, influence occurs when one actor intentionally transmits information 
to another that alters the actions of the latter from what would have occurred without that 
information. Knoke (1990) acknowledges that he defines the construct along the Weberian 
notion that power is “the probability that one actor within a social relationship would be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber, 1947, p. 152). Extending this 
further, Dahl (2002, pp. 202-203) notes that A has power over B to the extent to which A can 
get B to do something which B would not otherwise do. Within this context, A is in a position 
to get what he wants in order to satisfy his desires and interests. The autonomy of A, according 
to Göhler (2009, p. 28), means less power for B, and by implication, denotes an asymmetrical 
and zero-sum relationship.  
Göhler (2009) makes a distinction between power to and power over. Power over means 
enforcement of individual intentions over others while power to is the ability to achieve 
something independent of others (Göhler, 2009, pp. 28-29). In this respect, power over 
emphasises the repressive aspect of power given it restricts behaviour of actors that are 
subjected to it. This perspective of power, as stated by Rosness, Blakstad, and Forseth (2011), 
addresses two aspects of power: firstly, it examines how actors achieve their objectives against 
the interests of others, and secondly it associates power as a resource actors use to advance 
their interests irrespective of other interests. The latter aspect of the construct is important in 
the analysis of the power because it accrues to actors, who control and possess critical resources 
needed by others. Under this interpretation, power not only creates asymmetric relations in 
social relationships, but fosters resource dependence among parties (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 
1997). 
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Within this context, Frooman (1999) suggests a categorisation of power based on resource 
dependency theory. Resource dependency theory defines a resource as anything an actor 
perceives as valuable, whereas dependency is the state in which one actor relies on the actions 
of another to achieve a particular outcome (Frooman, 1999, p. 195). Thus, resource dependency 
is said to exist when one actor is supplying another with a resource that the other actor deems 
a means to an end. Taking this further, Frooman (1990) postulates that dependency is the extent 
to which actor A has power over B. That is, A has power over B if B is more dependent on A 
relative to A’s dependency on B. Central to the illustration provided by Frooman (1990) is the 
notion that B’s need for resources provides opportunities for A to gain control over it. Frooman 
(1999) defines two ways in which powerful actors gain control over others. These are 
characterised as “discretion over resource use” and “discretion over allocation”.  
In short, discretion over allocation translates to a stakeholder who has power to articulate a 
credible threat of withdrawal of resources (Frooman, 1999). Such strategies are likely to occur 
when A discontinues providing resources to B with the intention of making B change certain 
behaviour. Discretion over the use of resources involves a strategy in which A continues to 
supply resources with conditionalities attached (Frooman, 1999, p. 196). According to the 
above, power is determined by the combined measure of the amount of resources a stakeholder 
has and their capacity to mobilise those resources in support or opposition towards an activity 
(Schmeer, 1999). The use of violence, force, or physical sanctions are characterised as coercive 
power while physical resources such as money, funding, aid, or any material means constitute 
utilitarian power. Esteem, prestige and normative symbols constitute the normative aspects of 
power (Mitchell et al., 1997). Where power is defined as the type of resources used to exercise 
control, another view is that power must be examined relationally.  
In other words, actors do not possess power in the abstract; rather power accrues to those who 
dominate others in a relationship (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). In policy analysis, power as a 
relational concept unpacks “who participates, who gains and who loses from alternative 
outcomes; and who prevails in bargaining processes over key issues that could affect dynamic 
policy processes and outcomes” (Agupusi, 2011, p. 33). Considering that the above discussion 
closely matches the conceptualisation of power in network analysis, Young et al. (2010) duly 
note the term carries negative connotations akin to domination, submission and constraints 
which arise from the unequal distribution of power among actors. In order to avoid negative 
connotations, this thesis opts to use influence as an exercise of power, which in policy processes 
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translates to the “ability to shape policy decisions so that they are in alignment with the policy 
preferences of the actor” (Young, Lewis & Sanders, 2010, p. 30).  
Similarly, influence refers to the ability to control decision-making processes, as well as the 
ability to affect policy outcomes. In other words, influence empowers stakeholders with the 
ability to achieve their desired policy preferences. Stakeholders may exercise it through 
different channels such as direct and indirect lobbying or it can occur in different stages of the 
policy process like agenda setting, policy formulation or policy implementation (Young, Lewis 
& Sanders, 2010, p. 30). Overall, influence, as conceptualised here, is based on the possession 
of financial, symbolic or physical resources that other network participants deem a means to 
an end. 
Interest 
To understand influence as an exercise of power it is necessary to analyse the interests of the 
different actors and assess how these interests intersect in realising their policy preferences. In 
policy processes, actor beliefs, values, and culture shape their ideology and perceptions 
(Agupusi, 2011, p. 33). Such perceptions as Agupusi highlights, represent stakeholder interest 
in policy and decision-making processes and in many respects are transferred into the decision-
making and policy processes. Interest in this thesis is used in an economic sense to represent 
the level of utility or welfare perceived by stakeholders (Grimble & Wellard, 1997). Put simply, 
it represents the advantages and disadvantages that the implementation of the policy may bring 
to the stakeholder.  
Stakeholder analysis 
Stakeholder Analysis (SA) is used to assess stakeholders with favourable and unfavourable 
interests in the implementation of a respective policy or issue (Miron & Preda, 2009). It is 
employed for the description and identification of stakeholders based on attributes such as 
levels of interest and influence in policy processes. As an analytical approach to understanding 
a policy environment, SA identifies the key stakeholders who have the power to hinder or block 
a policy. As such, it is a risk management strategy, which attempts to categorise the differential 
consequences arising from a particular policy and indicating the interests and impacts of the 
policy on different stakeholders (Beilin & Gilmour, 2007). Within the mineral sector, SA is 
particularly relevant for policy analysis because the sector is characterised by multiple 
objectives, concerns, conflicts and competition over the use of highly valued resources. Such 
conflicts are based on economic competition for scarce natural resources or between economic 
or environmental use over such resources (Riege & Lindsay, 2003). 
31 
 
In general, a stakeholder can be of any form, size, or capacity. Stakeholders can be individuals, 
organisations, or unorganised groups (World Bank, 1996). Where Reed et al. (2009) classify 
stakeholders as people or organisations who either (a) stand to be affected by the project or (b) 
could ‘make or break’ the success of the project, Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines a stakeholder 
as 
Any group or individual, who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives 
 
Citing Goodpaster, Frooman (1999) observed two types of stakeholders in the Freeman 
definition: the strategic stakeholder and the moral stakeholder. The strategic stakeholder is said 
to affect the objectives of an organisation. Emphasis in this approach classifies stakeholders as 
strategic since these stakeholders provide something of importance to the organisation 
(Mayers, 2005). The moral stakeholder, on the other hand, is affected by the decision making 
process. Here stakeholders represent the groups or constituents that have a legitimate claim or 
“those that will be directly impacted” by the decision-making process (Pouloudi, 1999, p. 2). 
Although the Freeman (1984) definition is widely cited in the literature, it implies that any 
entity can be regarded as a stakeholder. As a result, scholars have narrowed the concept to those 
who have a ‘stake’, ‘claim’, or ‘vested interest’ in a given issue, policy, programme, or 
intervention. 
For example, Goodpaster (1991) associates stakeholders with players with a ‘stake’ in a project. 
These players invest economic value which puts them at risk. In other words, stakeholders bear 
some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial 
resources something of value in a project (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 865). Following this the 
scholars categorise stakeholders based on three key attributes to indicate the amount of 
attention managers need to give to stakeholders. In this view stakeholders possess one; two or 
all three of the following attributes (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 865): 
 The power to influence the policy; 
 The legitimacy of the stakeholders relationships with the policy; and/or 
 The urgency of the stakeholders claim on the policy. 
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With this in mind, there exist three approaches to analysing stakeholders. Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) and other scholars categorise the approaches as the substantive, instrumental 
and normative approaches to stakeholder analysis:  
 The substantive argument proposes that analysing stakeholders generates information 
that describes the interactions among organisations (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
Similarly, the descriptive SA reflects and explains past, present and future states of 
affairs of organisations and their stakeholders (Beilin & Gilmour, 2007).   
 The normative argument for stakeholder analysis contends that stakeholders are actors 
with legitimate interests in a particular programme, policy or project (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). According to this approach, self-serving ends of profit maximisation 
neglect the interests of actors affected by the decision-making process decisions. A 
view that prevails in the normative approach is that stakeholders should be involved in 
decisions that affect them and their communities. Therefore, SA legitimises the decision 
making process through the involvement of stakeholders in decisions that affect them 
(Pouloudi, 1999). 
 Stakeholder analysis can be used instrumentally to establish frameworks for examining 
the achievements of organisational objectives (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Here, 
scholars analyse stakeholders based on their capacity and ability to mobilise relevant 
resources toward the attainment of policy, programme or project outcomes (Jones, 
1995; Jones & Wicks, 1999). The instrumental aspect of SA is in many respects 
primarily linked to resource dependency theory, as it argues that organisations are 
dependent on the resources of others to survive (Phillips, 2003). Resource dependence 
theory argues that more often than not, these resources needed by the organisation are 
held by others in the external environment. Thus, power and influence over the 
organisation accrues to those organisations that control the resources they require 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003, pp. 44). In stakeholder terms, organisations need to respond 
to stakeholders that control critical resources because it is these stakeholders that 
“control resources that can facilitate or enhance the implementation of decisions” 
(Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999, p. 491).  
 
For Donald and Preston (1995, p. 74), the descriptive, normative, and instrumental approaches 
to SA are mutually supportive in the sense that the three approaches are “nested within each 
other” as depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: An illustration of the three aspects of stakeholder theory 
 
 
 
Source: Donaldson and Preston (1995). 
In their view, the descriptive aspect is supported by the instrumental aspect on one level 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 74). Since the descriptive aspect presents and explains 
relationships in the external environment, the instrumental aspect provides predictive value by 
prescribing the best practices for the attainment of goals. The core of the theory then is 
normative as it recognises the saliency of stakeholder rights and interests that have intrinsic 
value (Donaldson & Preston, 1995, p. 74). Likewise, Reed et al. (2009, 1936) agree that the 
normative aspect of SA reinforces the instrumental aspect in that the normative basis suggests 
that stakeholders should be involved in decision-making processes and thus feel some level or 
ownership of these processes. In doing so, argue Reed et al. (2009, 1936), SA “may serve 
instrumental ends if it leads to the transformation of relationships and the development of trust 
and understanding between participants”. 
 
In public policy, stakeholder engagement is initiated by the government and depending on the 
political environment and the issue at hand; it includes stakeholders with a legitimate 
involvement in the policy and on the instrumental level, the rationale is access to information 
and resources and build policy support (Schalk, 2011a, p. 5). Here, stakeholder engagement 
strengthens the collective nature of the policy-making process as information sharing increases 
the likelihood of finding innovative solutions to wicked problems. Governments also engage 
stakeholders to build support for policies and reduce the likelihood of conflict during the 
Descriptive
Instrumental
Normative
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implementation stage (Mtegha, Cawood & Minnit, 2010). When governments provide avenues 
for stakeholders to express their interests, concerns and perspectives regarding policy, 
strategies to influence key stakeholders can be formulated in order to promote supportive 
actions and decrease opposing actions before attempting to implement a policy (Ondee & 
Pannarunothai, 2008). These conditions are expected to reduce contracting costs, resulting in 
enhanced solidarity around a particular policy (Pouloudi, 1999; Hyder, et al., 2010). Against 
this background, the primary focus of this thesis is to unpack the basis on which stakeholder 
engagement occurs in the development and implementation of the beneficiation policy in South 
Africa. 
1.8. Research outline  
Chapter one, the introductory chapter of the research report outlines the background to the 
study. The problem and purpose statements as well as the research questions are discussed in 
the chapter. Following this, a detailed conceptual framework is presented in this chapter. Since 
the study has proposed that the MEC has yet to be analysed as a policy network of stakeholders, 
chapter two reviews the existing body of knowledge on the MEC and the manner in which 
scholars have analysed the MEC. Furthermore, the chapter evaluates extant literature on the 
beneficiation and the cross-cutting constraints identified in relation to the policy. In adopting 
network analytic techniques, chapter three discusses the policy network theory as the 
theoretical framework of the study. The research methodology of the study is outlined in 
chapter four. Chapter five presents the findings of the study and, finally, chapter six concludes 
the research report by presenting the main findings and policy recommendations for the policy 
network operations in relation to beneficiation policy of the minerals industry of South Africa. 
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Literature survey on MEC policy influence in the mineral sector 
2.1. Introduction 
Following the contention that the MEC has yet to be analysed as a network of policy actors, 
this chapter presents the existing literature on the MEC along with the complex’s influence on 
economic policy development in South Africa. The most common interpretation reasons that 
although the origins of the MEC lie in mining, it has evolved historically to represent linkages 
and agencies that control key sectors of the South African economy (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996). 
The state, through its regulatory authority played an important role in that regard by facilitating 
the growth of MEC productive activities and large scale capital. In this way, the MEC has been 
shaped by synergistic linkages between domestic corporate capital and the state, working hand 
in glove to protect and promote the political and economic interests centred around mineral 
resource extraction. On the contrary, the MEC is not by any means expressed as a homogeneous 
unit but rather as a struggle for access to state (political) power between different (economic) 
interest groups, sometimes characterised as fractions of capital8.  
Davies, Kaplan, Morris, and O’Meara (1976) express these fractions as the power bloc through 
which the dominant classes compete to maximise power over policy outcomes. In this line of 
analysis, capital development depends on a hegemonic fraction empowered to use the state as 
an instrument of advancing their policy interests (Davies et al., 1976). Thus, it is argued by the 
authors that in periods when different fractions dominate, the state adopts policy measures that 
preserve the power of that fraction of capital. Defined under the preserve of Marxist and neo-
Marxist scholarship, such instrumentalist conceptions on the South African state epitomize a 
“captured” state (Dietz in Jourdan et al., 2012, p. 52) “available to and wielded by an 
undifferentiated dominant capitalist class” (Wolpe, 1980). 
                                                             
8 The concept of fractions of capital refers to sections of capital that differ according to their productive activities. 
Thus mining capital, industrial capital and agricultural capital, or even local capital, and foreign capital represent 
distinctive fractions of capital (Clarke, 1978). As Clarke (1978, pp. 34-35) notes, “fractions are the product of the 
political organisation of a number of individuals capitals who have interests in common and only exist as such 
through their representation in the political process” Clarke (1978, pp. 34-35). 
Chapter 
2 
36 
 
The literature on the MEC has paid particular attention to the centrality of interest groups 
influencing policy and how their objectives systematically constrain the development of other 
policies (Fine, 2008). In analysing MEC policy effects, scholars tend to express policy-making 
in South Africa through various theoretical paradigms, among them, neo-Marxism, regulation 
theory, revisionist theory, and neo-corporatism. While these approaches focus on the 
interactions between the state and policy stakeholders and the relationships that influence 
policy development, the theories fail to provide a paradigm to view policy-making as 
conceptualised by the Policy Network theory. As a result of this deficiency in the literature, 
this chapter aims to propose a recasting in the literature through an integrative literature survey 
(Torraco, 2005). This type of analysis reviews and synthesises representative literature in order 
to generate new frameworks and perspectives on a topic under review. 
In other words, an integrative literature survey addresses the need for reconceptualising an 
existing body of knowledge, thereby offering a new perspective about an issue that is not 
addressed in the literature. The chapter begins by discussing the central concepts of the MEC 
thesis. The intention here is to unpack the notion of the MEC as conceptualised by the original 
authors of the thesis, Fine and Rustomjee (1996). This will provide the basis of examining the 
dominant policy interests in the economy along with an analysis of the evolution of the MEC. 
While Fine and Rustomjee conceptualise the MEC as a system of capital accumulation in South 
Africa, this literature review will show that the MEC has evolved into a policy network of 
participant stakeholders with varying levels of interests and influence in policy development. 
Following this, extant literature on the beneficiation policy is examined. 
2.2. Literature survey on the MEC 
As observed by Fine and Rustomjee (1996), the MEC exists as a set of public and private sector 
institutions whose interactions have set the pace and tone of the political economy in South 
Africa. In some orientations, institutions are widely recognised as appropriate for maintaining 
social order (Schofer, Hironaka, Frank & Longhofer, 2012); while in others they are viewed as 
governance arrangements shaping economic, social, and political factors for a variety of 
purposes (Leftwich, 2007). Institutions whether formal (rules and procedures) or informal 
(norms), “are the structural properties which constrain some forms of behaviour and interaction 
of societies” (Leftwich, 2007, p. 11). Thus, institutions are defined as “both formal and 
informal rules governing the actions of individuals and organisations and the interactions of 
the participants in the development process” (Kumssa and Mbeche, 2004, p. 841).  
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Utilising this typology, Fine and Rustomjee (1996) point to institutionalised relations between 
the state and subsidiaries of six corporations that controlled mining (with the exception of 
Iscor), namely Anglo American Corporation (AAC), General Mining Corporation (GMC), 
Anglo Transvaal (Anglovaal), Rand Mines, General Mining (Genmin), and Gold Fields of 
South Africa. These mining houses, known as the group producers, influenced policy through 
the well-known lobby group, the Chamber of Mines (COM) established in 1887 to represent 
the interests of the mining industry (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996, p 10). Policy coordination 
between the COM and the government was institutionalised on the macro-level with the 
formation of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs created in 1989 (Fine & Rustomjee, 
1996). The second major theme from Fine and Rustomjee entails the notion that the MEC is a 
core set of interlinked economic sectors directly tied to mining, energy, and finance (Fine & 
Rustomjee, 1996). 
Drawing on these two authors, Bell and Farrell (1997, pp. 591- 592) classify these industries 
under the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) scheme as mining, electricity, and mining-led 
manufacturing such as chemicals (SIC 351-4); non-metallic mineral products (SIC 361, 369); 
iron and steel (SIC 371), and non-ferrous metal basic industries (SIC 372). These sectors were 
linked by conglomerate domination and ownership concentration that revolved around what 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996, p. 10) term “a separate but intimately related epicentre of finance.” 
At the time of writing, the axes of capital dominated the financial sector, exhibiting oligopoly 
control since SA Mutual, Sanlam, AAC, Liberty/Standard, Rembrandt/Volkskas, and 
Anglovaal controlled the sector (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996, p. 106). Finally and perhaps more 
strikingly, Fine and Rustomjee argue that “the MEC is to be seen not merely as a core set of 
industries and institutions but also as a system of accumulation and one that has varied and 
changed in nature over time” (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996, p. 5). 
A system of accumulation in narrow terms specifies “a core set of industrial sectors with strong 
linkages with one another and relatively weaker linkages with other sectors in an economy” 
(Ashman, Fine & Newman 2012, p. 4). As a system of accumulation particular to South Africa, 
the MEC confines industrial activity to mining and related industries, which develop forward, 
backward, and upstream linkages into the industry. Subsequently, non-MEC sectors such as 
the agriculture and the manufacturing industries remain incipient features of the economy as 
examined by Marais (1998, p. 8). Viewed in this lens, the concept of the MEC as a system of 
accumulation addresses two features of the MEC. Firstly, it describes the process through 
which the core set of industries and institutions developed historically in the political economy. 
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Secondly, it highlights the extent to which other sectors in the economy have developed (Fine 
& Rustomjee, 1996, p. 91). 
Noting the significance of the mineral sector to the political economy of the country, Bell and 
Farrell (1997) argue that due to statistical inaccuracy, the conclusions drawn from the MEC 
thesis remain inconclusive. For Bell and Farrell (1997) a major dissatisfaction with the MEC 
thesis lies in its persistent rejection that South Africa industrialised through import substitution, 
stimulated by protection of consumer goods, as Fine and Rustomjee (1996, p. 5) observe. 
Import substitution industrialisation (ISI), represents a sequential process that begins with 
manufacturing-finished consumer goods, then moves to higher stages of manufacturing 
intermediate goods, followed by capital goods through backward linkages (Hirschman, 1968, 
p. 6). In accepting that ISI occurred before 1945 and declined relatively thereafter, Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996) argue that the form of industrialisation taken by post-war South Africa 
occurred in the opposite direction of the traditional ISI model. 
In this regard, Fine and Rustomjee conclude that the pattern of industrialisation in South Africa 
cannot be reduced to an ISI model, which has in fact theorised Latin American industrialisation 
(Fine & Rustomjee, 1996, p. 222). Likewise, Lewis, Reed, and Teljeur argue that South Africa 
failed to follow the ISI route to industrialisation due to the inability to diversify into the capital 
goods sector. Rather, Lewis et al. (2004, p. 151) acknowledge that a diversified consumer 
goods production system underpinned the industrialisation of the economy. In stark contrast, 
Bell and Farrell (1997) show that during the inter-war period (1919-1939) and subsequent 
periods, the percentage contribution of consumer goods declined relative to capital goods. 
Employing constant price data, as opposed to current price data used by Fine and Rustomjee, 
Bell and Farrell (1997, p 597) provide statistics in support of the ISI logic. 
In their view, during the period between 1916/7–1926/7, consumer non-durables contributed 
two-thirds of positive values and that by 1926/7–1936/7 consumer non-durables along with 
motor vehicles contributed 52.8 per cent. In 1936/7–1946/7 the share of consumer goods 
declined to 31.3 per cent while that of intermediate goods reached 46.9 per cent (Bell & Farrell, 
1997). Furthermore, they argue that during the period between 1946/7–1956/7, the percentage 
share of consumer goods fell to an estimated 26.2 per cent, while intermediaries and capital 
goods maintained 34.2 per cent and 24.7 per cent respectively. However, in the period between 
1956/7–1972, the shares of both intermediate and capital goods in manufacturing value-add 
continued to grow an average rate of over 7.1 per cent (Bell & Farrell, 1997, p. 597).  This 
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estimation showed that the percentage share of intermediate and capital goods continued to 
grow strongly after 1945. Contrary to the MEC thesis, Bell and Farrell conclude that “there is 
no historical evidence to support the contention that the MEC as a system of accumulation 
prevented diversification of the manufacturing industry and thus retarded industrialisation” 
(Bell & Farrell, 1997, p. 591). 
While the different data sources collected by Bell and Farrell (1997) seemingly challenge the 
MEC thesis, at the heart of the criticism is the assumption that South Africa followed an inward 
looking industrialisation path since it adopted protectionist measure to support the domestic 
industry. The argument postulated by Bell and Farrell (1997) ignores the fact that South Africa 
imported machinery and technology used in the cited sectors. It is erroneous therefore to 
conclude that industrialisation occurred as a result of the economy failing to produce a capital 
goods sector that could contribute to the means of production in the economy. Rather, Freund 
(2009) maintains that the economy focusses on raw material export while industrial output is 
founded wholly on imported goods. Nonetheless, the MEC, as Fine and Rustomjee (1996, p. 
5) see it, has “evolved depending [on] the balance and structure of the economic and political 
forces” at play. In other words, the process through which the MEC has evolved is highly 
dependent on the balance of power between political and economic interests. In this respect, 
Sub-section 2.2.1 details the evolution of the MEC as a system of accumulation.  
2.2.1. The MEC as a system of accumulation 
A number of scholars have drawn on the principal findings that the MEC is a system of 
accumulation particular to South Africa. For example, Ashman, Fine, and Newman (2012b) 
recognise that industry during the 1920s centred on English speaking (foreign) mining capital 
and conglomerates such as AAC and De Beers. Writing prior to the development of the MEC 
thesis O’Meara (1978) saw the economy as an appendage to the British economy since foreign 
interests dominated and controlled the sector, effectively restricting the participation of 
Afrikaners in mining activity (O’Meara, 1978, p. 173). A key feature of capital relations in this 
period as identified by Marais (1998) was the growing hostility towards the dominance of 
English conglomerates on the part of Afrikaner capital, which dominated agriculture and the 
manufacturing industry. Not only were the capital fractions economically distinct, but both 
adopted different views on the role of the state and the functioning of the economic system. 
 
As with most localised industries, Afrikaner capital produced intermediary products for the 
mining industry at a rate higher than imported foreign goods. Thus, Davies et al. (1976) locate 
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Afrikaner capital interests in restricting foreign competition and maintaining local markets for 
their goods. Mining capital interests on the other hand lay in minimising the prices of these 
commodities, preferring polices that encouraged competition. Similarly, Marais (1998, p. 10) 
notes that due to liberal policy prescriptions, foreign mining capital preferred free trade policies 
while localised Afrikaner capital required state assistance financed, ironically, through surplus 
generated from mining capital. Despite the rather different needs of mining and Afrikaner 
capital, the literature reports that both fractions benefited from state intervention in the market 
economy. Such interventions occurred in various forms including price controls, taxation, 
limiting the supply of commodities, and most significantly, labour market regulation (Jourdan 
et al., 2012, pp. 41). 
 
With respect to the latter, policy instruments wielded to advance capital accumulation rested 
on procuring cheap African labour, resulting in what Harvey (2003; 2005) termed accumulation 
by dispossession. Drawing on the Marxist concept of primitive accumulation, Harvey (2003) 
asserts that capital accumulation is always accompanied by two exploitative processes, namely 
the dispossession of the people from their land and the suppression of indigenous forms of 
production. To a large extent then, accumulation by dispossession created the proletarianisation 
of the work force (Harvey, 2003; 2005). Taken further, his use of the concept suggests that a 
key factor in the accumulative process involves the state policy. Likewise, Wilson (2001) 
mentions that the state advanced capital accumulation by enacting pass laws at the insistence 
of the COM. As an emergent power-player, the Chamber yielded considerable policy influence 
to procure the supply of cheap black labour while supporting policies such as the Industrial 
Conciliation Act  No. 11 of 1924 and the Mine and Works Act No. 25 of 1926, which reserved 
skilled employment for the white labour force (Wilson, 2001). 
 
Davies et al. (1976) recount how policy instruments such as the Customs Tariff Act proposed 
tariff protection to contractors that employed a fair amount of ‘civilised’ white labour. These 
policies, in addition to migrant labour, contract labour, racial despotism, and single-sex hostels 
are seen by Bezuidenhout (2008) as the cornerstones of capital accumulation during this period 
in South Africa. The body of literature analysing the MEC identifies the inter-war and post-
war periods as the two phases that marked significant changes in capital relations and in the 
distribution of power between Afrikaner and English fractions in particular. Although these 
phases merged into one another, Trapido (1971, p. 314) attests that each accompanied the 
emergence of a new group of beneficiaries from the surplus accumulated from MEC activities 
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in the economy. Therefore, the evolution of the MEC in this period exhibited overlapping 
phases in what Fine and Rustomjee opine as “a history of the creation and empowerment of 
large-scale Afrikaner capital, its interpenetration with English capital and their combined 
collaboration with the state” (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996, p. 5). 
2.2.2.1. The inter-war and post-war accumulation strategy 
Ashman et al. (2012b) assert that the establishment of SOCs such as Eskom in 1923 and Iscor 
in 1928 provided a bridge between the two fractions of capital.  In stark contrast Jourdan et al. 
(2012) argue that the primary objectives of the SOCs aimed to promote local industrialisation 
and the interests of the Afrikaner capital. This argument is also made by Roberts and Rustomjee 
(2009) who argue that the state used SOCs to incentivise and subsidise Afrikaner interests. In 
this instance, the state continued “its practice of protecting companies that employed a large 
percentage of white labourers on condition they paid high (civilized) wages to their white 
employees” (Schneider 2000 in Jourdan et al., 2012, p. 52). To that end, Davies et al. (1976) 
conclude that state intervention through SOCs was seemingly opposed to mining capital. While 
unconvinced that the establishment of Iscor like other MEC activities generally impeded 
broader industrialisation, Bell and Farrell (1997) contend that Iscor was an economically 
justifiable investment for long-term industrialisation in the economy. 
 
According to the authors, Iscor “represented an example of successful sectorial industrial 
policy in accordance with South Africa’s comparative advantage”” (Bell & Farrell, 1997, p. 
605). Not only was steel a relatively cheap productive input, but Bell and Farrell propose that 
it represented an important input into the development of the manufacturing industry. 
Secondly, the authors took to task the assertion, as they saw it, that Iscor preserved Afrikaner 
interests to the detriment of the manufacturing sector. In their discussion, manufacturing sub-
sectors such as the motor vehicles sector, paper and paper products, and textiles grew at an 
average annual compound rate of 24.6, 18.8, and 13.1 per cent respectively during these inter-
war years (Bell & Farrell, 1997, p. 601). However, Fine and Rustomjee (1996, p. 64) maintain 
that the establishment of these SOCs “cannot be read of as a policy to create an indigenous 
Afrikaner capital.” 
 
Given the power held by English capital, the authors did not associate the development of the 
SOCs with exclusive promotion of Afrikaner interests, but rather as the integration of Afrikaner 
interests into the mineral economy (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996, p. 64). In other words, policies 
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represented neither political interests nor did they seek to advance economic interests of one 
group over the other. In many respects then, policies epitomised complex interactions between 
economic and political interests, each with varying levels of power and influence on policy. In 
a subsequent response, Fine and Rustomjee add that policies represented shifting power blocs 
and distribution of power over the inter-war period, which shifted toward the 1950s (Fine & 
Rustomjee, 1998a). The 1950s witnessed massive state support for Afrikaner economic 
empowerment. Jourdan et al. (2012, p. 38)  mention that the state used its political power to 
support the emergence of the Afrikaner working class and the presence of Afrikaner capital in 
the MEC activities, which were previously the domain of English capital.  
 
Drawing on Fine and Rustomjee (1996), Jourdan et al. (2012, p. 46) suggest Afrikaner capital 
first arose to prominence through preferential treatment by the nationalist state. Through fiscal 
and monetary policy measures, assert Jourdan et al. (2012, p. 46), the government shifted state 
bank accounts to Afrikaner financial institutions, namely Volkskas, Sanlam, and Rembrandt, 
while awarding profitable procurement contracts for coal supply to Afrikaner-owned mines 
during the construction of new power stations in the 1950s. Such targeted actions are seen by 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996, p. 153) as well as by Jourdan et al. (2012) to have strengthened 
Afrikaner capital by challenging the dominance of British commercial banks such as Standard 
and Barclays Banks. Conversely, Ashman et al. (2012) recount that the 1949 establishment of 
the National Finance Corporation (NFC) realigned the balance of power between Afrikaner 
and English fractions.  
 
In their discussion, the NFC was set up by the state to facilitate local investment of treasury 
bills and mining debentures deposits (Ashman et al., 2012). Consequently, AAC was able to 
access local investment, which decreased its dependence on private capital from Britain. For 
Ashman et al. (2012, p. 6) the NFC significantly deepened the interdependency between the 
state and English capital, and eroded the disjuncture between English and Afrikaner capital. 
Although the interdependency of the fractions deepened in view Ashman et al. (2012), Jourdan 
et al. (2012) note that in certain areas of the mining industry the English fraction still continued 
to dominate. In the gold mining industry, attest Jourdan et al. (2012, p. 38), state power forced 
AAC to facilitate entry of Afrikaner capital, leading to Fedvolks (a subsidiary of Sanlam) 
acquiring GMC (a subsidiary of AAC) in 1962. 
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Nonetheless, both Ashman et al. (2012) and Jourdan et al. (2012) agree that the period of the 
1960s saw the emergent Afrikaner fraction penetrating core MEC sectors and the strengthening 
of several financial institutions. In both analyses, it is duly noted that financial institutions from 
both Afrikaner and English fractions engaged in cross-cutting activities that extended MEC 
control over the commanding heights of the economy (Ashman et al., 2012; Jourdan et al., 
2012). As a result of state patronage, Afrikaner “capitalists were propelled into the upper 
reaches of the economy and integrated into the steadily evolving web of conglomerates that 
dominated the economy” (Marais, 1998 p. 21). Thus, the 1970s marked a significant period in 
that the fractions of capital now merged into a unified power bloc focussed on capital 
accumulation centred on meeting international and domestic resource market needs (Fine & 
Rustomjee, 1996; Ashman et al., 2012; Jourdan et al., 2012). 
 
The construction of Sasol II and III plants, the expansion of Eskom, as well other 
manufacturing industries within the MEC core, consolidated collaboration between the MEC 
activities and state-led expansion in promoting industrialisation (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996, p. 
159). However, global events such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the sharp rise 
in oil and energy prices, and the imposition of select sanctions against apartheid intensified the 
reliance on the core MEC activities (Fine, 2008). At the same time, Terreblanche (2002) argues 
that the apartheid regime experienced a legitimacy crisis and the MEC a serious accumulation 
crisis due to disinvestments, capital controls, and social unrest. These events had the twin effect 
of hampering industrialisation and frustrating attempts to invest in international markets. 
Effectively, these events confined the accumulative strategy within South Africa (Fine & 
Rustomjee, 1996). With the dawning political transition, the MEC played an active political 
role in facilitating negotiations with the ANC to abandon its socialist doctrines and policies 
(Terreblanche, 2012).  
 
Since the mining industry entailed a racially structured system of mineral property and 
ownerships rights, its transformation was a key policy priority for the banned ANC (Capps, 
2012). The ANC 1955 Freedom Charter argued that: 
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored 
to the people; 
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be 
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; 
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All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people; 
All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and 
to enter all trades, crafts and professions. 
 
As a result of assumed socialist orientations, the MEC engaged in capital-intensive projects 
that were dependent on export markets to keep their assets out of reach of the post-apartheid 
state (Ashman et al., 2012). Following this, the MEC succeeded to convince the governing 
New National Party to accept policies of privatisation, which led to the privatisation of strategic 
SOCs such as Iscor and Sasol (Legassick, 2006; Terreblanche, 2012,). Subsequently, state 
investment programmes in the economy halted due to what Terreblanche (2012, pp. 59-63) 
refers to as “the dogma of neoliberal globalism.” In what follows, section 2.2.2.2. examines the 
evolution of the MEC after the 1994 poltical transition. For scholars like Marais (1998), this 
period realigned the MEC into a new domiant hegemonic project. Despite the political change, 
scholars analysing the MEC maintain that there is a continuing concentration on the core MEC 
sectors and economic activities,  a point that reflects the concept of path dependency as 
conceptualised by Roberts and Rustomjee (2009). 
2.2.2.2. The post-apartheid accumulation strategy 
While the MEC has survived over the post-apartheid period, it experienced significant changes 
partly driven by the democratisation, economic restructuring, globalisation, and 
financialisation of the economy (Ashman et al., 2012). Jourdan et al. (2012) highlight 
similarities between the evolution of the MEC pre-1994 and post-apartheid periods. In terms 
of similarities, economic empowerment, as observed by the authors, has been a policy priority 
for both governments. These authors argue that ANC government has used policy instruments 
including state financing, mineral rights and preferential procurement and Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) to support the participation of black capitalists in the mining industry 
(Jourdan et al., 2012, p. 37). Briefly, BEE set out to increase black ownership in companies 
and create a new black middle-class in South Africa. Such objectives aimed to ensure that black 
Africans could access finance capital, management training, and skills upgrading. 
 
While notable progress was made in leveraging access for domestic black capital into the MEC 
sectors, Jourdan et al. (2012) reason that the objectives of achieving greater black ownership 
were prioritised at the expense of broader national industrialisation. Evidence in support of this 
proposition lies in the MPRDA Amendment Act No. 49 of 2008 (Jourdan et al., 2012, p. 38). 
45 
 
Correctly acknowledging that beneficiation is not a formal objective of the MPRDA, the 
authors go on to suggest that the 2008 Amended MPRDA relegates the state to “a passive 
librarian-like role”, limiting the ability of the state to actively compel the MEC to achieve 
beneficiation policy objectives (Jourdan et al., 2012, p. 171). In making this statement, Jourdan 
et al. (2012) seem to agree with Leon (2011), that equity targeting set forth in the MPRDA has 
hindered broad based industrialisation. Leon (2011) associates BEE to comprador capitalism, 
crony capitalism, and opportunism: all of which hinder the promotion of BEE as the parties 
that benefit from such arrangements are connected to the ruling elite.  
 
The second similarity highlighted by Fine and Rustomjee (1996), Fine (2008), and Ashman 
and Fine (2012), entails the continuing MEC influence on ANC policy. According to these 
scholars, the egalitarian principles of the 1955 Freedom Charter and the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme of 1994 (RDP) set out to restructure the economy through 
nationalisation and active state participation in the mineral sector. Furthermore, Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996), argue that the RDP largely described as a socialist policy, was abandoned 
by the ANC as it adopted the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy. Capps 
(2012b) attributes this to the interventions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank together with the MEC, all of whom dictated that “there could be no alternative to 
the market in the new dispensation and that any project of social change would, therefore, have 
to work with its grain” (Capps, 2012 b, p. 319). Generally speaking, this process – called 
liberalisation – accompanied a redefinition of the relations between the state and the market, 
“even involving the withdrawal of the functions of the state as they had previously existed” 
(Campbell, 2003, p. 3). 
 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996, p.3) suggest that the GEAR policy “safeguarded” the interests of 
the MEC by protecting their assets from the newly elected ANC regime. For Ashman and Fine 
(2012), ANC protection enabled the conglomerates to move their primary listings to the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). This, according to the authors, accompanied unprecedented 
levels of capital flight as major corporations such as Anglo American, De Beers, Old Mutual, 
South African Breweries, Liberty, SASOL, and Billiton sold their less productive assets to the 
emerging black bourgeoisie (Ashman & Fine, 2012). Elsewhere, Fine reasons that the listings 
were not only the result of capital fear of losing economic control in South Africa, but were 
accompanied by internationalisation of their operations (Fine, 2008). Overall, Ashman and 
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Fine (2012) argue that the post-apartheid accumulative strategy has been dominated by the 
three Fs: capital flight, finance, and foreign ownership. 
Notably, the stark difference between pre-1994 policy-making and that of post 1994 is the 
participation of the previously unrepresented stakeholders and interest groups into the process 
of policymaking in South Africa, as observed by Lewis et al. (2004). For the authors, the 
participation of these new stakeholders reinforces substantial changes in the “mode of 
governance, mode of policy formulation and implementation” (Lewis et al., 2004, p. 156). In 
particular, the noteworthy interests are organised labour movements such as Cosatu, the 
National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), and the Federation of Unions of South Africa 
(FEDUSA), the Confederation of South African Workers Union (CONSAWU). Sectorally, 
these unions have also participated extensively in a number of important sectorial forums such 
as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and Mining Industry 
Growth Development and Employment Task Team (MIGDETT). 
NEDLAC, as documented by Lewis et al. (2004, p. 157), represents an important policymaking 
institution where policy stakeholders such as organised labour, the government, and business 
engage in the process of policy-making. In reviewing the character of policy in South Africa 
since 1994 and the influence of organised labour in the process, Lewis et al. (2004) maintain 
that organised labour is “largely responsible for initiating a participative mode of governance 
in NEDLAC” (Lewis et al., 2004, p. 157). What is more, MIGDETT is a multi-stakeholder task 
team chaired by the DMR including government departments from the Economic Sector and 
Employment Cluster9, Cosatu-affiliated union the NUM, FEDUSA affiliated United 
Association of South Africa (UASA) and Solidarity affiliated to CONSAWU. MIGDETT also 
includes organised business groups COM, and the South African Mining Development 
Association (SAMDA), an organisation representing small black mining interests in the mining 
industry. In view of Lewis et al. (2004), democratisation brought black business interest groups 
to the policy table, further transforming policy processes in the country. 
The above discussion on the MEC outlines the history of mineral-related policy-making in 
South Africa and interests underpinning policy development. Firstly, economic policy 
represented the interests of the powerful stakeholders, who supported the export of raw 
materials. As a result of these interests, the local economy is characterised by limited 
                                                             
9 Departments in areas of economic policy are grouped together or ‘clustered’ at the level of ministers and director-general. It 
consists of departments from Economic Development, Higher Education and Training, Mineral Resources, Labour, Public 
Enterprises, Science and Technology as well as Trade and Industry to name a few. 
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diversification of exports, a dwindling manufacturing sector and limited beneficiation (Roberts 
& Rustomjee, 2009; Freund, 2009). Roberts and Rustomjee (2009) conclude by stating that the 
poor performance of non-MEC sectors is the direct result of the MEC market power and its 
lack of interest in beneficiation and local industrialisation. Arguably, such interests have stakes 
in the current beneficiation policy, many of which will impact on the implementation of the 
policy. Section 2.3 surveys the literature on the beneficiation of minerals in South Africa. 
2.2.Literature survey on the beneficiation policy 
Within the literature, it is taken as a given that the beneficiation policy is little more than a 
pipe-dream and politicians are all talk and lack the capacity and political will to implement the 
beneficiation policy (Rees, 2011). Section 2.2.2.2 argues that a major obstacle to the 
implementation of the beneficiation policy was the MEC’s lack of interest in local 
industrialisation and beneficiation. Key to the analysis is the notion that MEC interests centres 
on resource extraction and exportation to international markets. Discussions on beneficiation 
argue that a number of other cross-cutting constraints affect the viability of implementing the 
policy. These constraints range from physical and social infrastructural constraints, to the skills 
shortage, input pricing, domestic and market constraints. For a better understanding of 
beneficiation sections 2.31, section 2.3.2 and section 2.3.3 each outline the constraints as they 
exist in the current body of knowledge.  
2.2.1. Physical constraints to the implementation of the beneficiation policy 
Representing the international advisor grouping set up to advise the Presidency of South Africa, 
the Harvard Group, Haussmann, Klinger, and Lawrence (2008) dismiss the policy on the 
assumption that it is based on anecdotes rather than systematic analysis. Dobreva and Schoer 
(2007) add that it is incorrectly framed in simplistic value chain analysis that fails to recognise 
the manner in which interventionist policies tend to generate market imperfections. Elsewhere, 
Haussmann, in collaboration with Rodrik and Sabel (2007, p. 17), admonish the narrow focus 
on the mining value chain, contending such views are legacies of archaic views of industrial 
policy. In arguing that beneficiation “is not a sensible policy”, these views propose that benefit 
from mining can be exploited in different avenues beyond downstream manufacturing. 
Furthermore, a major point of contention for the group relates to the proposition that targeting 
labour intensive downstream industries lead to employment creation (Haussmann et al., 2007; 
Haussmann et al., 2008). 
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Such a view rests on the widely recognised skills crisis plaguing South Africa. The skills 
involved in cutting and polishing diamonds in the jewellery industry, as Haussmann et al. 
(2008) point out, are quite different from those involved in mining diamond ore. In the same 
way, Rossouw and Baxter (1998) argue that an experienced miner cannot be trained overnight 
to become a metalworker. The study conducted by Lundall et al. (2008, p. 36) confirmed that 
the shortage of skilled artisans like millwrights, draughtsmen experienced in computer-aided 
design and metallurgical and chemical engineers affect the viability of the industry. Arguably, 
the skills crisis reinforces the insignificance of beneficiation given that the education system 
fails to supply the demanded workers, as observed by Rossouw and Baxter (2011). Similarly, 
it calls for the urgent need to address the misalignment between the education system and the 
skills demanded by the labour market.  To a large extent, the labour market requires highly 
skilled labour due to capital deepening and technological advancement (Yu, 2013). 
In discussions on beneficiation, another controversial issue is that the policy lacks an integrated 
approach that considers the true competitiveness of the downstream beneficiation sectors and 
the availability of infrastructure (Rossouw & Baxter, 2011). Of central concern here is the 
inadequacy of the rail and port infrastructure and its incapacity to freight beneficiated goods. 
The infrastructure related challenges are compounded further by the costs of transporting 
beneficiated goods. Since transportation costs are lower for exporting raw-ores than 
beneficiated ferroalloys, it stands to reason as does Burgess (2010) that the provision of 
physical infrastructure favours raw material exports at the expense of local beneficiation. 
Morris et al. (2012, p. 10) associate this with enclave infrastructural development, since 
“infrastructural services such as roads, ports, power, and water facilities were developed to 
facilitate the extraction of commodities, their transport to the coast and their shipping to final 
markets abroad”.  
As a result of this, Roberts and Rustomjee (2009) concluded that closer alignment between 
infrastructure and the development objectives is crucial. A further challenge discussed in the 
literature on beneficiation is the provision of electricity (Morris, 2011). Analysts have 
identified that stages 2 and 3 of the beneficiation value chain are very energy-intensive (Lundall 
et al., 2008). Secondly, these firms receive electricity supply directly from municipalities 
whose pricing structures are higher than those charged by Eskom (Lundall et al., 2008). For 
example, a study conducted by Eskom found that average prices charged to consumers were 
between 40 and 110 per cent higher than prices Eskom charges to direct customers (Eskom, 
2012, p. 91). Against this background, the National Development Plan (NDP) maintains that 
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beneficiation is not a panacea for job creation since high energy and capital costs render 
beneficiation unprofitable (National Planning Commission, 2011). 
2.2.2. Market constraints 
The analysis put forth by Jourdan (2010) is extremely useful because it sheds light on the 
difficulties experienced in accessing international markets for beneficiated commodities. The 
author shows the manner in which trade practices adopted by the European Union (EU) limit 
market access for higher value added exports from developing countries. As maintained, these 
practises include steel subsidies to European producers amounting to an estimated $80 billion 
in tariff barrier for products where value is added (Jourdan, 2010). Furthermore the analysis 
states that, anti-dumping laws, standards covering health, environment and labour are applied 
to prevent market access for these goods. In the main, Jourdan (2010) points out that the EU 
imposes low tariff barriers for ores and alloys in comparison to semi-finished and beneficiated 
goods. Such practises lead the author to the conclusion that EU trade practices inhibit industrial 
development in developing countries by imposing higher tariff barriers for beneficiated goods 
in an effort to encourage the export of ores and alloys (Jourdan, 2010).  
Related to international market access is the fact that South African manufactures have limited 
access to raw material inputs for local beneficiation. This, according to Turok (2013, p. 9) 
arises firstly as a result current structure of the mining industry, which is internationalised in 
nature. The consequence in view of Turok (2013) is that the industry remains interested in the 
export of raw materials as mining companies are bound in long-term supply contracts with 
international beneficiators. While Kraemer and Tulder (2009) reason the long term supply 
contracts grant overseas clients exclusivity rights and access over resources, the authors 
maintain that these international beneficiators maintain their strategic position in the control 
national resource reserves. Another aspect that impedes the growth of the downstream 
beneficiation industry is the wide-spread use of Import Parity Pricing (IPP). Defined as a 
pricing practise adopted by firms which sell their products to local producers at the same level 
as import price of that product   (Competition News, 2001), IPP forces local purchasers to pay 
a premium for key commodities produced in South Africa instead of an ‘across the fence’ local 
competitive price or export parity price (Jourdan, 2010). 
In other words, IPP adversely affects the affordability of resources as local purchasers are 
obligated to match the ‘landed price’ of assumed costs such as freight, insurance, harbour 
charges, import duty and surcharges. Since inputs become too expensive, the implication is that 
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pricing at par with imported prices is not strictly cost-related (Competition News, 2001). The 
reasons for IPP are manifold. However, the lack of competition in the domestic market is 
arguably a significant factor in this process. Essentially, this implies that in the absence of 
competitors dominant firms exert unilateral market power in setting prices. This pricing 
mechanism is practised by the dominant steel producer Arcelor Mittal SA (AMSA). While 
Jourdan has observed that South Africa has a relatively small market that cannot sustain more 
steel producers, Roberts and Rustomjee argue that there is now considerable evidence that the 
key impediment to beneficiation is the uneven power relationships between the oligopolistic 
upstream industry which practices IPP and the downstream domestic industry that cannot exert 
countervailing power (Roberts and Rustomjee, 2009, p 65).  
2.2.3.  Institutional constraints 
Other scholars have located beneficiation in the context of institutional alignment. Here, 
emphasis is placed on the institutional arrangements and how the misalignment between state 
institutions constrains the growth and structural transformation objectives of the country. 
Where Kaplan (2007) proposes that “institutionally there is no clear centre in government”, 
Morris et al. (2011b) add that the country lacks strategically directed and appropriately aligned 
institutional arrangements necessary for transforming the economy into an engine for growth. 
Similarly, Jourdan et al. (2012, p.222), report that the lack of co-ordination and strategy 
alignment between the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which is responsible for 
industrial and economic development, and the DMR, is the main reason for the lack of progress 
in realising beneficiation and job creation. In response to this disarticulation, the authors 
propose an Economics Super Ministry as an option to facilitate industrial development in the 
economy. 
While the call for a super-ministry is an attractive response to the problem of disarticulation 
between existing institutional arrangements, its establishment is not without political 
consequence. For instance, the Southern Africa Report cautions against bureaucratic turf wars 
between competing ideologies of big business, labour and government over policy control, 
since each stakeholder may see it as directly related to its interests (Southern Africa Report, 
2012).  Related to the bureaucratic turf wars, is the cost and complexity of setting up new 
institutions to manage policy. Cosatu (2012) claims the super-ministry is likely to be a 
“bureaucratic nightmare” with multiple layers of authority. As such the federation proposes a 
State Owned Mining Company (SOMCO) whose executive leadership would comprise of 
representatives from different government departments (Cosatu, 2012). What is clear from 
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these views is that the current institutional framework is inadequate in many respects and the 
DMR cannot provide an enabling environment for the implementation of the policy.  
The discussion on the beneficiation policy provides an overview of the on-going debates 
around the policy and its implementation dynamics. As a policy framework aiming to create a 
favourable environment for production-led growth and local processing the natural resources 
in South Africa, the beneficiation policy is a key component in the industrialisation strategy of 
the South African economy. Beyond this the literature survey reveals that the policy is marred 
by constraints such the provision of infrastructure and skills shortages, domestic and 
international market constraints and institutional shortcomings. While analysts and scholars 
alike argue that addressing these challenges is critical for the implementation of the policy, the 
literature on the beneficiation policy fails to account for the perceptions of the key stakeholders 
in possession of the resources required for the implementation of the policy. As a result, it is 
important to examine the stakeholders with a view of understanding their instrumentality in the 
implementation of the policy. 
2.3.Conclusion 
There exists consensus among scholars that the MEC has and continues to play an important 
role in determining policy direction and content through various linkage effects and power 
relations, especially in relation to beneficiation policy in South Africa. The observations made 
from the literature review shows that the historical process behind mineral policy development 
involved an intimate relationship between the state and stakeholder groups in the MEC. Such 
observations highlight the extent to which policy-making is path dependent because sectorial 
interests governing policy-making pre-1994 still continue to dominate policy-making in the 
mineral resource sector today. As we have seen, the MEC actors controlled critical resources 
and also influenced the adoption of policies centred on mineral resource extraction and 
exportation. In the main, scholars argue that due to sectorial interests underpinning the resource 
sector, South Africa is plagued by a dwindling manufacturing sector and jobless growth and a 
reserve army of unemployed youth. A key area of concern is to examine the evolution of the 
MEC as it exists in 2014 and identify the influential stakeholders that are likely to exercise 
higher levels of influence and power in the implementation dynamics of the beneficiation 
policy. The next chapter details the theoretical framework guiding the analysis of the MEC as 
it exists today. 
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Theoretical framework 
3.1. Introduction 
Up to this point it has been argued that the MEC exists as a product of complex network 
interactions of the state and domestic corporate capital in the economy, with global links clearly 
also present. In order to analyse the MEC in South Africa, this thesis employs the policy 
network approach as the guiding theoretical framework. This chapter details the key theoretical 
concepts of the policy network theory. It begins with an overview of the two typologies within 
policy network theory, the governance perspective and the interest intermediation perspective. 
The rationale is to provide a background of the policy network theory and also unpack the 
analytical units of each perspective. Section 3.3 details the interest intermediation perspective 
along with the analysis of the distribution of power in policy networks.  
3.2. The policy network theory 
As a starting point the policy network theory rejects the assumption that policy occurs 
‘automatically’ from the state (Brynard, 2007), in a top down fashion modelled in principal 
agent terms (Rodrik, 2008).  Instead, policy-making according to the policy network theory is 
the result of actors wound together in a complex web of resource dependency relationships. 
That is to say, policy networks indicate interactions between interdependent actors who 
strategically cooperate and exchange resources (Coleman & Perl, 1999; Thatcher, 1998; 
Mintrom & Vergari, 1998). Added to that, policy networks denote a specific ‘division of 
labour’ which fosters a collaborative and partnership approach to policy-making in 
contemporary democracies (Howlett & Ramesh, 1998; Pappi & Henning, 1998).  
For scholars in the public policy field, it is commonly agreed that policy networks illustrate 
expressions of collective action (Carlsson, 2000) which weave public, private and civil society 
actors in a complex web of relationships and interactions (Blair, 2000).  Policy networks 
represent a “sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other 
actors structured around shared and negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy-making 
(Rhodes, 2006, p. 426). Additionally, policy networks have the following three characteristics. 
Chapter 
3 
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Firstly, policy networks consist of actors such as government departments, business 
organisations and civil society groupings that regularly participate in a given policy domain. 
In this context, policy networks include what Booysen (2001) refers to as ‘participant 
stakeholders’ with a declared or conceivable interest or stake in a policy concern.  
Secondly some form of resource exchange occurs between the actors. This form of exchange, 
depending on the needs, interests and resources of the actors involved, links actors in resource 
dependency relationships (Jordan & Schubert, 1992, p. 33). Thirdly and related to the above, 
mutual dependencies emerge between participants who share resources in order to achieve their 
goals and preferred policy outcomes (Bevir & Richards, 2009). This perspective is in line with 
the notion that “mutual resource dependency links actors both horizontally and vertically in 
networks” (Sandstrom & Carlsson, 2008, p. 505). Not only are actors linked by resource 
exchanges, but actors engage in policy networks because they benefit from these relationships. 
Accepting this, Van Waarden (1990, p. 31) states that “administrators need political support, 
legitimacy, and assistance in the implementation of policy; while interest groups desire access 
to policy-making structures that favour their interests”.  
Van Waarden (1990) also emphasises that actors interact in policy networks in an attempt to 
reduce transaction costs. Gaining access to and influence over decision-makers is a time-
consuming exercise; thus in his view, building permanent relationships with government 
agencies reduces transaction costs for interest groups (Van Waarden, 1990). A rationale for 
government participation in policy networks is found in the fact that interest groups have 
knowledge and expertise on target populations (Van Waarden, 1990, p. 31). These two 
resources give stakeholders influence over policy processes since (Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 286): 
They possess the technical expertise within their sector and have systematized information 
and knowledge of the environment in which policy is to be implemented. Thus, members of 
policy communities can pool policy relevant resources behind a certain policy position. 
Politicians who are keen to avoid unintended policy consequences and implementation 
failure often, but not always, accommodate the interests of policy community members.  
 
In this way policy networks represent instrumental tools actors use to engage and exchange 
resources for mutual benefit (Van Waarden, 1990). The interdependency between the 
government and private interests does not imply the government is equally dependent on other 
stakeholders as they are to the government. Rather as Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) reason, the 
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government occupies a unique position in policy networks, one which is characterised by the 
resources at its disposal. Among the resources highlighted by the authors is “sizeable budget 
and personnel and monopoly on the use of force along with democratic legitimacy” (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000, p. 151). By implication then, the government engages with non-state 
stakeholders for instrumental purposes to gain information and support for the common interest 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). 
Against this background, Börzel (1998) argues there are a ‘Babylonian’ variety of policy 
network conceptions which differ according to the unit of analysis. In some instances, the term 
is used as a research method to analyse the relations between actors that are mapped as graphs 
(Pappi & Henning, 1998). Here, researchers analyse actor embeddedness in networks and 
analyse how actor locations impose constraints or opportunities as a result of their locations in 
the network structure (Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). For example, Kenis and Schneider (1991) 
propose that as a methodological tool network analysis enables a researcher to identify the 
‘complex policy games’ such as “the relations and patterns of strategic actions between a set 
of actors” (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, p. 44). In other contexts, the term is used as a theory to 
illustrate the complexity of the modern day policy environment (Miller & Demir, 2007).  It 
may be used to analyse the different phases in policy-making and the participant stakeholders 
involved in each phase since formulation and implementation stakeholders differ from each 
other (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, p. 24). 
Börzel (1998) identifies two different theoretical schools of thought on policy networks. On 
the one hand the interest intermediation school interprets policy networks as a generic term 
describing the relationships between the state and interest groups (Börzel, 1998). On the other 
hand, the governance school views policy networks as a new form of governance (Marsh & 
Smith, 2000). For Börzel (1998), the interest intermediation discusses power relations within 
networks, viewing policy networks as a concept that applies to all kinds of relations between 
the public and private actors (Börzel, 1998, p. 255). Governance, in her view focusses on the 
context, in which policymakers are embedded. Elsewhere, Börzel (2011) illustrates that those 
who view policy networks as a new form of governance focus on the structures and processes 
through which joint policy-making is organised.  
Much of the thinking behind the governance conception reasons that societies governed 
through networks are more inclusive. As elements of governance, networks enhance 
democratic participation by bringing together the expertise of actors who provide valuable 
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information about the target populations of programmes (Peters, 2000). According to Börzel 
(1997, p. 5) this view is often postulated by German public policy scholars like Kenis and 
Schneider (1991) along with König & Bräuninger (1998). These authors conceive policy 
networks a new mode of governance replacing market and hierarchical coordination. In 
particular, Kenis and Schneider describe policy networks described along the following 
dimensions (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, pp. 41-42): 
 
…By actors, their linkages and by its boundary. It includes a relatively stable set of mainly 
public and private corporate actors. The linkages between the actors serve as 
communication channels and for the exchange of information, expertise, trust and other 
policy resources. The boundary of a given policy network is not primarily determined by 
formal institutions but results from a process of mutual recognition dependent on 
functional relevance and structural embeddedness. 
 
In this body of literature, policy networks are political mechanisms that governments use to 
organise society (König & Bräuninger, 1998; Kenis & Schneider, 1991). In effect, policy 
networks represent vehicles for mobilising policy resources among a number of interest groups 
beyond the traditional hierarchical control of the government (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, 41). 
The main thrust of the governance paradigm argues that policy-making is the direct result of 
the blurring of boundaries between public and private actors (Kenis & Schneider, 1991). In 
many respects then, the governance paradigm draws on the ‘hollowing out of the state thesis 
to theorise that the autonomy of the state weakens due to the increasingly blurred distinction 
between the state and society” (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012, p. 197).  The applicability of the 
governance perspective is limited by the fact that the distribution of power is rarely used in the 
analysis of policy networks.  
Klijn and Skelcher (2008, p. 602) attribute this to the underlying assumption of the governance 
perspective that “cooperation, mutuality and consensus exist between actors in the policy 
network”.  In other words, the governance perspective assumes that policy network are 
hierarchy free, and that equality and equity exists in policy networks (Klijn & Skelcher, 2008). 
However, as Chapter 2 indicates, influence in policy is more accommodating to the interests 
of actors who control critical material and non-material resources. This chapter pays particular 
attention to the interest intermediation approach which views policy networks as power 
dependency relations between the government and interest groups (Börzel, 1998). The interest 
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intermediation paradigm takes as a given that power imbalances and asymmetric relationships 
exist as structural characteristics of policy networks. In the main, the distribution of power 
remains a central tenet of the interest intermediation paradigm.  
It explores the dominant type of interactions and resource exchanges in policy networks and 
whether a one or a few dominant actors dominate in the process (Kriesi, Adam & Jochum, 
2006). Where power is concentrated in such a manner, Kriesi et al. (2006) argue that the 
paradigm explores which configuration of actor interests form the core of the network and those 
that belong to the periphery. Effectively, the conclusions drawn from the interest 
intermediation paradigm attribute policy outcomes to the interests of those forming the 
powerful core of the network (Smith, 1990; Rhodes 1997). For Börzel (1998), the theoretical 
constructs within the interest intermediation school draw on Rhodes (1997) to analyse policy 
networks as power dependency relationships. In what follows, Section 3.3 of this chapter first 
examines the American literature before moving on to consider the British literature. It then 
analyses the key analytical constructs drawn from the British literature, used to analyse the 
interactions between and within the MEC policy network of stakeholders in the beneficiation 
policy. 
3.3. Policy networks as interest intermediation 
Within this body of literature, there are typologies that define policy networks as a meso‐level 
concept, focusing on the power relationships between organisations, and others which employ 
the term on the micro-level focusing on relationships between individual actors within a 
network (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). The American theory discusses policy networks on the 
micro-level, focusing on personal relationships between key actors. The British theory, on the 
other hand conceives policy networks as meso-level constructs, analysing relational 
interactions between institutions (Börzel, 1997; 1998; 2011). Section 3.3.1 and section 3.3.2, 
respectively, discuss the theoretical findings of the American and British theoretical 
perspectives on policy networks. 
3.3.1.  The American theoretical perspectives on policy networks 
The American contributions to the debates on policymaking note that policy processes in the 
United States (US) arises in policy subsystems with various actors actively concerned with 
policies in domains such as air pollution control and mental health. A notable contribution in 
that regard was Freeman who defines a subsystem “as the pattern of interactions of participants, 
or actors involved in making decisions in a special area of public policy with special interest 
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groups immediately attached” (Freeman, 1965, p. 5). Accordingly, Jordan (1990, 321) adds 
that policy occurs in informal “whirlpools or centres of activity” in which those with an interest 
in a topic participate. Furthermore, policy occurs in sub-governments consisting of (Ripley & 
Franklin 1984 in Jordan, 1990, p. 321): 
 
“Clusters of individuals that effectively make the most routine decisions in a given substantive area of 
policy… A typical sub government is composed of members of the House and/or Senate, members of 
Congressional staffs, a few bureaucrats and representatives of private groups and organisations 
interested in the policy area”. 
 
In an extension of this argument, scholars argue that policymaking occurs in policy subsystems 
commonly referred to as iron triangles which consist of members from the administrative 
agency, congressional subcommittee and an interest group (Kavanagh, 2006). While this view 
holds that policy is developed within a tightly knit relationship between the three actors, the 
iron triangle concept claims that a small set of policy actors dominate the policy domain and 
that the relationships between these actors are impermeable. Implicit in the conception is the 
premise that the three actors pursue their private interests at the expense of the general public 
(Rhodes, 1997).  It is noteworthy then to liken the analogy of iron triangles to that of 
corporatism, as do Jordan and Schubert (1992), in that all three participants have compatible 
goals and their activities are mutually supportive. Like iron triangles, corporatism envisions a 
tripartite partnership between a restricted number of privileged actors with the bureaucracy in 
policy-making (Jordan & Schubert, 1992).  
 
Having said that, Heclo (1978, p. 88) challenges this assumption, arguing that it is “not so much 
wrong as it is disastrously incomplete”. Heclo introduces the concept of issue networks to 
illustrate that policies emerge from a large number of participants with diverse interests.  As 
opposed to the impermeability of iron triangles, issue networks as Heclo points out includes a 
wide range of actors, such as legislators, businessmen, lobbyists, academics and journalists. 
Interaction, in this interpretation fluctuates and relies more on consultation rather than 
negotiation or bargaining (Heclo, 1978). Sabatier (1988) also argues that the iron triangle 
notion is restrictive and proposes that a larger number of actors are active in policy processes. 
For this reason, Howlett and Ramesh (1998) argue that a policy emerges from a broader ‘policy 
subsystem’ which includes all actors who play an important role in the policy process. Weible 
and Sabatier (2005, p. 181) define policy subsystems by: 
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geographic scope, a substantive issue, and a population of hundreds of active stakeholders from all 
levels of government, multiple interest groups, the media and research institutions. 
 
Within the policy subsystem literature, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) proposes 
that actors group themselves into advocacy coalitions “composed of people from various 
organisations who share a set of normative and casual beliefs and who often act in concert” 
(Sabatier, 1988, p. 133). Elsewhere Sabatier ( 1998, p. 103) defines an advocacy coalition as 
the set of actors in a policy subsystem from a wide variety of institutions who (a) share policy 
core beliefs10 and (b) who coordinate their actions [interests] with the aim of translating those 
beliefs into public policy. Weible and Sabatier (2005) build on this model to argue that in 
contentious policy domains, a policy subsystem usually comprises two or more advocacy 
coalitions “whose composition will remain stable over time because of the pressures for in-
group loyalty and out-group distrust” (2005, p. 183). This point is based on a study conducted 
earlier by Sabatier (1988) who examined policy-making in the air pollution policy sub-system 
in the U.S.  
Sabatier (1988) revealed two distinct advocacy coalitions; ‘the Clean Air Coalition’ and the 
‘Economic Feasibility Coalition’. Accordingly, environmental public health groups, labour 
unions and researchers dominated the ‘Clean Air Coalition group. Their belief systems stressed 
the following (Sabatier, 1988, p. 140): 
 The primacy of human health over economic development and efficiency; 
 The perception that air pollution was a serious health problem; and 
 Deep distrust of the motives of corporate officials. 
 
The competing ‘Economic Feasibility Coalition’ was dominated by; industrialists and energy 
companies along with their allies in Congress and a few economists. The belief system of this 
group stressed (Sabatier, 1988, p. 141): 
                                                             
10 Belief systems are categorized on a three tiered system at one end is a category of Deep Core beliefs which define the 
ideological orientations and value systems of the actors. At the next level policy core beliefs include strategies and policy 
positions for achieving Deep Core beliefs in the policy area/ subsystem in question. Following this, a set of Secondary Aspects 
comprising of instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to implement the Policy Core in the specific policy 
area (Sabatier, 1998, p. 103).  
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 The need to balance human health against economic development; 
 Questioned the seriousness of the health problem; and 
 Believed that social welfare generally required deference to market arrangements. 
 
The above study challenges the assumption that actors form coalitions with actors possessing 
similar interests or organisational affiliations. Rather the ACF framework argues that common 
belief systems enable network participants to pool resources to strengthen their bargaining 
position and advance their policy objectives. As such, policy core beliefs are the fundamental 
‘glue’ of coalitions since these structure network interactions (Sabatier, 1998, p. 103). In effect, 
the ACF framework advocates that advocacy coalitions compete to ensure their own policy 
objectives are translated into a government policy (Weible & Sabatier, 2005, p. 181). When 
the coalitions gain sufficient power to ‘own some turf’ (Thurber, 1996) they wield significant 
influence to capture the state and advance their own policy objectives at the expense of the 
weaker and peripheral actors. 
Having said that, a key feature of the US political system is its federal structure which renders 
policy processes far more open to a multitude of actors and interest groups (Marquard, 2006). 
Policy-making in the US reinforces for Atkinson and Coleman (1992) elements of pluralism in 
that a multitude of actors participate in the decision-making process. As the theorists observe, 
the participation of a multitude of actors tends to increase competition between the actors over 
whose interests translate into a government policy. Atkinson and Coleman further note that due 
to the competing interests the authority of the state fragments, amounting to a ‘disjointed 
incrementalism’ style of policy-making (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992, p. 163).What is more, 
the iron-triangle and the ACF were developed primarily from the US experience of 
policymaking and offer little explanatory power for policy network analysis in countries with 
different governance systems and policy-making institutions (Rhodes, 1997; Sabatier, 1998).  
Unlike the United States, the political system in South Africa pre-1994 and post-apartheid 
dispensations is largely modelled after the Westminster system of the United Kingdom. 
Drawing on the aforementioned description that the South African economy exists as an 
appendage of the British economy (O’Meara 1978), the political system of South Africa is also 
modelled after the British Westminster system. Thus, parliamentary sovereignty, strong 
cabinet, accountability through elections, majority party rule, the separation of powers and 
institutionalised opposition political parties characterise the Westminster governance system 
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(Rhodes, 1997). Another feature of the US policy-making is its association with pluralism 
which entails fragmentation and a diversity of interest groups. In contrast the UK represents 
corporatist realities since access to policy networks is limited and in most cases labour, business 
and the state participate in policy processes (Casey, 1998, p. 16).  
Similarly, economic policy-making in contemporary South Africa is often tight-knit, 
depending on the issues involved, politicisation of the issue and good standing between alliance 
members ANC, Cosatu and the South African Communist Party (SACP).  That is not to ignore 
the American contributions to policy network analysis in general. Apart from its analysis of 
coalitions, it addresses the extent to which policy core beliefs unify interest groups into 
strategic partnerships that vie to influence and control critical resources (Weible & Sabatier, 
2005). Notwithstanding, the US literature emphasises micro-level relations, failing to explicitly 
explain how the relationships between these actors impact on the distribution of resources and 
power in policy networks. Based on the research objectives of the current thesis, the British 
literature addresses this gap by analysing the meso-level of policy networks. The next section 
discusses the British literature and illustrates key points that will be used in analysing the MEC 
in South Africa, the focus of this thesis.  
3.3.2.  The British theoretical perspectives on policy networks 
The emergent scholarship within the British literature is largely attributed to the seminal study 
of Heclo and Wildavsky who analyse decision-making within the British Treasury. They 
illustrate that policy is made within a community where (Heclo & Wildavsky , 1974, p. xv): 
Community refers to personal relationships between major political and administrative actors, often in 
conflict, often in agreement, but always in touch and operating within a shared framework. Community 
is the cohesive and orienting bond underlying any particular issue 
 
Rhodes elaborates on this model by distinguishing between five types of networks that differ 
according to interests represented, membership, vertical and horizontal interdependence and 
the distribution of resources (Rhodes, 1997). He finds that the policy community is a network 
that is relatively closed, with restricted membership and vertical interdependence. Following 
Heclo (1978), Rhodes (1997) details that issue networks have a large number of participants 
and interaction amongst participants is based on consultation rather than negotiation or 
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bargaining11. Similarly, Smith (1993, 62) juxtaposes the term ‘policy community’ against 
‘issue networks’ as a description of loose relationships characterised by a large number of 
participants and low barriers to entry. Bevir and Richards (2009, p. 4) associate issue networks 
with unstable policy outcomes fluctuating interaction along with the absence of consensus on 
policy objectives.  
 
Within policy communities in contrast, policy-making is far more centralised among limited 
participants (Kavanagh, 2006). Also, policy communities are characterised by consensus on 
policy principles, suggesting for Bressers, O’Toole and Richardson (2002) that policy 
communities exhibit less conflict among participant stakeholders. Arguably, this is because 
policy communities tend to produce stable policy outcomes as members internalise norms and 
values of the network (Jordan & Schubert, 1992; Daugbjerg, 1998). This degree of 
institutionalisation differentiates issue networks and policy communities, as Jordan and 
Schubert (1992) propose. Policy communities in this framework represent institutions that 
shape attitudes, behaviour and structure the opportunities for actors (Jordan & Schubert, 1992). 
For Van Waarden (1990), the type of actors involved in policy communities shed light on the 
needs and interests of actors engaged in the policy process. Likewise, Rhodes argues that 
“policy communities are either dominated by government interests or economic interests or 
they serve the interests of all members of the community provided they develop common 
interests” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 39).  
 
The literature surveyed in chapter two of the thesis illustrated that the key interests of the MEC 
as a system of accumulation lay in resource extraction. Initially the MEC arose to preserve the 
economic interests of the English capital in the mineral, energy and financial sectors of the 
South African economy. Over time, the MEC evolved to incorporate both Afrikaner and 
African stakeholders in the process of mineral policy development and implementation. 
Following Van Waarden (1990), Rhodes (1997) and the surveyed literature, one can associate 
the MEC as a policy community characterised by common policy interests in the mineral sector 
of the South African economy. 
                                                             
11 The other three types of networks are said to differ according to the dominant interests (Rhodes, 1997, p. 39). 
As the name implies professionalised networks are characterised by the prominence of professionals who express 
the interests of a particular profession. Intergovernmental networks represent organisations from local 
governments and exclude public sector unions. Producer networks on the other hand are distinguished by the 
dominate role of economic interests.  
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While the type of actors sheds light on the policy community, structure is another important 
variable for Van Waarden (1990), as it indicates the size of the network, its boundaries, and 
the linkages between the members. Taking this into account, Sandstrom and Carlsson (2008, 
p. 499) add that the structure reflects stakeholder embeddedness within network connections 
as well as the relational linkages amongst participant stakeholders. In this perspective, the 
structure of a network is an important determinant in the distribution of resources and power 
in policy networks (Van Waarden, 1990; Sandstrom & Carlsson 2008). In an attempt to 
describe the distribution of power in policy communities, Rhodes (1997, p. 37) argues that the 
actors in policy networks employ strategies within known rules of the game, and engage in 
exchange relations with each other. Since neither possesses all resources needed to achieve 
their goals, a network of mutually dependent actors emerges in the process (Rhodes, 1997). 
Drawing on prisoners’ dilemma, Rhodes (1997) adds that relations in policy networks are 
‘game-like’ because actors aim to control key resources in order to maximize influence over 
policy outcomes. Furthermore, Rhodes (1997, p. 37) postulates that the ability to influence the 
decision-making process is largely the result of the resources of such actors. Highly valued 
resources, be they financial, information, labour power, facilities or legislative authority 
provide the resourceful actors with power to “coordinate collective actions toward the 
achievement of their preferred policy objectives” (Knoke, Pappi, Broadbent & Tsuinaka, 1996, 
p. 18). The greater the resources, the more indispensable the actor is to the policy network 
games and by implication the actors acquire an influential position in the network (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000, p. 141). At the heart of the British scholarship is the notion that the structure 
of the policy network reflects the differing capacities of actors to gain access to resources 
needed for participating in and influencing policy decisions (Knoke  et al., 1996).  
According to Knoke  et al. (1996, p. 18) “access to resources and their exchange confers 
unequal positional advantages, which can be represented as the actor locations either near the 
centres or on the peripheries of the network”. Under this framework, there is a clear distinction 
between the core of the network and peripheral actors. In other words, peripheral actors 
represent structurally marginal actors who are less connected to resources, less influential, and 
more isolated than central actors in policy networks (McDaniel & Miskel, 2002). To quote 
Rhodes and Marsh, asymmetrical power relationships and actor positions “foster competition 
and conflict among the participants to increase their access to network power and influence 
over policy outcomes” (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992, p. 186). Well-connected actors gain important 
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advantages through their access to flows of resources, while peripheral actors cannot tap 
sufficient quantities of quality resources to participate effectively to collective actions. Thus 
policy actors who control scarce resources which are unavailable form alternative sources have 
the ability to influence policy outcomes and policy processes (Knoke  et al., 1996; McDaniel 
& Miskel, 2002). 
Despite its theoretical observations underpinning the interest intermediation school, it is the 
subject of major criticisms. In an extensive critique, Dowding (1995) argues that the concepts 
provide explanations on the properties of policy networks but fail to produce fundamental 
theories of the policy process. He demonstrates that due to their inability to distinguish between 
independent and dependent variables, the typologies of the interest intermediation school lack 
clear conceptualisation of the causal and relational variables. In his words, the driving force of 
explanation, the independent variables, are not networking characteristics per se but rather the 
characteristics of the components within the networks. In general he advocates that network 
analysts concentrate on network characteristics rather than focussing on actor attributes 
(Dowding, 1995, p. 137). Extending the analogy on the metaphorical use of policy networks, 
Thatcher (1998) claims the explanatory claims are too vague and poorly-defined. 
Thatcher (1998) claims there has been terminological disagreement within the interest 
intermediation school; some authors have used the same terms to describe different phenomena 
or different terms to describe the same phenomenon. As a result, this has created definitional 
complexity. Another criticism the author levels against the interest intermediation school 
alleges that many of the factors cited to explain why policy networks arise – such as the 
fragmentation of government and the interdependence of government and interest groups and 
increased specialisations in policy-making – are very general. Finally, the genesis of policy in 
terms of ideas and agendas is not analysed. It is also unclear whether policy network typologies 
seek to explain both policy processes and outcome or merely processes (Thatcher, 1998). 
Notwithstanding the above reservations, the perspective adopted in this thesis finds the 
typologies within the interest intermediation school as the most suitable analytical framework 
in its analysis of the MEC as a policy network of participant stakeholders in the beneficiation 
policy.  
 
Framed in this manner, the MEC can be analysed using policy network theory based on the 
following observations; firstly theorists assert that policy networks are “in large part the sum 
of past policy decisions and the outcomes are likely to privilege certain policy options” (Marsh 
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& Smith, 2000, p. 6). As scholars cited in the literature survey, Fine and Rustomjee (1996) 
argued that the historical process through which the MEC evolved over time, involves an 
intimate relationship between the state and domestic corporate capital. Both stakeholders 
interact through various linkage effects to support the interests centred on mineral resource 
extraction and exportation. Taking account of the linkages and the interactions between the 
MEC stakeholders, Ashman et al. (2012) conclude that the MEC led to policies that prohibited 
the adoption of policies targeting diversification of the economy beyond mineral resource 
extraction. 
 
Secondly, the interest intermediation perspective of the policy network theory argues that in 
contentious policy domains a limited number of groups enjoy privileged access to policy- 
making (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; Marsh & Smith, 2000; Daugbjerg, 1998). Like the United 
Kingdom consultation in ‘high politics’ domains is limited in South Africa. In these cases, the 
policy-making process is closed, with only a small group of influential people consulted 
(Rhodes, 2006). In the literature review Lewis et al. (2004) alluded that stakeholders from 
business organisations, organised labour and government departments in the Employment 
cluster participate in various economic policy-making forums such as NEDLAC and 
MIGDETT. These stakeholders engage in the policy-making process due to their sectoral 
expertise, resources and knowledge within the economy and the mineral sector. In addition, 
these stakeholders participate in policy networks to influence the outcome of the policy and 
protect their interests in the process (Lewis et al., 2004). 
 
Within the interest intermediation perspective it is generally acknowledged that the 
stakeholders whose interests shape the outcome of the policy process are usually in a position 
of influence in the policy network. Furthermore, these theorists assert that the ability to 
influence the policy process depends on the resources of the actors (Rhodes, 1997; McDaniel 
& Miskel, 2002; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). The literature survey showed that business 
interests continue to influence ANC economic policy (Roberts & Rustomjee, 2009, Ashman et 
al., 2012). Considering MEC interests own 80 per cent of JSE capitalisation, their share of the 
economy is a resource that gives them influence on policies that affect their economic interests, 
as Agupusi (2011) observes. Based on this, one can apply the policy network theory to argue 
that the MEC has veto power due to the resources at its disposal, which in turn reinforces the 
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analogy that such actors are indispensable in policy networks (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, p. 
141). 
The exchange of resources is an important theoretical construct in the interest intermediation 
perspective as theorists reason that stakeholders depend on the resources of others to achieve 
policy goals (Rhodes, 1997). In the South African context, the government depends on business 
tax to support its expenditure and public finance, while the corporate sector depends on the 
government to provide a stable policy environment for capital accumulation (Seekings & 
Nattrass, 2011, p. 340). Additionally, the ANC government depends on organised labour 
movements such as Cosatu based on their ability to mobilise for political and socio-economic 
goals (Khunoa, 2013, p. 176) and in turn Cosatu depends on its alliance with the ANC to 
influence the policy direction in the economy (Buhlungu & Tshoaedi, 2013, p. 16). While 
scholars such as Calland (2006) as well as Buhlungu and Tshoaedi (2013) regard Cosatu as an 
important and influential actor in the broader socio-economic and political landscape, Habib 
and Taylor (2013) attest to the waning influence of the federation over government policy. 
Evidence in support of this proposition is provided by the fact that the GEAR policy was 
adopted without any consultation with Cosatu (Habib & Taylor, 2013). As a result, the adoption 
of GEAR provoked discontent within the alliance as Cosatu expressed hostility towards GEAR 
through a serious of wildcat strikes and public criticism against the ANC (Seekings & Nattrass, 
2011; Habib & Taylor, 2013). This raises a number of questions:  is organised labour part of 
the MEC policy community; if so what explains their radical perceptions and differences? After 
all the literature maintains that members within policy communities have consensus with the 
ideology and that within policy communities there is a shared world view, a common culture 
(Marsh & Smith, 2000). Rhodes (2006, p. 427) adds that within a policy community: 
Over the years, such interests become institutionalised. They are consulted before documents are sent 
out for consultation. They don’t lobby. They have lunch. These routine, standardised, patterns of 
interaction between government and insider interests become policy networks 
 
Does this imply that business organisations are closer to the core of the policy network than 
organised labour movements? More questions are raised again, who then are the influential and 
resource dependent actors within the MEC network? To answer these questions and unpack 
the how policy network concerning the beneficiation policy is constituted, this thesis employs 
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network analytic techniques to unpack and detail the relationships of the MEC as a policy 
network of stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter detailed the theoretical framework guiding the analysis of the MEC as a policy 
network of participant stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. The chapter detailed the key 
constructs of the policy network theory, differentiating between policy networks as new 
governance and policy networks as interest intermediation. In particular, the thesis adopted the 
interest intermediation perspective and within that the key perspective derived from the British 
scholarship theorising on policy-making process and the distribution of power. Given, the 
literature survey suggested that the MEC has evolved over time based on the political and 
economic forces at play (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996); this thesis seeks to use the policy network 
approach to argue that the MEC as it exists in democratic South Africa has evolved into a 
policy network of participant stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. In particular, the thesis 
draws on the theory to unpack and detail networking amongst the participant stakeholders with 
a view to learn how the network concerning the beneficiation policy is structured and operates 
in terms of the resource exchanges concerning the beneficiation policy. In order to achieve 
these objectives, this thesis employs Social Network Analysis as a methodology. 
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Research Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
The following chapter details the research methodology used to explore the research questions 
posed in Section 1.5 of the thesis. The methodology used to carry out this thesis is generated 
from Social Network Analysis (SNA), a research methodology used for analysing the 
interactions and relationships between actors in a given network (Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). 
Section 4.2 outlines the research objectives with specific reference to the purpose statement in 
section 1.4 of the thesis and the rationale of conducting the research as outlined in Section 
1.4.1. Section 4.3 sets out to justify the rationale of employing SNA to achieve the research 
objectives. In Section 4.4 the research design is discussed, detailing the sampling frame and 
target population of the study. Since the research was conducted in two sequential phases, 
Section 4.5 details the implementation of the research design in two separate sub-sections. 
Following this, validity and ethical considerations are discussed prior to the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
4.2. Research objectives 
As Section 1.4 outlined, the purpose of this exploratory sequential thesis is to analyse the MEC 
as a network of policy stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. Through network analytic 
techniques, this question seeks to explore the powerful and influential actors in the policy 
network and how these actors relate to the interrelations and resource exchanges in the network. 
Furthermore, the rationale is to probe actors’ interests and positions regarding the beneficiation 
policy. Against this background, the research objectives of the thesis are to analyse:  
 the structure of the MEC policy network and the locations of the stakeholders;  
 the roles actors facilitate in resource exchanges as a result of organisational affiliations; 
 identify the  policy perceptions of the central stakeholders; and 
 uncover their level of interest and influence of the central stakeholders in the 
implementation of the beneficiation policy. 
Chapter 
4 
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4.3. Justification of the research methodology  
To answer the research questions posed in Section 1.4 and achieve the stated research 
objectives, this thesis employs network analytic techniques. The thesis combines qualitative 
and quantitative research methodologies to investigate the structure of the MEC as a policy 
network of stakeholders as well as the central stakeholder perceptions on the beneficiation 
policy. In line with the theoretical arguments posed in chapter three, network analysis offers a 
specific methodology for investigating networks dynamics (see Section 3.2). In particular, the 
methodological concepts and principles derived from SNA inform the analysis of networks, 
the actors, and the resource exchanges between the actors. Actors in SNA are classified as 
nodes or vertex, while the relationships between them are classified as ties, linkages, or edges. 
Secondly, the linkages between actors are the main unit of analysis (Wasserman & Fraust, 
1994). Additionally, the linkages (relational ties) between actors are channels for transfer or 
resource flows.  
 
Researchers employ quantitatively driven methods to measure the presence or absence of ties. 
Network analysts use these ties to analyse actor positions and power within the network in 
order to determine the actors that control key resources in the network (Brandes, Kenis & 
Wagner, 1999). Data is collected using quantitative methods, which enable researchers to 
measure structural network properties of nodes within the network (Edwards, 2010). 
Furthermore, the structural measures provide indications on resources flow through networks 
and also aid in examining the roles actors play as a result of their location in a network 
(Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). On the other hand, Scott (1991) maintains that SNA consists of 
a body of qualitative methods that generates data on the interactional processes, actor 
perceptions on relationships and network dynamics. In other words, the qualitative aspect of 
network analysis is appropriate in addressing the process, content and dynamics of networks, 
through analysing the perceptions of network participants (Jack, 2005).  
 
Since qualitative research involves a “methodically controlled understanding of meaning actors 
attach to their reality” (Hollstein, 2011, p. 405), then qualitative network analysis develops 
more representative data from the “bundles of relations” that connect individuals to others 
(Schepis, 2011). According to Edwards (2010), qualitative network researchers have employed 
a number of strategies in an attempt to generate and analyse network relational data. The 
methods highlighted by Edwards (2010) include in-depth interviews, name generator tools, 
observation techniques, archival data, and ethnography. While quantitative and qualitative 
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methods have dominated network analysis, a number of researchers have combined both 
research methods in the analysis of networks. For these researchers, SNA presents a specific 
opportunity to combine quantitative and qualitative methods in order to map and measure 
network properties, explore issues relating to the dynamics of network ties as well as exploring 
the meaning the ties have for network participants (Edwards, 2010, p. 5).  
 
For example, Prell, Hubacek and Reed (2009) conducted interviews with respondents to gather 
data indicating the relational ties amongst stakeholders involved in natural resource 
management. In the second phase, Prell et al. (2009) transformed the resulting data into 
numerical data through UCINET, a computer programme for network analysis (Borgatti, 
Everett & Freeman, 2002). The software aids in the statistical analysis of exploring structural 
measures of the network. Coviello (2005) conducted a study on the structural charactersitics of 
the personal network of  FLUX Glassworks International.  The data collection involved the use 
of inductive in-depth interviews, asking respondents a set of open-ended questions to describe 
relational ties between the actors as well as the period in which each tie was formed (Coviello, 
2005). Following the interviews, Coviello (2005) transformed the qualitative data into 
quantitative measures also using UCINET, simultaneously generating strucutural measures that 
analyse centrality (Coviello, 2005).  
 
The methodology employed by Prell et al. (2009) and Coviello (2005) is known as a sequential 
mixed design. Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (2006, p. 53) describe a sequential mixed design as 
“the data collected and analysed from one phase of the research informs the other phases of the 
research”. Furthermore, the research methodology employed by the scholars follow the 
convention of a bifocal approach where mixing methods occurs at the time of data analysis 
(Coviello, 2005).  Within this context, Coviello (2005) recommends collecting qualitative data 
in the first phase of the research project as this enalbes the researcher to transform the responses 
into numberical data using UCINET, during stage two. In pursuit of the research obejctives, 
the bifocal approach to network analysis remains the most appropriate methodology for the 
analysis of the MEC as a policy network. The methodology embraces the use of both qualitative 
and quantitative means to investigating the structure of the network, the roles the actors 
facilitate, the perceptions, levels of influence and interest in the implmentation of the 
beneficiation policy. Section 4.4 details the research design and draws on the citied authors in 
its rationale of employing SNA as a method in analysing the power and influence of 
stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. 
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4.4. Research design 
Creswell (2003, p. 215) defines a sequential exploratory research design as “the collection and 
analysis of qualitative data followed by the collection and analysis of quantitative data.” The 
research design of a sequential exploratory thesis involves a series of decisions concerning data 
collection and analysis of the data.  Creswell (2003) presents these decision-making variables 
as “priority, implementation and integration.” In a mixed methodology study, implementation 
of the research design occurs in sequential or concurrent phases when data is collected 
(Creswell, 2003, p. 211). Thus, qualitative data was collected prior to quantitative data for this 
cross-sectional thesis. Priority indicates the importance of the quantitative or the qualitative 
approach in a single study. The priority might be equal, or either qualitative or quantitative data 
dominate a research methodology. Similarly, “priority indicates whether quantitative or 
qualitative information is emphasized first in the study as well as the extent of treatment of one 
type of data or the other” (Creswell, 2003, p. 212). 
 
Priority in this study is given to the qualitative data, while quantitative results assist in 
measuring and interpreting the findings of the study. According to Creswell (2003, p. 212), 
data integration involves combining both qualitative and quantitative methodologies at the data 
collection or data analysis stage in the research design. Since the ‘bifocal’ approach to network 
analysis involves mixing methods in network research at the level of data analysis (Edwards, 
2010), the thesis integrated quantitative and qualitative methods during the analysis stages. In 
particular, qualitative data was converted into quantitative data and subsequently analysed. For 
Edwards (2010), qualitative data provides contextual details that aid in the interpretation of the 
configuration of the network. Figure 5 presents a graphic illustration of the sequential 
exploratory design 
 
Figure 5: The stages of the sequential exploratory research design 
Qualitative 
Data Collection 
Quantitative 
and Qualitative  
Data Analysis  
 
Quantitative 
Data Collection 
Qualitative 
and Quantitative  
Data Analysis 
Interpretation of 
entire analysis 
Source:  Adapted from Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003). 
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4.4.1. Sampling frame and target population 
In instances when network boundaries are unclear and policy network actors unknown, 
researchers employ snowball sampling strategies to gather network data (Lahat, 2011). 
Snowball sampling is a strategy of identifying actors through the subjective recommendations 
made by research participants of other people who belong to the group under study (Lahat, 
2011). In network analysis, ‘snowball sampling’ occurs through two types of questions: name 
generators and name interpreter items. Name generators identify other actors in order to 
delineate network boundaries whereas name interpreters obtain information on the 
relationships amongst network participants (Marsden, 2005, pp. 11-17). 
4.5. Research implementation and generation of data 
Within SNA, researchers either study ego-networks or complete networks. Ego network 
analysis focusses on an individual actor named the ‘ego’ and the relationship the ego maintains 
with other the alters (actors who have ties with the ego (Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). The 
analysis of complete networks collects relational data on the whole network that includes 
participant stakeholders and ties between actors (Everton, 2012, p. 398). Therefore, the thesis 
collected data on the complete network. The questionnaires used in both phases one and two 
of the data collection were designed and constructed after analysing the works of scholars such 
as Prell et al. (2009), Wasserman and Fraust (1994) and Schmeer (1999). In line with the 
research objectives outlined in section 4.2, data collection occurred in two distinct phases, 
discussed in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. 
4.5.1. Phase one – qualitative data collection 
In this phase of the data collection, the researcher administered a telephonic questionnaire 
(Appendix B) constructed to answer the research objectives in section 4.2. Phase one data 
collection sought to explore the roles actors facilitate in resource exchanges as a result of their 
structural location in the MEC policy network. The objective was to identify the stakeholders 
with high levels of influence in the resource exchanges of the MEC policy network. The 
interviews in this phase of the implementation of the research design began on 26 April 2013, 
ending 19 June 2013. Interviews ranged between 10 minutes to 30 minutes (see Appendix C 
for the list of dates of the interviews). The snowball method of sampling in this thesis began 
with the focal actor, the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), since the ministry is the 
custodian of the beneficiation policy. On April 26, 2013, the researcher contacted the DMR 
telephonically and administered the name generator questionnaire, asking the DMR to name 
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all local and international actors, groups, and organisations who participated in the 
development of the beneficiation policy. 
 
While it is recognised that policy processes are complex and messy activities (Pasteur, 2001), 
this thesis draws on Dunn (1994, p. 15) in analysing policy processes as a series of 
interdependent and sequential phases, which represent on-going, related and linked activities 
that occur through time. Furthermore, the theoretical framework of the thesis, discussed in 
Chapter 3, established that policy processes and policy outcomes are the result of networks of 
policy stakeholders wound in complex resource exchanges in public policy (Mintrom & 
Vergari, 1998; Skogstad, 2005). Adopting the policy network theory as an analytical 
framework that captures the processes of policy-making between actors, the name generator 
sought to establish which stakeholders participated in the following phases of the policy 
process: 
 Agenda setting 
Before a policy is developed, a problem or an issue must exist to facilitate necessary 
government intervention. Thus agenda setting involves “problem structuring” (Dunn, 1994, p. 
17). 
 Policy formulation  
Policy formulation often includes forecasting and the examination of various policy scenarios 
as well as the consequences of the existing and proposed polices (Dunn, 1994, p. 18). 
 Policy adoption 
Legislative authorities pass legislation that adopts the policy as an official government policy 
and an administrative authority is assigned responsibility for implementation (Dunn, 1994, p. 
18). 
 Policy implementation 
Once the policy decision has been adopted, the policy carried out by institutions which mobilise 
financial and human resources to implement the policy (Dunn, 1994, p. 19).   
Rather than presenting the DMR with a list of names, the name generator enabled the DMR to 
recall the first names that came to mind. The ‘free recall’ approach encourages respondents to 
generate a list of actors as they recall or come to mind, adopting the ‘free choice approach’ 
(Prell, 2012; Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). After listing the alters, the name interpreter sought 
to ascertain information on the resource exchanges amongst the policy network stakeholders. 
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The questionnaire asked participants to indicate the relational ties and exchanges of 
information and material resources between their organisations. Information included meeting 
dates, invitations to seminars and workshops, networking events and documentation on the 
policy. In terms of material resources, respondents were asked to indicate the exchanges of 
material resources such as sponsorship, financial assistance, budgetary allowance, grants and 
aid.  
The name interpreter recorded this information on the presence or absence of ties as well as the 
flow of information and financial resources. The researcher then approached the ‘new’ 
members and administered the telephonic questionnaire until no new stakeholders were 
enumerated. The data from the telephonic responses generated a list of 19 stakeholders in the 
beneficiation policy listed below:  
Government departments and related institutions  
 Department of Mineral Resources  (DMR) 
 Department of Trade and Industry  (DTI) 
 Department of Science and Technology  (DST) 
 Economic Development Department  (EDD) 
 Department of Higher Education and Training  (DHET) 
 Department of Public Enterprises  (DPE) 
 National Planning Commission  (NPC) 
 Department of the National Treasury  (DNT) 
Public institutions  
 Mining Technology  (MINTEK) 
 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
 The Industrial Development Corporation  (IDC) 
Governing Party  
  African National Congress   (ANC) 
Organised business associations  
  Chamber of Mines  (COM) 
  South African Mining Development Association  (SAMDA) 
 Manufacturing Circle  (MANU-CIRCLE) 
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Organised labour associations   
  National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa  (NUMSA) 
 National Union of Mineworkers  (NUM) 
 Solidarity  
 United Association of South Africa  (UASA) 
 
Once the participant stakeholders were identified and the relational ties between them 
disclosed, the next step in phase one, discussed in section 4.5.1.1 required the data to be 
prepared for subsequent analysis 
4.5.1.1.  Phase one – data preparation 
The data gathered during phase one was prepared in a Microsoft Excel spread sheet by 
constructing a matrix representing the data. In network analysis, researchers often utilise the 
adjacency matrix to represent the presence or absence of ties (Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). 
Each entry in a matrix is called a cell. The number of rows and columns indicates the number 
of actors and the elements represent the ties between them. The sender of the directed tie is the 
row and the receiver is the column (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). To illustrate data preparation 
in network analysis, the example presented has been extracted from Hanneman and Riddle 
(2005) in their tutorial on SNA. The two researchers (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005) are 
interested in analysing the relationship between four actors A, B, C, and D of a network. Each 
member is asked whom they regard as a close ally within the network. Data collected from the 
responses reveals the following;  
 
- A chose B and C, but not D;  
- B chose only C;  
- C chose A and B and D; and 
-  D chose only C.   
 
The collated data is then entered into Microsoft Excel to represent the presence of a relationship 
from sender to receiver. Since actor A is the sender of a tie to actor B and C a ‘1’ is entered in 
the cell; if a tie is absent – as in B does not choose A –  ‘0’ is entered to indicate the nature of 
the relationship (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Relationships between the four hypothetical 
actors can be represented in the following Excel matrix: 
 
75 
 
Table 2: A methodological presentation of an adjacency matrix in Microsoft Excel 
 A  B C D 
A - 1 1 0 
B 0 - 1 0 
C 1 1 - 1 
D 0 0 1 - 
 
            Source: Hanneman and Riddle (2005). 
 
The patterns of relationships in Table 2 are binary graphs that indicate the absence or presence 
of a tie. Furthermore, the ties between A and B are an asymmetric relationship since element 
AB does not necessarily equal element BA. However, the ties between A and C are bonded ties 
representing a symmetric relation, since the element AC equals element CA (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). Following the guidelines of Hanneman and Riddle (2005), the relational data on 
the MEC prepared in Microsoft Excel was exported to UCINET (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 
2002) and subsequently analysed to map actor positions and measure structural dynamics of 
the MEC as a policy network of stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. Section 4.5.2 details 
the SNA concepts used to analyse the MEC as a policy network of participant stakeholders in 
the beneficiation policy. 
4.5.2. Phase one – data analysis 
The analysis of the data on the MEC as a policy network of stakeholders follows two 
approaches: centrality measures and sub-structure analysis. Centrality is used in the analysis to 
evaluate the distribution of power in the network whereas substructure analysis describes actor 
embeddedness within the network (Chan & Liebowitz, 2006). Section 4.5.2.1 outlines 
centrality concepts that inform the analysis of the data, followed by section 4.5.2.2, which is a 
discussion on the techniques used for substructure analysis. 
4.5.2.1. Centrality measures in network analysis 
Within network analysis there are three measures that quantify the most important actors in a 
network. These measures of centrality are commonly cited as degree centrality, betweenness 
centrality and closeness centrality. While the three types differ in how they define centrality, 
they systematically provide measures of how power is distributed in a network.  
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4.5.2.1.1. Degree centrality 
This approach refers to well-connected actors that are highly visible and recognized by the 
other network participants (Brandes, Kenis, & Wagner, 1999). These actors are then regarded 
as major channels of information and “crucial cogs” in the network since they maintain direct 
contacts to other actors in the network (Wasserman & Fraust, 1994). In essence, degree 
centrality holds the premise that the more ties actors maintain, the more power and influence it 
gains. Consider the example in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: An illustration of a star in a network 
 
Source:  Hanneman and Riddle (2005) 
 
Figure 6 indicates that actor A is well connected since it possesses more relational ties than the 
other actors. Therefore actor A is “well connected and has access to many alternative sources 
of information, material and ideational resources” (Rowley, 1997, p. 899).  Based on the 
relational ties actor A has, it is said to have relative autonomy as it is less dependent on others 
for resources (Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2010). If actor B fails to provide resources to 
actor A, actor C or D represent alternative sources for resource exchange. The degree centrality 
of a node as computed by Wasserman and Fraust (1994, p. 179) is symbolised as d(ni), where 
d symbolises degree and n the number of nodes in a given network. The actor-level degree 
centrality index is defined as ܥ݀(݊݅) where ܥ݀ represents centrality degree. Furthermore, degree 
centrality depends on group size symbolised as g – 1. Based on the above degree centrality can 
be symbolised (Wasserman & Fraust, 1994, p. 179) as: 
ܥ݀(݊݅) = ݀(݊݅)݃ − 1 
What is more, degree centrality of a node differs when the ties in network are directed or the 
ties are undirected. In an undirected network, the element AB equals BA. Simply put, if A is 
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connected B, it is taken as a given that B is connected to A  (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
However, if the network is directed, that is if the ties in the network have direction (Wang & 
Li, 2009, p. 2289) degree centrality is distinguished as either in-degree or out-degree. If an 
actor receives many ties, this actor is said to be prominent, or to have high prestige. That is, 
many other actors seek to direct ties to the actor. Thus in-degree measures indicate the 
importance or centrality of the nodes. Actors who display high out-degree centrality are often 
said to be influential actors since these actors can influence the attitudes of members and 
exchanges between them (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
The out-degree centrality of a node as computed by Wang and Li (2009, p. 2289): 
ܥ݀݋(݊݅) ෍ ݆ܺ݅݊
݃−1  
The in-degree centrality of a node is calculated as (Wang & Li, 2009, p. 2289): 
ܥ݀݅(݊݅) ෍ ݆ܺ݅݊
݃−1  
Where ܥ݀݋  refers to out-degree while  ܥ݀݅ is in-degree, ݊ = the number of nodes in the network 
and ݆ܺ݅ refers to the sum of all ties from actor ݅	to actor ݆ (Wang & Li, 2009, p. 2289). The 
UCINET routine calculates degree centrality based on these measures and produces a table 
which contains a list of degree centrality in descending order.  
4.5.2.1.2. Betweenness centrality 
Betweenness centrality indicates which actor is an intermediary between other actors. In policy 
networks these actors are considered important because they control the interaction between 
other actors who must go through it to communicate and exchange resources with each other. 
Figure 6 illustrates that actor A is the only one with a direct link to actor B. In order for actor 
C to exchange resources with actor B, it can do so only through actor A. If actor C is connected 
to actor B only through actor A, then actor A controls all resource flows between them. Thus 
resource exchange between B and C is completely at the “whim” of A; “who can distort or 
falsify any exchange passing through the actor” (White & Borgatti, 1994, p. 336). The 
betweenness centrality algorithm as computed by Everton (2012, p. 223): 
ܥ஻ = ෍݅	෍݆	௚೔ೖೕ௚೔ೕ 		/[(݃ − 1)(݃ − 2)2 ] 
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Where ݆݃݅ indicates the number of geodesics from actor ݅  to actor ݆  and ݆݃݅݇ refers to the number 
of geodesic paths from actor ݅  to actor	݆ that pass through actor ݇ , in this instance betweenness 
measures actor݇ (Everton, 2012, p. 223). The UCINET routine calculates betweenness 
centrality based on this measure and produces a table which contains a list of betweenness 
centrality in descending order. Associated with betweenness centrality is the concept of a local 
bridge as developed by Granovetter (1973). A local bridge is an attribute of an actor who is a 
bridge between two or more actors (Granovetter, 1973). In Figure 7, n2 and n4 represent the 
local bridges between n1 and n5. 
Figure 7: An illustration of the local bridge in network analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  Source: Freeman (1978) 
 
 
As Freeman (1978) identifies, there exists two paths from n1 to n5; 
-  One through n2, n3 and n4; and 
- Another through n2 and n4. 
 
Effectively, n2, n3 and n4 represent gatekeepers since these actors facilitate the process of 
resource exchange between n1 and n5. The gatekeepers “allow, withhold, or distort incoming 
and outgoing resources” (Hafner-Burton, & Montgomery, 2010, p. 4). Actors that enable the 
flow of resources between actors who need to exchange resources facilitate brokerage positions 
in networks. Brokerage is defined as a relation “where one actor mediates the flow of resources 
between two other actors who are not directly linked” (Fernandez & Gould, 1994, p. 1458). 
Fernandez and Gould identify five different brokerage roles in policy networks as coordinator, 
itinerant broker or consultant, representative, gatekeeper, and liaison. These five different roles 
 
● n3 
 
 
● n2                                    ● n4 
 
 
 
 
● n1                                       ● n5 
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indicate that brokers facilitate different roles depending on the group to which they belong 
(Fernandez & Gould, 1994):  
 
- The Coordinator mediates resource flows between members of one group. In the 
illustration below, the shapes are used to illustrate that all three actors belong in the 
same group. Thus, actor B coordinates information amongst all group members 
(Fernandez & Gould, 1994, p. 1459).  
 
 
- The itinerant broker or consultant mediates between members of one group. Here, the 
itinerant broker is not a member of the group, hence the different shape. While the circle 
illustrates that actors A and C are members of the same group, the rectangle indicates 
an actor B mediates the flow of resources within members of another group (Fernandez 
& Gould, 1994, p. 1458).  
 
 
- The Representative, according to Fernandez and Gould (1994, p. 1458), facilitates the 
flow of resources from its respective group to members of another group. Thus the 
circle shows that actor A and B are members of the same group and actor B facilitates 
resource flows to actor C, a member of a different group, represented by the triangle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B C 
C 
A B C 
A B 
A 
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- Gatekeeper regulates the flow of resources to its respective groups. Thus, actor B and 
C are members of the same group and actor B facilitates resource flows from actor A 
(Fernandez & Gould, 1994, p. 1458). 
 
 
- The various shapes used in this illustration show that all three actors have different 
organisational affiliations. Thus, the Liaison broker mediates resource exchanges 
between two different groups; however it is not a member of either group. Thus, actor 
B mediates between actors A and C (Fernandez & Gould, 1994, p. 1458). 
 
 
The analysis of brokerage positions are implemented in UCINET to calculate the raw number 
of times that each stakeholder plays one of these five brokerage roles (Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005). Analysing brokerage positions describes the types of brokerage roles dominant in 
networks, while shedding insight on the specific roles the actors have assumed within the 
network structure (Fernandez & Gould, 1994; Borrás, 2007). The analysis of brokerage is 
limited to the roles of coordinator, gatekeeper and representative since these roles yield 
significant political power in policy networks. As Fernandez and Gould (1994) discuss, such 
brokers control the flow of information and determine who receives the information, when and 
how others receive information. Drawing on the framework developed by Fernandez and Gould 
(1994), the researcher grouped the MEC stakeholders according to their respective institutional 
and organisation types: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A C 
A 
C 
B 
B 
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 Group one: Government departments 
 Group two: Organised labour 
 Group three: Governing party 
 Group four: Public institutions 
 Group five: Organised business associations 
 
The output generated to analyse brokerage roles is presented in a table illustrating the raw 
number of times a nodes plays a brokerage role (Hanneman &Riddle). After analysing 
brokerage positions, the researcher sought to explore the sub-structure of the MEC as a policy 
network of stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. Section 4.5.2.2 outlines the concepts 
informing the analysis of sub-structures in network analysis.  
4.5.2.2. Sub-structure measures in network analysis  
The analysis of substructures evaluates network embeddedness (Chan & Liebowitz, 2006). 
Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt (2000) highlight relational embeddedness and structural 
embeddedness as two different ways in which actors are embedded in a given network. The 
relational aspect of actor embeddedness, as defined by the authors assesses the characteristics 
of the relational ties, while structural embeddedness examines the structural positions of actors 
within a network (Rowley et al., 2000, p. 369). Two approaches to analysing the substructure 
of the MEC as a policy network are the bottom-up and top-down approaches, each emphasising 
a different aspect of stakeholder embeddedness. The bottom up approach argues that the whole 
network structure emerges from the micro-structure or sub-components of the network, while 
the top down approach examines the macro network and then identifies sub-structures which 
form the broader macro network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
Furthermore, the bottom up approach analyses structural embeddedness of the nodes in a given 
network. In doing so, it examines the cliques within the network and actor embeddedness 
within those cliques (Chan & Liebowitz, 2006).  A clique reflects a sub-set of a network in 
which the actors have more ties to one another than to other members of the network 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Network analysts argue that the formal clique approach imposes 
two restrictions in the analysis of cliques. Firstly, the approach requires every member of a sub 
group to have a direct tie with all members of a sub component. Secondly, it insists that the ties 
in the sub-component cannot exist in any other clique (Chan & Liebowitz, 2006 Everton, 2012). 
While Hanneman and Riddle (2005) along with Chan and Liebowitz (2006) have proposed 
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alternative methods such as the n-cliques12, the thesis employs the top down approach as it 
analyses both relational and structural embeddedness of a given network. 
The top down approach examines the sub-components of a network in order to determine the 
weak spots or the cut points of the network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The actors whose 
removal disconnects the flow of resources are called “cut points” (Everton, 2012). Such cut 
points, like brokers, are crucial to the flow of resources because they link disconnected nodes 
in the network. Thus in examining structural embeddedness, the top down approach evaluates 
whether the removal of these nodes affects the flow of resources. Additionally, the Lambda Set 
approach examines the relations that are critical to the structure of the network (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). In doing so, the Lambda Set ranks each of the relations by measuring the flow 
or resources or ‘traffic’ passing through each link. Following that the Lambda Set approach 
then identifies sets of relationships which if disconnected would disrupt the flow of information 
among all the actors (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
In essence, the Lambda Set partition approach to sub-structure analysis highlights the most 
strategic relationships for the flow of resources in policy networks. The Lambda Set approach 
identifies these relationships in a hierarchical clustering dendogram that ranks the relationships, 
as depicted in Figure 8. The x-axis represents the level of the relationship, and the y-axis 
represents the nodes and the level or rank of the relationship at which they are clustered. The 
interpretation of the dendogram means that rank one show that the relationship between nodes 
4 and 5 are the most important followed by the relations between nodes, 5, 4 and node 3. Each 
branch in the dendogram is called a clade and the terminal end of each clade is called a leaf. 
Clades can have one leaf called simplicifolious and two-leaved clades are bifolious and three-
leaved are trifolious (Drout & Smith, 2012). Thus the relationship between nodes 4 and 5 is 
simplicifolious while the relationship between 5, 4, and 3 is trifolious. 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 The n-clique it allows an actor to be a member of a clique if they have ties to some member at a predetermined 
path distance (Everton, 2012).  
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Figure 8: An illustration of the Lambda set 
 
      Source: Adapted from Drout and Smith (2012). 
Much like degree centrality measures and brokerage analysis, sub-structure analysis measures 
are calculated in this thesis to generate data that answers the primary research questions of the 
thesis. As per Section 1.5, the research question seeks to identify the influential actors in the 
policy network and also explore how these actors relate to the interrelations and resource 
exchanges in the network.  Furthermore, the network analysis methods are employed in the 
pursuance of the research objectives which seek to explore the configuration of the network, 
the central and important actors in resource exchanges, the relational linkages between and 
amongst participant stakeholders, and the roles the stakeholders facilitate as a result of 
organisational affiliations.  
The data collected during phase one of the research project generated four types of data: (1) 
data depicting the stakeholders engaged during the policy processes, (2) actor embeddedness 
within the MEC policy network, and (3) data depicting relational ties between stakeholders as 
well as (4) data on centrality and sub-structures of the policy network. Finally, the collection 
of data on the influence and interest of stakeholders was introduced in the second phase of the 
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research project. Phase two of the implementation of the research design is discussed in section 
4.5.3 
4.5.3. Phase two – quantitative data collection  
The stated objectives of this stage in the research project were to interview the influential and 
stakeholders in the implementation of the beneficiation policy. To arrive at a measure of 
influence Schiffer, Waale and Monge (2010, p. 22) propose summing up the number of times 
an organisation was mentioned, then dividing this by the number of organisation in the 
network. Schiffer et al. (2010) are informed by the logic that more influential actors would be 
mentioned more often. Once central actors were quantified using the above formula the 
researcher set up appointments with the respondents to conduct (focussed) semi-structured in-
depth interviews. The interviews were set up with these stakeholders to conduct stakeholder 
analysis based on their perceptions on the beneficiation policy as well as their observations on 
the data collected from the first phase. In no order of importance, below is a list of the 
influential stakeholders based on the count of influence: 
Government departments and related institutions  
 Department of Mineral Resources  (DMR) 
 Department of Trade and Industry  (DTI) 
 Department of Science and Technology  (DST) 
 Economic Development Department  (EDD) 
Public institutions  
 Industrial Development Corporation  (IDC) 
Organised business associations  
 Chamber of Mines  (COM) 
Organised labour associations   
 The National Union of Mineworkers  (NUM) 
 Solidarity13  
 The United Association of South Africa  (UASA) 
 
The rationale of employing in-depth interviews was motivated by the aforementioned assertion 
that qualitative research methods allow researchers to delve deeply into the perceptions of 
                                                             
13 Due to industrial action in the mining industry, the respondent from Solidarity could not be reached. As a result, 
the stakeholder has been left out in this round of data collection. 
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interviewees (Jack, 2005; Hollstein, 2011; Schepis, 2011). These in-depth interviews were 
conducted at the offices of the interviewees and in some instances at conferences on the subject 
under review, or at coffee shops (see Appendix D for the interview dates). During the process 
the researcher utilised a questionnaire to obtain in-depth information regarding the relationship 
between the position of the stakeholder in the MEC policy network and his/her influence and 
interest in the implementation of the beneficiation strategy. The questionnaire included an 
introductory section detailing the purpose of the Masters Research project, along with the stated 
objective of this round of interviews. Methods for recording the interviews for analysis entailed 
audiotape recording and note taking (Appendix E). 
4.5.3.1. Phase two – data preparation 
Upon completing the interviews, data preparation entailed transcribing the audiotaped 
interviews into readable text for content analysis. Subsequently, the researcher coded the data 
into content areas to generate homogenous themes. Coding is the process of organising data 
into categories and labelling those categories with a term (Creswell, 2003, p. 192). This process 
enables a researcher to arrange data into a more concise and systematised format, dividing the 
text into meaning units that can be condensed and labelled with a code (Graneheim & 
Lundman, 2004, p. 106). The coding approach involved clustering the data into content areas 
such as definition and understanding of policy, position, level of influence, interest and support 
in the implementation of the beneficiation policy.  
In the interest category, the stakeholder respondent were asked to indicate, their own the level 
of interest in the implementation of the beneficiation policy. The researcher scored these 
responses on a Likert-Type scale where 5 represented a very high level of interest in the 
implementation of the policy, 4 represented a high level, 3, showed a medium level, 2 a low 
level and  1 indicated the stakeholder had a very low level of interest in the implementation of 
the beneficiation policy.  Similarly, in the influence category, the responses were scored on a 
scale of 1-5 to show that a 5 indicated a very high level of influence in the implementation, a 
4 (high level of influence, 3 (medium level of influence), 2 (low level of influence) 1 (very low 
level of influence). Following this the categories were summed up and tabulated into the 
influence interest matrix. Section 4.5.4 outlines the methods of analysing the data collected 
during phase two of implementing the research methodology. 
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4.5.4. Phase two – data analysis 
The responses generated in phase two provided qualitative and quantitative data. Firstly, the 
qualitative data is tabulated into the homogenous themes, as highlighted in section 4.5.3. The 
issues and themes arising from the data underpinned the analysis of the stakeholders based on 
their level of interest in the outcome of the policy; and the level of influence that each 
stakeholder has in the implementation of the beneficiation policy. The data generated to analyse 
the influence scores as per section was analysed in the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) depict the distribution of influence scores across organisational categories. 
Furthermore, the responses for the interest and influence levels were used to characterise the 
stakeholders in an influence-interest matrix, as presented in Figure 9.  
Figure 9: An illustration of the influence interest matrix 
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Source:  Adapted from Bryson, Patton and Bowman (2011). 
This grid arrays stakeholders on a two-by-two matrix where the dimensions on the x-axis 
represent the level of influence in the policy, and the y-axis, the level of interest in the 
implementation of the policy (Bryson, 2004). The level of influence, according to Schmeer 
(1999) depends on the quantity and type of resources and power the stakeholder has and the 
level of interest is the priority and importance the stakeholder attaches to the policy. The results 
and findings of the stakeholder analysis are presented in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
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4.6. Validity issues 
Validity is the extent to which any measure measures what it is intended to measure (Coromina 
& Coenders, 2006, p. 212). In network analysis the issue of validity centres on whether 
questions aimed at measuring a respondents’ network accurately measure that network. To 
avoid measurement error and decreasing accuracy of the design, respondents in this study were 
asked free recall questions. According to Prell (2012), this decreases the likelihood of gathering 
incomplete or inaccurate data since some respondents either have more or have less ties than 
others (Prell, 2012).  
4.7. Ethical considerations 
Since the research objectives of the current thesis require data that record linkages between 
actors and the nature of these relationships, anonymity at data collection and data analysis stage 
is not guaranteed. According to Borgatti and Molina (2003), this “places a special burden” on 
the academic researcher who must record a link from that respondent to the person the 
respondent indicates having relationships with (Borgatti & Molina, 2003, p. 338). To ensure 
that University of the Witwatersrand’s ethical considerations are factored in, the researcher 
circulated a letter informing the research participants about the study and the objectives of the 
study, and a description of how the data generated from the interviews would be used. 
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the research methodology of this exploratory sequential thesis which 
seeks to analyse the MEC as a network of policy stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. The 
objectives of the thesis centred on unpacking the structural embeddedness of the policy network 
stakeholders within the network and the roles actors facilitated as a result of their locations in 
the network. Furthermore, the thesis sought to uncover the influential stakeholders in the 
implementation of the beneficiation policy and categorise these stakeholders in an influence-
interest matrix. The thesis adopted SNA, as the most appropriate research methodology to 
achieve the stated objectives. Following the theoretical arguments posed in Chapter three, 
network analysis offers a specific methodology for investigating networks dynamics such as 
relational embeddedness and network configuration. Additionally, SNA presents a specific 
opportunity to combine quantitative and qualitative methods in order to map and measure 
network properties and explore network dynamics from the perspectives of network 
participants. 
The implementation of the research design occurred in two sequential stages where phase one 
obtained qualitative data. In this phase, the researcher administered a telephonic questionnaire 
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to determine the network boundaries and the participant stakeholders in the beneficiation 
policy. The data generated resulted in two resource exchange networks, as well as a list of 19 
stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. Following the phase one data analysis, nine 
stakeholders scored the highest levels of influence as per the telephonic interviews. Phase two 
interviewed these stakeholders with a view of categorising these stakeholders into an influence-
interest matrix. The findings generated from both stages will be discussed in Chapter five of 
the thesis. 
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Presentation and analysis of data gathered on the MEC 
5.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, the research findings, and specifically the data generated, are presented. As 
Chapter 4 demonstrates, a number of goals inform the collection and analysis of the MEC as a 
policy network of participant stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. Those goals were to 
unpack the structural embeddedness of the policy network stakeholders and the roles actors 
facilitate in resource exchanges as a result of their locations in the network. Furthermore, the 
thesis seeks to uncover the influential stakeholders in the implementation of the beneficiation 
policy and categorise these stakeholders in an influence-interest matrix. This chapter will show 
that the research objectives were accomplished. The findings obtained from phase one of 
implementing the research design are presented in section 5.2. Here, the findings highlight the 
structure of the information and material resource exchanges in relation to the beneficiation 
policy. In this context, measures of centrality and sub-structure analysis identify the influential 
stakeholders in the resource exchanges and how these actors relate to the interrelations and 
resource exchanges in the network. Section 5.3 then examines the phase two findings with a 
view of examining the influential stakeholder perceptions on the implementation of the 
beneficiation policy. The contribution of Section 5.3 is to understand key stakeholder 
perceptions on the implementation of the beneficiation policy. 
5.2. Presentation and analysis of phase one data 
The data from the telephonic responses generated a list of 19 stakeholders in the beneficiation 
policy, as outlined in Section 4.5.1. The name interpreter in the questionnaire asked participants 
to indicate the relational ties and exchanges of resources between and the egos and alters. Based 
on the responses, the results presented in this section reflect the perceptions of the stakeholders 
who were interviewed telephonically regarding other stakeholders that participated in the 
policy processes of the beneficiation policy prior to the implementation stage of the policy.  
The findings generated two networks, the information network and the material (funding) 
network. These findings are organised as follows: 
Chapter 
5 
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 Section 5.2.1 presents the findings for degree centrality, brokerage analysis, and the 
top-down approach analyse the information exchanges in the MEC policy network.  
 Section 5.2.2 presents the findings for degree and betweenness centrality and the 
substructure of the material exchanges. 
5.2.1. The structure of the information exchanges in the MEC policy network 
Figure 10 provides a structural indication of the network as well as actor embeddedness within 
the exchanges of information regarding the beneficiation policy. It is constructed based on the 
responses from the interviewees who were asked to state the names of the 
organisations/individuals/institutions that provided their organisation with information on the 
policy. Examples of information include information on the policy, meeting dates, invitations 
to seminars and workshops, networking events, strategies, ideas, and related documentation. 
Furthermore, respondents were asked to state the names of organisations that they provided 
information to. Figure 10 presents part of the research findings of the current thesis which 
sought to explore the information exchanges amongst the MEC policy network participants.  
Figure 10: The structure of the information exchanges in the MEC policy network 
Note: The direction of the arrows in Figure 10 indicates who is sending information to whom in the MEC policy 
network and the absence of an arrow indicates the absence of resource exchanges between nodes. 
Source: Results from fieldwork 
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Figure 10 illustrates that the DMR and the DTI are located in the centre of action, pointing 
toward the dominance of government organisations in the information exchange network 
concerning beneficiation policy-making and implementation in South Africa. However, the 
DMR receives a larger number of ties, which in turn suggests its importance in the exchange 
of information related to the beneficiation policy. Amongst non-state actors, organised labour 
movements UASA, Solidarity and NUM exchanged information amongst one another. 
Secondly, some ties are reciprocated between government organisations such as the DMR and 
the DTI as well as between the DMR and the EDD. Thirdly, Figure 10 also reveals that some 
nodes such as the DPE are isolated in the exchanges, while other nodes such as MINTEK are 
connected to one other node in the network of information exchanges. In what follows, the 
remainder of section 5.2.1 presents the degree centrality findings in sub-section 5.2.1.1, 
brokerage analysis in sub- section 5.2.1.2, while sub-section 5.2.1.3 presents the findings of 
sub-structure of the information exchanges in the MEC policy network. 
5.2.1.1. Degree centrality findings of information exchanges in the MEC policy network 
Table 3 presents the results of degree centrality measures generated from phase one of the 
research process. The output developed from UCINET shows that measures of in-degree 
indicate receivers of information and out-degree indicates the senders of information 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). It is also important to note   that the degree of actor is equal to 
the number of other nodes in direct contact with the actor (Freeman L. , 1978). In the example 
presented in Figure 6 actor A is adjacent to six other nodes, therefore its maximum degree 
centrality is numerically equivalent to 6, and the other actors each have degree centrality equal 
to 1 (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
The output in Table 3, generated from UCINET, indicates that the ANC displays the highest 
measure of out-degree centrality in the information exchanges in the MEC policy network. 
Nodes displaying high out-degree are said to be powerful to the extent of sending ties to a 
number of actors in a network, thereby influencing the information inside the network 
(Hanneman& Riddle, 2005). Given that the current government is led by the ANC, it stands to 
reason that the ANC enjoys a close relationship with all government departments and non-state 
actors in policy processes regarding the beneficiation policy. At the same time, the democratic 
legitimacy of the ANC as the governing party enables it to exert influence on the state 
apparatus. As such, the measure of out-degree centrality reflects that the ANC is in direct 
contact with many stakeholders in the policy network. In network analysis, nodes displaying 
high out-degree measures are commonly recognised as major channels of relational 
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information and ‘crucial cogs’ in the network configuration (Wasserman & Fraust, 1994, p. 
179). 
 
Table 3: Degree centrality findings of information exchanges in the 
 MEC policy network 
Stakeholder Out-degree In-degree 
ANC 
NUMSA 
COM 
DHET 
SAMDA 
EDD 
SOLIDARITY 
DTI 
NPC 
DMR 
IDC 
NUM 
CSIR 
MANU-CIRCLE 
DNT 
MINTEK 
DST 
UASA 
DPE 
6.000 
4.000 
4.000 
4.000 
4.000 
3.000 
3.000 
3.000 
3.000 
3.000 
2.000 
2.000 
2.000 
2.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.000 
1.000 
5.000 
1.000 
8.000 
0.000 
15.000 
1.000 
4.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.000 
5.000 
2.000 
0.000 
Note: Out-degree measure represents the number of ties stakeholders sends while in-degree shows the actors who 
receive many ties in the network.  
Source: Results from fieldwork 
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The findings for in-degree show that the DMR, followed by the DTI, displays higher in-degree 
centrality due to the large number of stakeholders directing ties to both these government 
departments. The high level of in-degree recorded for the DMR illustrates that as the policy 
champion of the beneficiation policy, the DMR is the information centre because the 
information related to beneficiation flows to the department. The DTI is also located in the 
centre of the information exchanges. Since the beneficiation imperative is a key pillar of IPAP 
2012/13-2014/15, stakeholders engage the DTI on matters related to supporting and 
encouraging local beneficiation and manufacturing. According to the definition of centrality 
postulated by Hanneman and Riddle (2005), the more ties an actor maintains in policy 
networks, the more sources for the actor to send and receive information. Due to the many 
connections with other actors, the ANC, the DMR, and the DTI are the most active actors in 
the MEC policy network. This increases their influence in the information exchanges on the 
beneficiation policy. 
 
In contrast, actors with low in-degree centrality measures are inactive. Thus, removing these 
actors is said to pose no effect on the ties that are present in the network, as theorised by 
Wasserman and Fraust (1994, p. 179). Therefore, the out-degree measures for UASA and the 
DPE illustrate that the two nodes do not send beneficiation related information to other network 
members. The in-degree measures like those of the DHET captures the extent to which the 
other nodes isolate the other government departments in the information exchanges on the 
beneficiation policy. Due to the well-recognised skills crisis plaguing South Africa, the 
mandate of the DHET is to facilitate the development of a world-class education system that 
produces skilled citizens that can compete and participate in the formal labour market (see 
Higher Eduction Act No. 101 of 1997). The development of world-class R&D falls beyond the 
scope of the DHET, but is within the purview of the DST and its apex agencies such as CSIR. 
Consequently, the DHET is overlooked in the information exchanges because participant 
stakeholders assume that those in possession of resources such as R&D knowledge are more 
important than the development of workers who will produce the R&D technology.  
5.2.1.2. Brokerage analysis of the information exchange network 
The discussion in Section 4.5.2.1.2 on betweenness centrality introduced to the concept of 
brokerage as developed by Fernandez and Gould (1994). The brokerage concept asserts that 
the occupancy of positions linking unconnected actors is an important determinant of network 
influence. The authors extend the concept further to note that actors can be differentiated into 
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a set of mutually-exclusive sub-groups “because the flows of resources within and from groups 
have different meanings” (Fernandez & Gould, 1994, p. 1457). Simply put, the authors propose 
that actors, grouped according to similar features (homophily), serve different brokerage roles 
depending on the group to which they belong. Analysing brokerage positions not only describes 
the types of brokerage roles dominant in exchange networks, but brokerage analysis provides 
insightful information on the specific roles the actors have assumed within the network 
structure (Fernandez & Gould, 1994; Borrás, 2007). 
The analysis of brokerage is limited to the roles of coordinator, gatekeeper and representative 
since these roles yield significant political power in policy networks. As discussed in Section 
4.5.2.1.2 such brokers control the flow of information and determine recipients of the 
information, as well as when and how other stakeholder receive information. The organising 
principle of grouping the MEC stakeholders is drawn from Fernandez and Gould (1994) who 
recommend grouping stakeholders according to their organisational affiliations: 
 Group one: Government departments 
 Group two: Organised labour 
 Group three: Governing party 
 Group four: Public institutions and 
 Group five: Organised business associations. 
 
In implementing these directives from the theory, the current research output, produced using 
UCINET, is displayed in Table 4. The rows show the raw number of times that each stakeholder 
plays one of the five-brokerage roles listed in the columns (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). As 
Table 4 illustrates, the largest brokerage scores emanate from Group 1, the government 
organisations. Amongst group one organisations, the DMR ranks the highest on brokerage 
scores, facilitating the roles of coordinator and gatekeeper. As illustrated in Section 4.5.2.1.2, 
coordinators enable the flow of information between actors of the same group. When one 
considers the coordinating role of the DMR, it is interpreted in terms of its responsibilities as 
the policy champion leading the policy. Due to the interface between the beneficiation policy 
and the broader macro-economic objectives of the ANC government, coordination entails 
consulting with other government departments in order to ensure strategic alignment of inter-
ministerial operations. 
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Table 4: Findings of the un-normalised brokerage scores of the information exchanges 
in the MEC policy network 
                                                                                    
Groups Brokerage  Roles 
Organisation Coordinator Gatekeeper Representative Consultant Liaison 
Group 
One 
DMR 
DTI 
EDD 
DPE 
DST 
DHET 
DNT 
NPC 
7.500 
0.500 
2.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
18.333 
3.000 
3.500 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3.000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Group  
Two 
NUM 
NUMSA 
SOLIDARITY 
UASA 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
0 
0 
0 
1.000 
1.000 
0 
0 
Group 
Three 
ANC 0 0 0 1.000 1.833 
Group 
Four 
MINTEK 
CSIR 
IDC 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.333 
Group 
Five 
SAMDA 
COM 
MANU-
CIRCLE 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.000 
2.000 
0 
 
Note: The coordinator mediates resource flows between members belonging to one group. In other words the 
actor coordinates information amongst its group members. The itinerant broker or consultant mediates between 
members of one group. Here, the itinerant broker is not a member of the group, but mediates the flow of resources 
within members of another group. The representative facilitates the flow of resources from its respective group to 
members of another group. The gatekeeper regulates the flow of resources that flow from another group into its 
own group. The liaison broker mediates resource exchanges between two different groups; however it is not a 
member of either group (Fernandez & Gould, 1994, pp. 1458). 
Unormalised brokerage scrores represent the number of times (raw count) a node acts as a broker in a network. 
 
Source: Results from fieldwork 
The department also ranks the highest values as gatekeeper. Since the function of the 
gatekeeper includes controlling the flow of information from other groups into its own group, 
the DMR is located in a key position to choose which information is filtered through to its 
group members. By controlling information flows, the gatekeeper not only determines which 
information is filtered through to its group, but also the content and nature of the information 
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that is filtered through to group members. As a result of its gatekeeping role, other government 
departments depend on the DMR to receive information or even connect with members from 
other groups in the context of the beneficiation policy. According to Borrás (2007, p. 6), the 
roles of coordinator and gatekeeper are the strongest forms of intermediation and brokerage in 
the policy networks, given that these positions allow the brokers to exercise important political 
influence. 
On the other hand, the DTI predominantly acts as representative and to a lesser extent as 
gatekeeper, liaison and consultant broker. Where the liaison broker mediates between actors 
embedded in different groupings, the role of the representative entails controlling information 
flows from the group of the broker to other groups. This role is arguably as important as that 
of gatekeeper since both are positioned to filter the flow of information within groups. The 
EDD also emerges as a significant broker in the MEC policy network as it fills the role of 
coordinator and the gatekepper broker. In the broader macro- environment, the EDD is 
responsible for coordinating policies and programmes of other government departments by 
ensuring the alignment of government policies. Thus the DMR, the DTI and the EDD form 
part of what policy network theory refers to as the dominant coalition which retains some 
discretion regulating the process of resource exchange (see Rhodes, 1997, p. 37).  
Amongst the stakeholders in Group 2, the dominant brokerage role-  the representative is 
occupied by the NUM. While the affiliation to COSATU enables NUM to gain strategic 
advantage over other actors in Group 2 in accessing the DMR, other factors account for its 
strategic position. Firstly, prior to August 2012 statistics recorded that the union had the largest 
membership of unionised workers14 within the mining industry (Steyn, 2013). As per the 
Amended Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 (LRA), this majoritariansim accorded the union 
offical recognition rights to participate in bargaining councils engaged in wage determination.  
5.2.1.3. The sub-structure analysis of the information exchanges in the MEC policy 
network 
The top-down analysis of sub-components of the MEC network generates data that reveals the 
sub-components such as weak-spots and cut-points of the network. As conceptualised by 
Hanneman and Riddle (2005), the rationale of analysing weak-spots is to investigate whether 
the removal of certain nodes divides the network into unconnected parts. Furthermore, the point 
                                                             
14 At the time of writing (early 2014), NUM had lost considerable membership base to the Association of Mine 
Workers and Construction Union (AMCU) in the gold and platinum sectors. 
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at which the weak-spots occur is the cut-point of the network. Figure 11 illustrates that the 
DMR is the cut point of the information exchange network since it connects MINTEK to other 
stakeholders exchanging information resources on the beneficiation policy.  
Figure 11: The results of the blocks and cut-points in the information exchange network 
 
Note: The removal of certain nodes divides the network into unconnected parts.  The point at which the weak-
spots occur is the cut-point of the network. 
          
 
 
Source: Results from fieldwork 
In this context, the removal of the DMR would isolate MINTEK from resource exchanges on 
the beneficiation policy. Similarly, the figure shows that the DMR creates a path for MINTEK 
to connect with other actors of the network. This supports the findings in Section 5.2.1.2 that 
among the roles the DMR facilitates is one of the local bridge; connecting actors in policy 
networks. In many respects then the DMR is structurally embedded at the centre of the 
Legend:   
 Cut point Network participants 
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information exchanges in the beneficiation policy. This allows the department to control and 
facilitate the relationships and resource exchanges. 
Section 4.5.2.2 described that the Lambda Set ranks each of the relations in a given network 
by measuring the flow or resources or ‘traffic’ passing through each link. Furthermore, the 
Lambda Set approach identifies sets of relationships which, if disconnected, would disrupt the 
flow of information among all the actors (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The Lambda Set 
approach in Figure 12 ranks the relationship between the DMR and the DTI as the most 
important relationships for the flow of information related to the beneficiation policy.  
Figure 12: The hierarchical lambda set partitions of the information exchange network 
 
Note: The Lambda Set approach identifies relationships in a hierarchical clustering dendogram that ranks the 
relationships. The x-axis represents the level of the relationship, and the y-axis represents the nodes and the level 
or rank of the relationship at which they are clustered.  
Source: Results from fieldwork 
Figure 12 shows that the amount of information flowing to and from the two nodes is vital for 
network cohesion and the flow of information related to the beneficiation policy. In the broader 
political economy landscape, the two departments are working on the Mineral Value-Chains 
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strategy that seeks to identify the regulatory requirements as well as other constraints and 
opportunities in the industry. Since they are in possession of this information, Figure 12 
reaffirms the notion that linkages between the two are vital for the exchange of information 
resources. 
Additionally, the ties between the DMR, the DTI, the EDD and the ANC are identified as the 
second most important linkages in the MEC policy network. The exchanges between these four 
actors hinge on the synergy between the economic policies of the governing ANC party and 
those of the national government led by the ANC. The transformation of the South African 
economy has been a key policy priority for the ANC as a political party dating as far back as 
the Ready to Govern Conference of 1992 (ANC, 1992), the Draft Discussion Document on the 
Minerals and Energy Policy tabled in 1994 (ANC, 1994), and the Polokwane Conference 2007 
Economic Transformation Resolutions (ANC, 2007) and more recently to the 2012 National 
Policy Conference in Gauteng (ANC, 2012) and the 2012 Elective Conference in Mangaung 
(ANC, 2012). Based on these policies, each of the three government departments has adopted 
policies strategically aligned to the ANC transformation agenda. 
Much like the beneficiation policy adopted by the DMR, a key pillar of IPAP 2012/13-2014/15 
adopted by the DTI seeks to improve the competitiveness of the economy and the 
manufacturing industry (The Department of Trade and Industry, 2013), the New Growth Path 
adopted by the EDD seeks to expand the industrial base of the economy and the labour 
absorption rate (Economic Development Department, 2011). Thus, the overlap of policies is 
indicative of the relational linkages and resource exchanges between the ANC and the 
government. Policies, strategies and resolutions emanating from ANC national conferences 
inform official policies and programmes of government departments, which in turn, are 
governed by senior ANC politicians. Taken as a whole, Figure 13 illustrates that four nodes in 
emerge as the core of the information network, as computed in UCINET. Within this context, 
core nodes are well connected in comparison to the peripheral nodes that exhibit fewer 
relational ties (Rombach et al., 2013). 
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Figure 13: The core-periphery structure of the information exchanges in the MEC 
policy network 
 
Note: Core of the information exchanges includes: DMR, DTI, EDD, and ANC.                              
Periphery includes: DHET, NPC, DST, NUM, NUMSA, Solidarity, DPE, UASA, MINTEK, CSIR, IDC, 
SAMDA, COM and Manufacturing Circle. 
Source: Results from fieldwork 
As the theoretical framework guiding this thesis argues, the core of the network influences 
policy while the periphery or structurally marginal actors are less influential and more isolated 
than the core nodes (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992; McDaniel & Miskel 2002). Due to the 
resource exchanges between the core of the network, the UCINET data findings of degree 
centrality, brokerage analysis and sub-structure analysis, indicate that the dominant resource 
exchanges occur frequently amongst the government departments and the governing ANC. 
There are fewer links in and amongst non-state actors such as NUM and NUMSA, with the 
exception of the linkages between the mining industry stakeholders such as NUM, UASA, 
Solidarity and the COM. Overall, the core of the network includes the resourceful nodes that 
in the words of Klijn and Koppenjan (2000, p. 141) are “indispensable to the policy network 
games.” Furthermore, these nodes, as the findings show, have influential positions in the flow 
of information related to the beneficiation policy. 
core
periphery
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5.2.2. The structure of the material resource exchanges in the MEC policy network 
The analysis of the MEC as a policy network of participant stakeholders in the beneficiation 
policy showed that the resource exchanges are not solely confined to the exchanges of 
information on the beneficiation policy. Rather, the data analysis indicates that the stakeholders 
exchange material resources (such as funding) in pursuit of the policy objectives. In this 
section, the results of the material exchanges are presented with a view of exploring stakeholder 
embeddedness in the relational linkages, as described in the research objectives of the thesis. 
Funding in this context means the provision of sponsorship, financial assistance, budgetary 
allowance, grants and aid support. 
Figure 14 illustrates actor embeddedness in the funding network. The figure illustrates the 
senders and receivers of material funding where the direction of the arrow shows the target of 
funding. This network also reflects the perceptions of the interviewees in relation to financial 
exchanges in the beneficiation policy. It highlights the stakeholders who exchange monetary 
resources within the whole network. 
Figure 14: The structure of the beneficiation policy material exchanges in the MEC 
policy network 
 
Note: The direction of the arrows in Figure 14 indicates who is sending beneficiation policy related funding to 
whom in the MEC policy network and the absence of an arrow indicates the absence of resource exchanges 
between nodes. 
Source: Results from fieldwork 
DMR
DTI
EDD
DPE
DST
DHET
DNT
NPC
MINTEK
CSIR
IDC
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It becomes apparent that the funding network is homogenous since funding flows within 
organisational borders. That means cross-boundary resource exchange is minimal as funding 
is channelled within similar organisations, as highlighted in the theory by Sandström and Rova 
(2010). The flow of financial resources occurs amongst state institutions. In this view, the NUM 
does not access beneficiation policy-related funds from the state, nor does the COM. Instead, 
these stakeholders’ access funds from membership contributions. 
Figure 14 captures the structure of financing within the MEC policy network. The flow of 
resources within this context occurs in a linear manner, flowing in formal hierarchies. As 
illustrated in Figure 14, funding is channelled in a top down fashion from the DNT to other 
government departments who in turn distribute the funds to their agencies. For example, 
funding flows from the DNT to the DST, and then to the CSIR in a centralised way. In many 
respects, this network displays a star-like structure similar to Figure 6 in Section 4.5.2.1.1 since 
the DNT is the central actor. Next, the degree centrality, betweenness centrality and sub-
structure analysis results generated during fieldwork regarding the flow of financial resource 
within the MEC policy network are discussed in Section 5.2.2.1, Section 5.2.2.2 and Section 
5.2.2.3, respectively. 
5.2.2.1.Degree centrality findings of material exchanges in the MEC policy network 
Within network analysis degree centrality provide measures of how power is distributed in a 
network. In essence, degree centrality is premised on the notion that the well-connected ones 
have access to a number of sources for resource exchange (Rowley, 1997). The more ties an 
actor maintains, the less dependent it is on any specific actor in the process. As a result of this 
autonomy, an actor becomes relatively powerful in the network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  
Freeman (1978) argues that the degree of an actor is equal to the number of other nodes in 
direct contact with the actor. As captured in Figure 6, actor A is adjacent to six other nodes, 
therefore its maximum degree centrality equals 6, and the other actors each have degree 
centrality equal to 1 (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Table 5 is the output generated to represent 
the measures of in-degree and out-degree centrality of the nodes in relation to material resource 
exchanges related to the beneficiation policy. 
 
Measured by out-degree, the DNT ranks the highest level of centrality in the funding network. 
Therefore, it is the most influential stakeholder in the funding network. As far as the ranking 
is concerned in the broader economy, the DNT manages government fiscal policy, and the 
allocation and distribution of revenue between national, provincial and local governments and 
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various state organs. In other words, the DNT determines who gets what, when and how in the 
allocation of financial resources in relation to the beneficiation policy. With respect to in-
degree, the IDC possesses prestige as more actors are directing funding to the stakeholder. In 
this respect the IDC is the most connected stakeholder. As a state development financing 
institution, which provides finance for industrial development projects, the IDC is in this 
context structurally located to provide support to manufacturers who seek to beneficiate 
minerals and metals. 
 
Table 5: Degree centrality findings of material exchanges in the MEC policy network 
Stakeholder Out-degree In-degree 
DNT 
DMR 
EDD 
DST 
DTI 
DPE 
DHET 
NPC 
MINTEK 
CSIR 
IDC 
7.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
4.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.000 
1.000 
2.000 
 
Note: Out-degree measure represents the number of ties stakeholders sends, while in-degree shows the actors who 
receive ties in the network.  
Source: Results from fieldwork 
 
The IDC has a dedicated Mining and Metals Beneficiation Business Unit established to assist 
and finance mining activities, value addition and other projects that promote job creation. 
Although the IDC falls under the EDD, there exists an indirect financial relationship between 
the IDC and the DTI, captured in Figure 14. In the 2012 Budget Review, the DNT introduced 
a six-year economic competitiveness and support package toward enhancing manufacturing 
competitiveness, and industrial development in South Africa (National Treasury, 2012). By 
2013 the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) directed R 8.6 billion to the DTI 
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toward the Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme (MCEP), which offers 
financial support to enhance manufacturing competiveness as well as industrial development. 
The MCEP consists of the Production Incentive administered by the DTI and the Industrial 
Financing Loan Facilities managed by the IDC. Effectively, the flow of funds from the linkages 
between the DNT, the DTI and the EDD is captured in both Figure 14 and Table 5. 
5.2.2.2.Betweenness centrality findings of financial exchanges in the MEC policy network 
In policy networks actors who link otherwise unconnected actors are considered important 
because they control the interaction between other actors who must go through it to 
communicate and exchange resources with each other. Table 6 illustrates the betweenness 
centrality of the funding network calculated by UCINET. The numbers in the table illustrate 
the number of nodes that the actor connects in policy networks. 
Table 6: Betweenness centrality findings of material exchanges in the MEC policy 
network 
Stakeholder Betweenness  
DMR 
EDD 
DST 
DTI 
DPE 
DPE 
DHET 
DNT 
NPC 
MINTEK 
IDC 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: The betweenness centrality measure reflects the number of times a node is an intermediary between other 
nodes. 
Source: Results from fieldwork 
 
Table 6 shows that, on average, actor betweenness ranges from zero to 1. This implies that one 
actor is the bridge between other actors and that the hierarchy ranges from the DNT to the 
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DMR to MINTEK. Similarly, the betweenness centrality of the DMR is 1, suggesting the DMR 
is the intermediary between MINTEK and the DNT, and the DST is the intermediary between 
CSIR and the DNT. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that the government departments are 
the intermediaries between the DNT and the state agencies that require the funding to fulfil 
their various functions related to the beneficiation policy 
5.2.2.3. The sub-structure analysis of the material exchanges in the MEC policy network 
The analysis of network sub-structures is interested in analysing the sub-structures which form 
the broader macro network and how resources flow from the actors who control scarce 
resources to those who require the resources. Furthermore, sub-structure analysis offers 
meaningful insights into relational embeddedness of the actors in resource flows of the 
exchange network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). As the objective of the current thesis is to 
reveal structural and relational embeddedness of the resource exchanges, Figure 15 discloses 
the strategic relations that affect the cohesion and flow of material resource flows in the MEC 
policy community. 
Figure 15: The hierarchical lambda set partitions of the financial exchange network 
 
Note: The Lambda Set approach identifies relationships in a hierarchical clustering dendogram that ranks the 
relationships. The x-axis represents the level of the relationship, and the y-axis represents the nodes and the level 
or rank of the relationship at which they are clustered.  
Source: Results from fieldwork 
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5.2.3. The results in relation to the primary research question  
The primary research question that directed the research project was: 
What roles do the stakeholders in the MEC policy network facilitate and what complex 
relationships prevail amongst them? 
The data computed in UCINET reflects that the DMR and the DTI facilitate important roles in 
the dissemination of information on the beneficiation policy. These actors ranked the highest 
brokerage scores, pointing to their centrality in the information exchange network. The roles 
of coordinator and representative imply that these stakeholders control information on the 
policy. In a contentious policy domain like the beneficiation control over the flow of crucial 
information increases the power of stakeholders who are empowered to share information. 
Since ‘knowledge is power’ such brokers can manipulate information, play actors against each 
other or even exclude other actors in the process of information exchange (Freeman, 1978). 
Equally, the ability to mobilise resources is considered to be an important indicator of power 
in policy networks, as observed by the theorists. Based on the data generated from UCINET, 
government institutions such as the Treasury and the IDC play influential roles in the MEC 
funding network. In structural terms, this particular network represents star-like characteristics 
since the DNT is the crucial cog in the network. As illustrated, funding flows in a linear and 
most importantly a hierarchical manner from the department to other departments who in turn 
distribute funding to agencies mandated to perform various R&D and financial obligations in 
relation to mineral beneficiation. The results support the theoretical premise that the 
government is “not an actor among actors” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, p. 151), but rather a 
pivotal actor in the activities of the MEC policy network 
5.3. Presentation and analysis of phase two data 
The findings in phase one considered the structural and relational aspects on the resource 
exchanges in the MEC policy network. Furthermore, the data supported the theoretical premise 
that the amount of resources and the ability to mobilise resources towards a policy activity is 
an indicator of the level of influence for a stakeholder (Schmeer, 1999). To analyse the levels 
of influence and interest in the implementation of the beneficiation policy, the thesis sought to 
consider the type of influence stakeholders may exert and the level of interest in the 
implementation of the beneficiation policy. Influence levels as Section 4.5.3 outlined, are the 
sum total of the number of times an organisation was mentioned divided by the number of 
organisations in the network (Schiffer et al., 2010). The findings of the data analysis conducted 
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during phase one revealed nine stakeholders with high levels of influence. This section of the 
thesis presents the findings of the stakeholder analysis based on the levels of influence and 
interest recorded from the data analysis. 
5.3.1. Stakeholder positions on the definition of beneficiation 
The analysis of stakeholder interest is premised on the proposition that interest is closely related 
to policy definition and the position of the stakeholder regarding a policy (Schmeer, 1999). In 
this view, policy definition highlights a stakeholder’s understanding of the policy under review 
and identifies those who may oppose policy choices due to their (mis)understandings. 
Similarly, the definition will inform the vested interest and position on the policy. As Ben 
Turok, Member of the South African Parliament (2012) mused, one of the challenges facing 
the beneficiation strategy is lack of common understanding of what beneficiation represents 
(Matthews, 2012). In the research interviews conducted on the beneficiation policy, 
respondents agreed with the normative principles of addressing the high unemployment rate in 
the country and reducing the dependence of the economy on resources. Furthermore, the 
interview data indicated consensus between the interviewees that the main challenges regarding 
the mineral beneficiation policy related to supply-side interventions such as electricity and 
security of supply for local beneficiators. 
Despite this, interviewees diverged when it came to the most appropriate definition of 
beneficiation. The respondent from UASA acknowledged this conundrum: “I agree with the 
statement that we do not have a common understanding of what beneficiation is. What the 
employer views as beneficiation is vastly different from what organised labour will classify as 
beneficiation” (interview with UASA, 19 July 2013). Along similar lines, NUM acknowledged 
that a common definition is impossible given that stakeholders have different interests. From 
NUM’s perspective, beneficiation represents a phenomenon of moving beyond the old practice 
of mining minerals from the pit to port [sic] and a process of  “identifying a value chain from 
the mineral extracted from the ground and processing it to meet all the downstream industries” 
(interview with NUM, 10 July 2013). The respondent from the DST (24 July 2013) downplayed 
the merits of the beneficiation policy on the grounds that it lacks an informed understanding of 
the manner in which South Africa is integrated in global trade relations, to the DMR (12 July 
2013). To the DTI (22 August 2013) and the EDD (27 July 2013) beneficiation represents an 
opportunity to grow and industrialise the economy. 
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The respondents highlighted the importance of the beneficiation strategy to the manufacturing 
process and thus saw it as the interface between mining and manufacturing (DMR, 12 July 
2013; DTI, 22 August 2013). In particular, the DMR acknowledged the policy sought to utilise 
minerals in their final usable form as inputs into the local manufacturing process. The 
observations made from the interviews with the DMR (12 July 2013), the DTI (22 August 
2013) and the EDD (27 July 2013) were corroborated by the IDC. The IDC argued that mining 
is not beneficiation, but forms part and parcel of the mineral value chain of which 
manufacturing forms an important part (interview with IDC, 19 July 2013). This is because the 
process of beneficiating minerals entails value-addition where minerals are processed into 
commodities, a process that entails manufacturing. The premise that beneficiation is not 
confined to mining is shared by the COM for whom “beneficiation is not a mining policy” 
(interview with COM, 22 August 2013). 
The reason the COM refutes the notion that beneficiation is solely a mining policy is an 
economic one since beneficiation extends beyond the confines of mining and transcends other 
sectors such as manufacturing (interview with COM, 22 August 2013). The NUM respondent 
argued that the mining companies represented by the COM are export-oriented and do not care 
about secondary industry. The NUM respondent went on to reason that beneficiation is “not 
their [the] business [of the COM]” (interview with NUM, 10 July 2013). Inherent in the NUM 
perspective is the observation that the COM is intent to avoid restructuring the sector and that 
the COM is highly interested in profit maximisation at the expense of local industrialisation. 
Nevertheless, consensus exists amongst the interviewees that beneficiation represents a series 
of processes where value is added to the mineral in question at each stage of the value chain. 
The findings of the analysis suggest that from a policy perspective, beneficiation is an 
important input into strengthening the linkages between the mining and manufacturing sectors 
and possibly other sectors that are currently playing a less direct role in the industrialisation of 
the South African economy. 
5.3.2. Stakeholder levels of interest in the implementation of the beneficiation policy 
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, stakeholder definition and understanding on the policy is 
important for determining stakeholder position and vested interest in the policy under review. 
This is important because it establishes whether the stakeholder is neutral, supports or opposes 
the policy. According to Schmeer (1999), determining stakeholder interest sheds light on the 
instrumentality of the stakeholder in the implementation of the policy. This section outlines the 
findings on stakeholder levels of interest in the implementation of the beneficiation policy as 
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observed in the interviews. The content in the following bullet-point sections refers to the data 
obtained from the phase two interview with the representative of the organisation, unless 
otherwise stated. 
 Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) 
The mission of the DMR is to enable a globally competitive, sustainable and meaningfully 
transformed minerals and mining sector to ensure that all South Africans derive sustainable 
benefit from the mineral wealth. As a result of its constitutional mandate, the level of interest 
and support in the implementation of the beneficiation strategy is very high (interview with the 
DMR, 12 July 2013). Such interest relates to the departmental objectives of reducing poverty 
and unemployment and eliminating income inequality. The respondent suggested “we hope it 
[beneficiation of minerals] will increase employment as it stimulates more economic activity; 
it will shift South Africa’s economic structure from an unsustainable one that is dependent on 
raw materials to one that is sustainable, dependent on the export of tradable goods” (Interview 
with the DMR, 12 July 2013). 
 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
Among the responsibilities of the DTI is the promotion of economic and industrial development 
in the economy. Through policies and strategies such as IPAP, NIPF and MCEP the department 
has targeted the mineral sector to promote the competitiveness of value adding sectors and 
increase the labour absorption rate of the economy. While the department strongly supports the 
policy on mineral beneficiation, the advantage and interest to the DTI is also very high 
(interview with the DTI, 22 August 2013). During the in-depth interview, the respondent 
maintained that the beneficiation strategy is important to unlocking the growth potential of the 
economy. The respondent went on to reiterate that growing the economy through beneficiation 
is strategic in attaining their [the department’s] mandate (interview with the DTI, 22 August 
2013). 
 Department of Science and Technology (DST) 
As a state institution responsible for scientific research, the DST generally has an interest in 
the beneficiation policy. When asked to rate the level of interest of the DST, the respondent 
chose ‘medium level of interest’, indicating a neutral position on the beneficiation policy 
(Interview with the DST, 24 July 2013). One of the main reasons for selecting the option is 
highlighted by the level of support the DST exhibits for the policy. By stating that the 
department ‘somewhat supports the policy’, the respondent noted the policy had objectives that 
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sound reasonable but cautioned that beneficiation is not a job creator (interview with the DST, 
24 July 2013). Based on the current project in the titanium sector, the respondent estimated that 
a titanium plant could generate a mere 1500 jobs. According to the respondent, generating 1500 
jobs does not amount to “the creation of massive jobs as set out by the beneficiation policy” 
(Interview with the DST, 24 July 2013). The respondent concluded that benefit from economic 
activity in the mining industry is derived from foreign earnings obtained from exports. As such, 
it was stressed that mining and sidestream industries create more jobs than beneficiation, which 
is a high tech and specialist industry (interview with the DST, 24 July 2013). 
 Economic Development Department (EDD) 
The EDD is mandated to coordinate government economic policies in line with the NDP. The 
department aims to contribute to the growth, development and employment targets by ensuring 
coherence between the economic policies and plans of the state institutions (interview with the 
EDD, 27 July 2013). Based on this, the department has positive interest in the strategy, because 
it ensures attainment of the departmental mandates. According to the respondent the 
department’s positioning on the policy is positive since it “benefits the mandate of job creation 
in collaboration with other government departments such as DTI” (interview with the EDD, 27 
July 2013). 
 Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) 
As a developmental financing state institution, The IDC has an interest in the implementation 
of the beneficiation strategy (interview with the IDC, 19 July 2013). It has a dedicated Mining 
and Metals Beneficiation Business Unit, established to assist and finance mining activities, 
value addition and other projects that promote job creation. It was observed that the IDC has a 
very high level of interest in the policy since the policy of beneficiating minerals in South 
Africa provides an opportunity for the IDC “to continue supporting the developmental 
objectives of the state” (interview with the IDC, 19 July 2013). 
 Chamber of Mines (COM) 
On the macro-level, the COM represents and articulates the policy interests of the mining 
industry through various state organs. According to the respondent, the COM supports the 
noble objectives of the policy, but disagrees with section 26 of the 2008 Amended MPRDA 
Act No. 49 that compel mining companies to set aside a portion of mining output  for use in 
local beneficiation (interview with the COM, 22 August 2013). Rather, the interest of the COM 
“lies in competitive supply agreements that support the sustainability of the mining industry” 
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(interview with the COM, 22 August 2013). Thus support of the policy is contingent upon the 
removal of the clause that compels mining companies to set aside a portion of mining output. 
According to the NUM respondent, the COM is not interested in the beneficiation policy 
because it threatens their interests such as profit maximisation and capital accumulation. The 
respondent from NUM reasons that setting aside 10 per cent of mining output for use in South 
Africa is a loss because that 10 per cent is a loss in billions of foreign earnings for the mining 
companies (interview with NUM, 10 July 2013). In principle, the position of the COM towards 
the beneficiation strategy is one of a conditional supporter given its level of interest as observed 
by the researcher. 
 National Union of Mineworkers South Africa (NUM) 
NUM facilitates a meaningful role in protecting worker interests in the mining industry. Such 
interests are related to health and safety issues in the mines, wage negotiations and protecting 
workers from retrenchments. According to the NUM respondent, beneficiating minerals will 
lead to the creation of “massive jobs and of course NUM membership will increase” (Interview 
with NUM, 10 July 2013). It stands to reason that the interest of NUM is two-fold. On the one 
hand, NUM’s interest is tied to maintaining if not increasing its membership base, considering 
it lost a considerable portion of its membership base to AMCU and NUMSA following the 
August 2012 Marikana Massacre (Steyn, 2013). The second interest for NUM relates to 
retaining or regaining its status as the union with the largest membership base in Cosatu. 
According to the statistics released by Steyn (2013), the membership losses of NUM moved it 
to the fourth largest Cosatu affiliate while NUMSA became the largest Cosatu affiliate. As a 
result, another official from NUM acknowledged that there are “politics” between NUM and 
NUMSA, which limit the extent of engagement and communication between the two COSATU 
affiliates (Anonymous, 21 July 2013). 
 United Association of South Africa (UASA)  
Much like NUM, UASA has an interest in the beneficiation policy since its implementation 
will solve the job crisis in the country and advantage their members who will get jobs (interview 
with UASA, 19 July 2013). 
With the exception of the DST, the above discussion reveals that the DMR, the DTI, the EDD, 
the IDC, NUM and UASA and COM have high levels of interest and support in the objectives 
and the implementation of the policy. 
112 
 
5.3.3. Stakeholder levels of influence in the implementation of the beneficiation policy 
Influence, as conceptualised in Section 1.7 of the thesis, entails the ability of the stakeholder 
to shape policy decisions in alignment with the policy preferences of the stakeholder. In effect, 
influence empowers stakeholders with the ability to control decision-making processes and 
affect policy outcomes (Young, Lewis & Sanders, 2010, p. 30). Within policy networks, 
stakeholders possess different degrees and levels of influence to control, shape and affect the 
public policy-making processes. Some have financial resources needed in the implementation 
of a policy while others have technical information required in the implementation of public 
policies. Figure 16 illustrates that the distribution of influence varies across organisations.  
Figure 16: The distributional influence scores across organisational affiliation in a boxplot
 
Note: In Figure 16 the x-axis represents the organisations where 1.00 = Group one, the government departments, 
2.00 = Group two, organised labour, 3.00 = Group three, Governing party, 4.00 = Group four: Public institutions 
and 5.00 = Group five: Organised business associations.  The y-axis is the total level of influence of each Group 
in the implementation of the policy based on summing up the number of times an organisation was mentioned, 
then dividing this by the number of organisation in the network  
 
Source: Results from fieldwork 
 
113 
 
The distribution of influence scores across organisations is shown in Figure 16 in the form of 
box plot depicting the mean, second and third quartiles (Q2 and Q3, respectively) as the box 
and the first and fourth quartiles as the whiskers (Q1 and Q4 respectively). The first observation 
is that the upper quartile or 75th percentile of Group one is relatively higher than the other 
groups. Secondly, Group two stakeholders have the second highest influence scores, followed 
by Group five and Group four. This suggests that government institutions have higher influence 
relative to other groups in the implementation of the beneficiation policy. As the policy network 
theorists in section 3.3.2 argued, stakeholders influence policy based on policy relevant 
resources such as information, funding, technical skills and experience policy implementation 
(Knoke et al., 1996; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). 
In all interviews conducted in round two of data collection, respondents acknowledged that the 
influence of the DMR lies in its regulatory and legislative authority in the mining industry. As 
custodians of the policy, the DMR respondent argued that the main objective of the department 
in relation to the beneficiation policy is to ensure security of supply by compelling mining 
companies to set aside a portion of production at developmental prices (interview with the 
DMR, 12 July 2013). Thus, regulatory authority is the main source of power for the DMR in 
relation to the implementation of the policy. Furthermore, the respondents from the DMR, the 
DST (24 July 2013), the EDD (27 July 2013), NUM (10 July 2013), the IDC (19 July 2013), 
and the DST (24 July 2013) highlight funding as an important resource for the implementation 
of the policy. In that regard, the six respondents acknowledged the importance of the DTI.  
Interestingly, respondents representing the DMR and the DST questioned the institutional 
relevance of the EDD, with the DST citing the establishment of the department as an example 
of state patronage (interview with the DST, 24 July 2013). The DMR noted that the institutional 
mandate of the EDD is to coordinate economic policies and “unblock any constraints that may 
arise in policy processes” (interview with the DMR, 12 July 2013). However, the DMR 
assessed that the “coordination role of the EDD duplicated the functions of the Economic 
Sector and Employment Cluster, which by and large coordinates policy-making among 
government departments in the economic sector” (interview with the DMR, 12 July 2013). 
With the exception of the DTI (interview with the DTI, 22 August 2013) none of the 
respondents interviewed in phase two acknowledged the importance of the DST as government 
department mandated with R&D. In many respects this supports the proposition of the DST 
respondent that this department has low levels of influence in the implementation of the policy 
(interview with the DST, 24 July 2013).  
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Accordingly, “the DST is a small department compared to the others; the department does not 
have regional and provincial departments in South Africa. So in the hierarchy of economic 
departments DST is extremely small compared to the DMR and the DTI” (interview with the 
DST 24 July 2013). The respondent lamented that the annual budget for the Mining and 
Minerals Beneficiation unit is “R 40 million, the DMR’s budget is about R 4 billion, SKA gets 
more money than me” (interview with DST 24 July 2013). This response suggests that the 
national government is yet to recognize the important role played by the DST in the policy 
implementation process relative to the DTI and the DMR. The significance of the DST is to 
foster R&D, which is important for developing the skill set and world-class technology needed 
by the mineral beneficiation sector. 
Overall, the findings generated from the in-depth interviews highlight that the respondents 
perceived the DMR and the DTI as the most influential government departments in the 
implementation of the beneficiation policy. The respondents highlighted that the DMR is in 
possession of information resources such as scientific knowledge, legal authority and political 
authority. In line with the theoretical premise developed in section 3.3.2, the possession of 
these resources does not result in the loss of power for the possessor, as Knoke et al. (1996, p. 
18) theorise. Thus, the DMR retains its privileged position of power in the MEC policy 
network. Additionally, respondents identified the DTI as an equally important actor in the 
implementation of the policy (interviews with the DMR, 12 July 2013; the EDD, 27 July 2013; 
the DST, 24 July 2013). For theses respondents, the DTI is in possession of physical resources 
such as funding for the implementation of the beneficiation policy. Additionally, three 
government departments – the DST, the EDD and the DTI – cited the IDC as an instrumental 
stakeholder in funding beneficiation projects (interviews with the DST, 24 July 2013; the EDD, 
27 July 2013; the DTI, 22 August 2013). 
The six interviewed stakeholders – the DMR, the DTI, the EDD, the DST, the IDC as well as 
the COM – neglected to recognise the role of organised labour in the implementation of the 
policy (interviews with the DMR, 12 July 2013; the DTI, 22 August 2013; the EDD, 27 July 
2013; the DST, 24 July 2013; the IDC, 19 July 2013; the COM, 22 August 2013). This 
highlights the argument in Section 5.2.2 that actors tend to focus on actors similar to them 
(Hanneman &Riddle, 2005). For example, UASA in this round of interviews focussed another 
organised labour union by relating the importance of NUM to the level of worker 
representatively which the union has in the mining industry (interview with UASA, 19 July 
2013). 
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NUM did not reciprocate this to UASA. Rather, the NUM respondent noted that NUMSA was 
an important stakeholder in the implementation of the policy. The NUM respondent reasoned 
that the “political muscle and ability to shape policy in the manufacturing sector is an important 
resource of NUMSA.” When probed further on the structure of the MEC as a policy network, 
the NUM respondent argued that NUMSA was “never part of these official processes and I do 
not remember them participating in the official processes” (interview with NUM, 10 July 
2013). In his view, NUMSA is important and influential because the union organises in “that 
end of the [mineral] value chain”. During stage one of data collection the respondent from 
NUMSA charged that the government side-lined the union during the official policy 
formulation processes (interview with NUMSA, 20 May 2013). This observation was 
corroborated by the DMR in the interviewee’s statement that “[they] do not engage NUMSA” 
(interview with the DMR, 12 July 2013).  
Be that as it may, stakeholders such as CSIR and MINTEK were seen by the DST (24 July 
2013), the DTI (22 August 2013), the EDD (27 July 2013), the IDC (19 July 2013) and UASA 
(19 July 2013) as important actors due to their R&D functions. Based on the responses and 
findings of the data analysis, Figure 17 illustrates the eight policy network stakeholders (DMR, 
the DTI, the EDD, the DST, the IDC, UASA, NUM as well as the COM) in an influence interest 
matrix. The stakeholder matrix summarises stakeholder attributes based on their respective 
levels of influence and interest in the implementation of the policy. The stakeholder analysis 
matrix presented in Figure 17 shows that the key players quadrant of those with high influence 
and high interest in the policy includes the DMR, the DTI and the IDC; the subjects (have low 
levels of influence but high interest in the policy) includes non-state actors the NUM, the COM 
and UASA. Furthermore, the EDD is the context setter based on the findings that it exerts a 
high influence level but low interest in the policy and finally the DST is a stakeholder in the 
crowd quadrant as it has both low levels of influence and interest in the policy. 
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Figure 17: The influence interest stakeholder analysis matrix of the influential 
stakeholders in the MEC policy network 
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Note: This grid arrays stakeholder on a two-by-two matrix where the dimensions on the x-axis represent the level 
of influence in the policy, and the y-axis, the level of interest in the implementation of the policy.  In the interest 
category, the stakeholder respondent were asked to indicate, their own the level of interest in the implementation 
of the beneficiation policy. The researcher scored these responses on a Likert-type scale where 5 represented a 
high level of interest in the implementation of the policy, 4 represented a high level, 3, showed a medium level, 2 
a low level and  1 indicated the stakeholder had a very low level of interest in the implementation of the 
beneficiation policy.  Similarly, in the influence category, the responses were scored on a scale of 1-5 to show 
that a 5 indicated a very high level of influence in the implementation, a 4(high level of influence, 3 (medium 
level of influence), 2 (low level of influence) 1 (very low level of influence). Following this the categories were 
summed up and tabulated into the influence interest matrix 
Source: Results from fieldwork 
 
Based on the findings of Figure 17, the remainder of the discussion details the interpretations 
of the stakeholder analysis. The contents of these following sub-sections represent the author’s 
interpretation of interview data. 
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 The key players quadrant: the DMR, the DTI and the IDC 
The key players’ quadrant in Figure 17 includes the DMR, the DTI and the IDC. As central 
nodes in the information network, the power of the DMR and the DTI emanates from their 
constitutional mandates. The DMR possesses the legal authority to compel mining companies 
to set aside a portion of mining output. Furthermore, it has discretion over resource use in that 
it has the ability to articulate a credible threat or withdrawal of resources such as awarding 
mining licenses to mining companies. Based on the conceptualisation of section 1.7 and the 
theoretical framework guiding the thesis, it can be argued that the DMR has the power to 
persuade and influence behavioural outcomes of stakeholders in the mining industry in general 
and with regard to beneficiation policy in particular, such as the COM, UASA and NUM. 
The power of the DTI is understood as utilitarian, based on the ability to mobilise physical 
resources such as funding toward the implementation of beneficiation-related projects. Both 
the interests of the DMR and the DTI are driven by the normative objectives of achieving 
economic and industrial development in the economy of South Africa. Unlike government 
departments such as the DMR and the DTI, the IDC has no power to persuade or compel 
stakeholder behaviour. Rather, the IDC possesses influence which stems from its ability to 
mobilise physical resources toward the implementation of the beneficiation policy.  
 The subjects quadrant  
In this quadrant, UASA, NUM and the COM form part of the subjects in this policy network. 
The term subject describes stakeholders who have high interest in the implementation of the 
policy, but possess low levels of influence when compared to the key players. The COM has 
an interest in the normative objectives of the policy, but claims the policy may adversely affect 
the sustainability of the mining industry and investor confidence. UASA and NUM are driven 
by the shared belief of protecting worker interests and maintaining their representation in the 
mining industry. 
 Context setters 
As a context setter, the EDD has influence in policy-making through coordinating the economic 
policies of the government. However, interest in the implementation of the policy is low as the 
respondent indicated the department could not commit physical or utilitarian resources to the 
implementation, as this would divert resources away from the “day-to-day” operations of the 
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department (interview with the EDD, 27 July 2013). Effectively the EDD has other concerns 
that are perceived to be more important than the beneficiation policy. 
 Crowd 
Since the respondent representing the DST highlighted that the DST has low levels of influence 
in the implementation of the policy, the respondent also outlined that the DST has a medium 
level of interest in the implementation of the policy. The respondent indicated the policy does 
not affect their core functions of R&D (interview with the DST 24 July 2013). 
5.3.4. Emerging stakeholder perceptions: the implementation of the beneficiation 
policy 
During the stage two interviews, the subject of institutional arrangements emerged as an 
important theme in evaluating whether the current institutions provide a supportive framework 
for the implementation of the policy. For example, the respondent from the IDC argued that 
under the DMR, the beneficiation policy is misplaced “because miners do what they do best, 
which is to dig (the mineral) out of the ground, process it, upgrade it, crush it and get it to the 
right size, increase concentration, and refine it, but further on it is a manufacturing” (interview 
with IDC, 19 July 2013). The respondent postulated that the DMR is a regulatory body 
governing the mining industry. Since the IDC respondent views beneficiation as a 
manufacturing process, the DTI, in this context is the most appropriate institutional body to 
provide support for the beneficiation policy. The respondent from the DST advanced a similar 
observation but observed that the economic government departments functioned independently 
on cross-cutting issues. 
 
The respondent illustrated that South African Airways (SAA), an SOE under the DPE, 
purchased fleets from Boeing and Airbus (interview with the DST 24 July 2013). These aircraft 
manufacturing companies, as discussed, purchase titanium from South Africa and in turn use 
the titanium to manufacture the aircraft. Since South Africa has producer dominance in 
titanium, the respondent suggested the government ought to negotiate off-take agreements that 
encourage the companies to assist in developing the productive capacity across various 
segments of the manufacturing sector in the country. Furthermore, the respondent adopted a 
critical stance regarding the institutional arrangements governing the transport industry in the 
country. The Department of Transport does not govern the entire transport industry, but only 
commuter transport; the DTI on the other hand governs the movement of cargo; and the DPE 
through Transnet governs ports, harbours and aviation. Due to the lack of an integrated 
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transport system, he asked whether “it any wonder we do not have a public transport system in 
South Africa?” (Interview with the DST 24 July 2013). 
 
Furthermore, the respondent alluded to the need for a coordinating super-ministry that can 
oversee the functioning of the economy. The respondent cited Finland as an example of a 
resource rich country that successfully industrialised through the coordinating ministry called 
the Department of Employment and the Economy (Interview with the DST 24 July 2013). The 
Finish government department, in view of the respondent is a combination of the DTI, DPE, 
DST and the DHET in South Africa. Based on the institutional alignment of the Finish regime 
the respondent remarked “it makes you realise why Nokia became one of the powerhouses it 
is today” (Interview with the DST 24 July 2013). The discussion on the economic super-
ministry elicited controversial remarks from the respondents, many of whom opted not to 
respond to the question. Nonetheless, the IDC remarked that they “support an overall 
coordination role, but the beneficiation policy does not require a super-ministry, because there 
would be some duplication as the EDD facilitates that role” (interview with IDC, 19 July 2013). 
Likewise, the DMR respondent argued that the EDD facilitates an important role in 
coordinating policy domains in the economic sector (interview with DMR, 12 July 2013). 
  
5.3.5. The results on the secondary research question 
What do the central stakeholders perceive as advantages and disadvantages of the 
beneficiation policy? 
In the main the stakeholders alluded to some challenges facing the policy. In line with section 
2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of the literature review, stakeholders such as the DMR and the NUM noted that 
access to raw material for use in local beneficiation whereas the DST proposed that institutional 
arrangements posed challenges to the implementation of the policy. While these challenges 
pose significant disadvantages to the implementation of the policy, the stakeholders identified 
a number of advantages in implementing the policy. Firstly, the influential stakeholders 
understood beneficiation as a series of production processes where value is added to the mineral 
in question at each stage of the mineral value chain. Secondly, the stakeholders were in favour 
of the policy, noting it represents an important policy intervention that seeks to strengthen the 
linkages between the mining and manufacturing sector in South Africa. The findings suggest 
that the stakeholders perceive the beneficiation as an apt policy that seeks to increase the 
absorption rate of the labour market and contribute to transforming the economy from a 
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producer and exporter of raw materials to that of a manufacturer of products higher up the 
mineral value chain. In many respects, the stakeholders perceived this as a major advantage in 
strengthening the industrialisation strategy and the competitive advantage of the economy. 
5.4. Conclusion  
The data generated from phase one of the research projects identifies the DMR and the DTI as 
crucial actors in the information exchange policy network. These stakeholders display high 
measures of degree centrality, which influences how stakeholders network in information 
exchanges. In the section on brokerage analysis, the data showed that NUM, the DMR, the DTI 
and the EDD take on important brokerage roles which connect actors from different sub-
groups. Furthermore, the UCINET analyses identified that the DTI, the DMR, the EDD, the 
DST and the ANC form the core of the information network. Viewed from the policy network 
theory, these actors form part of the dominant coalition which controls the process of 
networking and resource exchange (Rhodes, 1997). On the other hand, the funding network 
exhibits a star-like structure because funding flows in a hierarchical manner from the DNT. 
Furthermore, the findings reveal that the linkages between the DNT, the DTI, the EDD and the 
IDC have considerable bearing on the flow of financial resources in relation to the beneficiation 
policy.  
Phase two conducted an analysis of the stakeholders identified as influential in the 
implementation of the policy. Stakeholders were then categorised into a stakeholder matrix 
based on attributes such as influence and interest in the implementation of the policy. The key 
player quadrant specified the DMR, the DTI and the IDC as stakeholders with high levels of 
influence and interest in the implementation of the beneficiation policy. Due to the information 
resources of the DMR and DTI and material resources at the disposal of the DTI and IDC, the 
three stakeholders have considerable bearing on the implementation of the policy. Analysed 
from the policy network theory (see Knoke et al., 1996; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000) these actors 
are indeed indispensable to the policy network and the objectives of the beneficiation policy. 
The implications of the trends that emerged from the data results are presented in Chapter 6. 
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Summary and conclusions 
6.1. Introduction 
This exploratory sequential thesis unpacked how the MEC as a policy network of stakeholders 
is constituted and operates in terms of the resource exchanges around the beneficiation policy. 
The research proposition argued that stakeholders in possession of highly valued resources in 
the MEC policy network are likely to exercise higher levels of influence in the implementation 
dynamics of the beneficiation policy. This proposition proved true as the results generated from 
phase one revealed a limited number of influential stakeholders in the MEC policy network. 
Moreover, phase two detailed the policy perceptions of the influential stakeholders along with 
the stakeholder level of interest and influence in the implementation of the beneficiation policy. 
The objectives of this chapter are to summarise the findings of this exploratory sequential 
thesis. Section 6.1.1 recounts the theoretical framework and the findings of the literature survey 
in order to position the research findings. Section 6.1.2 and section 6.1.3 summarise the 
findings of phases one and two, respectively, while section 6.2 concludes that this application 
of the network analytic techniques offered significant insights on the process of mineral policy 
development and implementation in South Africa. 
6.1.1. Interpretations of the literature survey and theoretical framework 
Among the principle conclusions drawn in the literature survey was the finding that the MEC 
is to be seen as a system of capital accumulation particular to South Africa (Fine & Rustomjee, 
1996). Viewed as a system of accumulation, the MEC inhibited the adoption of policies that 
targeted diversification of the economy beyond mineral resource dependence. Secondly, the 
literature detailed the historical process behind mineral policy development, which involved 
an intimate relationship between the state and organised business associations, such as the 
COM in the MEC. Thirdly, a key argument proposed by Fine and Rustomjee is that the MEC 
has evolved over time to include new actors in the process of mineral policy development and 
implementation in South Africa. This thesis found evidence that the MEC, as it exists today, 
Chapter 
6 
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has evolved into a policy network of participant stakeholders in mineral policy development 
and implementation. 
The literature surveyed in chapter two of the thesis illustrated that the key interests of the MEC 
as a system of accumulation lay in resource extraction. Initially the MEC arose to preserve the 
economic interests of English capital in the mineral, energy and financial sectors of the South 
African economy. Over time, the MEC evolved to incorporate both Afrikaner and African 
stakeholders in the process of mineral policy development and implementation. 
In terms of the theoretical framework guiding the study – that of policy network theory – policy 
is formulated in a network of policy stakeholders. Under this interpretation, policy networks 
comprise stakeholders from government departments, business organisations civil society 
organisations as well as other groups with an interest in a policy domain. It is theorised that 
stakeholders participate in policy networks to influence the outcomes of policy in line with the 
interests of the stakeholder organisations or institutions. Based on the above, policy networks 
represent instrumental tools for policy stakeholders. Another rationale for stakeholder 
participation in policy networks stems from the lack of the necessary resources to achieve their 
preferred policy goals. Thus, participation in policy networks centres on resource exchange 
(Bevir & Richards, 2009). In the process of resource exchange a network of mutually 
dependent actors emerges (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). These dependencies result in power 
relationships in which various actors aim to maximise influence and attain their policy 
preferences (Rhodes, 1997). 
Within the policy network theory, theorists either view policy networks as interest 
intermediation or as new governance. Conceptions that view policy networks as interest 
intermediation share common understandings of policy networks as power dependency 
relationships between the government and interest groups in which resources are exchanged 
(Börzel, 1998). The scholarship that emerged from the British school of thought on interest 
intermediation argued that power in policy networks is the result of the resources of each 
stakeholder. Furthermore, the powerful actors in policy networks determined the distribution 
of those resources (Rhodes, 1997, p. 37). As a result of the relative power and distribution of 
resources, influence in policy favours the preference of the actors with more power and control 
over material and non-material resources (Robinson & Keating, 2004). 
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6.1.2. Phase 1 findings 
The thesis found that the dominant exchanges within the MEC policy network centres on the 
exchange of information and financial resources. These findings generated two types of 
exchange networks: the information exchange network and the financial resources network. 
The findings illustrated a centralised network with regard to financial resource exchanges in 
relation to the beneficiation policy. The funding network exhibited star-like characteristics with 
high levels centralisation and the hierarchical distribution of funds. Due to the institutional 
framework of the South African government, funding is channelled from the DNT, through to 
various government departments that in turn channel funds to their respective state agencies. 
In essence, the results point to the asymmetrical distribution of power since the government 
controls the key financial resources in the MEC policy network. Essentially, the DTI, the EDD, 
the DNT and the IDC are strategic channels for financing beneficiation related projects in the 
mineral sector. 
Klijn and Koppenjan (2003, p. 147) theorise that coordinating actors do not exist in policy 
networks. However, the results generated from UCINET reflect the contrary in terms of 
information exchanges of the beneficiation policy. UCINET measures revealed that 
government departments such as the DMR, the DTI, and the EDD facilitate significant 
brokerage roles that enable the stakeholders to control the flow of information among policy 
network stakeholders. As the measures of centrality analysis have shown, these government 
departments possess relatively higher number of ties than any other stakeholders such as 
organised labour and business organisations. Based on the results computed in UCINET, it can 
be concluded that the government is relatively powerful in the dissemination of information in 
the policy network. Furthermore, there is evidence that stakeholders closely aligned to the 
DMR received information on the policy, a dynamic that suggests selective sharing of 
information with similar organisations. 
Unlike stakeholders located in the periphery of the network, those aligned to the DMR are 
either drawn from the Economic Sector and Employment Cluster or from the mining industry. 
As a result of sectoral alignment and jurisdictional frameworks, organised labour unions such 
as the NUM, Solidary and UASA and business organisations such as the COM and SAMDA 
have representation on advisory committees and decision-making bodies established around 
mineral policy development. Apart from the aforementioned government departments, the 
DMR engages its own stakeholders, those in the mining industry. The engagement of such 
stakeholders, who are impacted by mining policy and the regulatory framework promulgated 
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by the DMR, represents normative stakeholder engagement since these stakeholders have 
legitimate rights in policy processes. The peripheral stakeholders, such as the Manufacturing 
Circle and NUMSA, are drawn from the manufacturing sector and as a result they have minimal 
engagement with the DMR. 
Arguably, the stakeholders from the manufacturing sector do not speak the same language as 
the mining industry stakeholders; there are different policy frameworks guiding sectors that are 
linked in a rather “messy and unpredictable” way (Richardson, 2000, p. 1008). As a result of 
this, it is tempting to view the isolation of the marginal actors along the theoretical premise that 
these actors lack relational ties to key actors (as suggested by Marsh & Smith, 2000). However, 
the two stakeholders exchange resources with the DTI, a central stakeholder in both the funding 
and the information exchanges network. Both stakeholders have considerable industry 
knowledge and technical experience on the manufacturing end of the mineral value chain. 
Where NUMSA represents workers in the manufacturing and related sectors, Manufacturing 
Circle is an industrial employers’ organisation. Within this context, the relational ties to the 
DTI centre on exchanging information resources about the manufacturing and beneficiating 
sectors of the South African economy. 
Marsh and Smith (2000) also theorise that peripheral actors lack policy relevant resources. The 
data generated showed the DPE as another isolate in the information exchange network. The 
isolation of the DPE points to a lack of understanding on the importance of process 
management. As observed by Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) process management seeks to 
strengthen the policy process through the inclusion of peripheral actors in possession of key 
resources. Not only do the authors make this recommendation for normative reasons, but 
highlight the transaction costs of excluding stakeholders in possession of policy relevant 
resources (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Section 2.3.1 of the literature survey highlighted the 
infrastructural constraints such as the provision of physical infrastructure in favour of raw 
material exports and the high electricity costs. The DPE governs the SOCs such as Eskom and 
Transnet. As a result of the legislative authority and facilities at the disposal of the DPE, it is 
in possession of the power to influence the operations of the SOCs. 
In many respects, isolating the DPE highlights a weakness in the policy alignment of 
overlapping economic policy issues in South Africa. More importantly it reflects shortcomings 
in how the DMR and the EDD fulfil their brokerage roles in the network constituted around 
the beneficiation policy. Considering the mining industry stakeholders lack the wherewithal to 
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implement the policy, what is required of the policy brokers is facilitating dialogue and 
communication with stakeholders that transcend other sectors pivotal in the policy. Without 
input from these stakeholders, the policy will stagnate, resulting in transaction costs such as 
jobless growth and stakeholder conflict that manifests in different avenues. Chief among them 
is the NUMSA 2013 resolution to organise a series of wild cat strikes calling for radical policy 
transformation in mineral beneficiation. 
6.1.3. Phase 2 findings 
The results generated in the analysis of the stakeholders illustrated the different levels of 
interest and influence stakeholders have in the implementation of the beneficiation policy.  
Based on these attributes, Figure 17 categorised the stakeholders into four groups, namely, the 
key players, the subjects, the context setters, and the crowd.  This revealed significant 
differences in stakeholder levels of interest in the policy. For example, two government 
departments, the DST and the EDD, exhibited lower levels of interest in the implementation of 
the policy. At the very least, the comments from the two respondents signify what Rhodes 
refers to as “the tunnel vision” dynamic where government departments “do not see beyond 
the boundaries of their areas of specialisation” (Rhodes, 2011, p. 227). In other words, these 
government departments focus insularly on their own organisational objectives despite the fact 
that the beneficiation policy cuts across departmental boundaries. 
In response to this silo mentality, Rhodes (2011) suggests the concept of joined-up government. 
The term describes a situation of joining up government departments horizontally in pursuit of 
policy coordination. Accordingly, the joined up government concept works on the premise that 
joining up government departments enables them to share information, coordinate actions 
towards the achievement of cross-cutting policy goals (Rhodes, 2011, p. 227). One such 
example as defined by Kraak (2009) is horizontal coordination of government departments at 
the macro level. In essence, “horizontal coordination is the management of a set of activities 
between two or more organisational units, where the units do not have hierarchical control over 
each other and where the outcomes cannot be achieved by the units working in isolation” 
(Kraak, 2009, pp. 13-14). 
 
The aforementioned Economic Sector and Employment Cluster system is a case in point where 
departments in areas of economic policy are grouped together or ‘clustered’ due to 
complementary mandates of several government departments, “to ensure cohesive and 
coordinated policy-making across and between different government departments” (Gumede, 
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2010, p. 176). While the cluster system represents significant attempts towards the joined-up 
government concept, policy analysts have hinted at the establishment of a coordinating super 
ministry to coordinate sectors that drive economic growth and industrialisation (Kraak, 2009; 
Jourdan et al., 2012). Even though these discussions have manifested different viewpoints, at 
the heart of debates is the fact that industrialisation starts with a dedicated unit that oversees 
the processes. 
 
During the data collected for the thesis, divergence was observed amongst respondents over 
the necessity of a super-ministry. Where the IDC and the DMR reasoned that the super ministry 
was superfluous since the EDD facilitates the coordinating role, the DST respondent alluded 
to the need for an empowered ministry to oversee departmental alignment in the 
implementation of the policy. While the call for a super-ministry is an ideal and attractive 
response to the problem of institutional misalignment, its establishment is not without political 
consequence given the strong entrenched interests in maintaining the status quo in the mineral 
sector. Since the coordinating institution does not exist in South Africa, one option is to 
establish it with all the associated challenges and politics described in section 2.3.3 of the 
literature survey. The second alternative is for the policy to be managed by an existing 
institution such as the EDD. Although the EDD fulfils a brokerage role in the MEC policy 
network and in the broader macro-economy, its political legitimacy within the other 
government departments needs to be anchored. 
 
Within the context of the beneficiation policy, the institutional arrangement debate is closely 
related to an understanding of the productive processes in beneficiating minerals down the 
mineral value chain. This thesis adopted the definition that beneficiation entails a series of 
value addition activities through various manufacturing processes of the mineral value chain. 
Respondents interviewed reached similar conclusions on the definition of beneficiation, noting 
that the policy represents an important intervention for strengthening the competitiveness of 
the South African mineral sector. As a result of the findings, this thesis has contributed towards 
the understanding of beneficiation from a policy perspective. 
 
The thesis distinguished stakeholders as key players, subjects, context setters and the crowd 
based on their levels influence and interest in the implementation of the beneficiation policy. 
The subject quadrant included the NUM, the COM, and UASA. The context setter quadrant 
included the EDD based on the findings that it exerts a high influence level but low interest in 
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the policy and finally the crowd quadrant included the DST as it has both low levels of 
influence and interest in the policy. Furthermore, the stakeholder matrix showed that the DMR, 
the DTI and the IDC are the key players of the MEC policy network in relation to the 
beneficiation policy due to their high levels influence and interest in the policy.  The 
stakeholder analysis showed that indeed stakeholders have varying levels of influence, based 
on the resources at their disposal and their level of interest in the policy. 
 
For example, the COM, an influential lobby group in the mining industry has low levels of 
influence in the implementation of the beneficiation policy because beneficiation extends 
beyond the mining industry interests, which centre on raw material extraction. Although 
organised labour unions in the mining industry such as the NUM and UASA exhibit high levels 
of interest in the implementation of the policy, these stakeholders do not possess the resources 
to implement beneficiation, as the process of adding value falls beyond the mining industry 
and resides in the manufacturing sector, where NUMSA organises and possesses labour power 
in the sector. In terms of the government departments, the data showed that influence in this 
network resides with the IDC, DTI and the DMR. 
 
The main significance of the results generated in the thesis is in the finding that there is a strong 
connection between the position of the actors in the resource exchanges of the MEC policy 
network and their level of interest and influence in the implementation of the beneficiation 
policy. Simply, the DMR and the DTI emerge as key figures in both phase one and two findings 
of the thesis. Both stakeholders are heavily involved in the networking and the resource 
exchanges concerning the beneficiation policy, as phase one data revealed. Secondly, both 
stakeholders are key players in the implementation of the beneficiation policy. Equally 
important is the finding that the DTI is a central stakeholder in both the funding and information 
exchange networks and a key player according to the stakeholder matrix. This not only points 
to the importance of the DTI in the policy network as it is constituted around the beneficiation 
policy, it also illustrates the fact that power and influence in policy processes differ according 
to the resources stakeholders possess and their ability to mobilise the resources towards a policy 
activity. 
The DTI is in possession of resources such as regulatory authority, financial resources, 
information and expertise in the beneficiation end of the mineral value chain. While it is well 
recognised that the DMR has an important role in securing raw material supply to local 
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manufactures in the beneficiation value chain, the DMR is constitutionally incapacitated to 
provide incentives, let alone subsidise stakeholders beyond the mining value chain. 
Furthermore, the DMR lacks the technical information and expertise of sectors beyond the 
mining industry. Because the DMR lacks the resources required for the implementation of the 
beneficiation policy, it is the firm belief of the researcher that under the auspices of the DMR, 
the policy is misplaced. Therefore, what is required is careful examination of how existing 
institutions can be aligned to meet the transformation objectives and developmental goals of 
the beneficiation policy. 
6.2. Concluding remarks 
This thesis analysed the MEC as a network of policy stakeholders in the beneficiation policy. 
It employed network analytic techniques in the evaluation of relational and structural 
stakeholder embeddedness within the MEC policy network. It was achieved by analysing the 
roles that stakeholders assume in resource exchange, as well as the dominant resource 
exchanges amongst the policy network stakeholders. Additionally, the thesis sought to analyse 
the key stakeholder perceptions on the beneficiation policy along with stakeholder level of 
interest and influence in the implementation of the policy. These objectives were informed by 
the knowledge that in policy networks, policy-related interactions are often closely linked to 
perceived influence (or potential influence) on the policy subject matter. 
The research found that in the development of the beneficiation policy, the DMR engages 
stakeholders for normative reasons. It engages stakeholders derived from the mining industry 
since mining policy affects these stakeholders. 
 
An important tool the government should adopt in policy processes is network analytic 
techniques. In this way, the government would be able to identify central stakeholders with 
highly valued resources beyond their boundaries that can be committed towards the attainment 
of public policy goals. Such an analysis identifies the instrumental stakeholders that will 
contribute to the development and implementation of public policy in South Africa. 
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Phase One Telephonic Interview Schedule 
Title of Study: 
 Mineral energy complex on the beneficiation policy through the lens of network analysis 
 
Interviewee organisation ______________________________________________________ 
 
Date___________________      Location___________________ 
 
 Note to Interviewer: Instructions to you are in italics. Questions for you to read out are 
in normal print. 
 
Read out the following: 
Good morning. My name is Khensane Hlongwane and I am a student at the Graduate School 
of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand. I am registered for 
the degree of Masters in Management of Public Policy. As part of the requirements for the 
degree, I am conducting research for my thesis on the stakeholders in the Beneficiation Policy 
Network. 
While the beneficiation strategy is widely discussed and the opinions and recommendations of 
a number of actors available in the public domain, these have yet to be explored in relation to 
stakeholder and network analysis. The aim of this research interview is to explore and learn 
from your opinions on the relationships between the stakeholders as well as the characteristics 
of the stakeholders who have been engaged in the policy processes of the Beneficiation Strategy 
for the Minerals Industry of South Africa.  
The phases of the policy process that are to be investigated are agenda-setting, policy 
formulation, policy adoption, and policy implementation. My preliminary research has 
identified you as an important stakeholder in the policy processes around beneficiation. 
Therefore, it is crucial for this study to obtain your opinion. I kindly wish to ask you seven 
questions about your perceptions regarding the characteristics of stakeholders in the 
beneficiation policy network. 
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Background  
 (Read out the following and record answers in the blank spaces) 
 
1. Gender 
Female 
 
 
Male 
 
 
2. How many years have you worked for your organisation or company? ________ Years 
 
3. What position do you occupy?    
Executive Director                  
Chief Executive Officer          
Managing Director  
Manager      
If other, please specify ______________________________________________ 
General information 
 Stage 1: Name generator question 
 
 (Read out the following and record answers in the space below.) 
 
- Please mention all organisations, groups or actors who have been engaged in the following 
policy processes of the Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa 
- Provide the following examples: The first organisations or groups that come to mind, that 
you have seen participating, or heard from someone else that they are or have been 
participating in the following policy processes – or phases of the policy process:  
 
a) Who were the actors that were engaged in the problem structuring? (Agenda-setting) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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b) Who were the actors that were involved in formulating policy options? Or, who were the 
actors that proposed alternative policy options and envisioned long-term consequences for 
the policy? (Policy formulation) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
c) Who were the actors that were involved in the adoption of the policy? Or, who were the 
actors that were present and active when the policy was adopted? (Policy adoption) 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
d) Who are the actors in your opinion with the potential to affect the implementation of the 
policy? By implementation I mean the actors who will mobilise material and non-material 
resources carry out the policy. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 Stage 2: Name interpreter questions 
 
 (Read out the following and record answers in below.) 
 
1. Please mention the names of the organisations/individuals/institutions which provide/ d 
your organisation with information on the policy. Information includes the following: 
information on the policy, meeting dates, invitations to seminars and workshops, 
networking events, strategies, ideas, terminology and documentation. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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2. Please mention the names of the organisations/individuals/institutions which your 
organisation provides/d information on the policy. Information includes the following: 
information on the policy, meeting dates, invitations to seminars and workshops, 
networking events, strategies, ideas, terminology and documentation. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Please mention the names of organisations/individuals/institutions which provide/d your 
organisation with non-material resources. Non-material resources include and not limited 
to staff and personnel. Please mention all relevant organisations. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Please mention the names organisations/individuals/institutions which your organisation 
provides/d non-material resources such as staff and personnel. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Please mention the names of the organisations/individuals/institutions which provide/d 
your organisation with material support. Material support includes sponsorship, financial 
assistance, budgetary allowance, grants and aid. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Please mention the names of the organisations/individuals/institutions to which your 
organisation provide/d material support. Material support includes sponsorship, financial 
assistance, budgetary allowance, grants and aid (funds). 
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___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you very much for taking the time to answer my questions. 
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Phase One Interview Dates 
Organisation Interview Date 
The Department of Mineral Resources 26 April 2013 
The Department of Trade and Industry 7 May 2013 
The Economic Development Department 7 May 2013 
The Department of Science and Technology 27 May 2013 
The Department of Higher Education and Training 7 June 2013 
The Department of Public Enterprises 27 May 2013 
The National Planning Commission 7 May 2013 
The Department of the National Treasury 6 May 2013 
Mintek 6 May 2013 
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 6 June 2013 
Industrial Development Corporation 24 May 2013 
African National Congress 20 May 2013 
Chamber of Mines 19 June 2013 
South African Mining Development Association 19 June 2013 
Manufacturing Circle 30 May 2013 
National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa  20 May 2013 
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National Union of Mineworkers 3 May 2013 
United Association of South Africa 6 May 2013 
Solidarity 6 May 2013 
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Phase Two Interview Dates 
 
Organisation Interview Date 
The Department of Mineral Resources 12 July 2013 
The Department of Trade and Industry 22 August 2013 
The Economic Development Department 27 July 2013 
The Department of Science and Technology 24 July 2013 
Industrial Development Corporation 19 July 2013 
Chamber of Mines 22 August 2013 
National Union of Mineworkers 10 July 2013 
United Association of South Africa 19 July 2013 
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Phase Two Interview Schedule  
 
Date: _________________   Location: _______________________ 
Interviewee organisation: _____________________ 
 
General information 
  (Read out the following and mark with a circle over letter) 
 
 
1. Beneficiation has been variously described as: 
I. A variety of processes whereby extracted ores from mining are reduced to particles that 
can be separated into mineral and waste where the former is suitable for further 
processing or direct use. 
Or 
II. The process or series of processes by which an ore containing a metal or mineral as it is 
found in nature is converted into a product containing a progressively higher 
concentration of the metal or mineral concerned. The final result is achieved when the 
metal or mineral reaches the highly beneficiated or chemically pure form required by 
the end-user. Beneficiation ends and manufacturing begins when the mineral commodity 
has been converted into a final usable product. 
 
- Which of the above descriptions best matches or captures your understanding of 
beneficiation? 
a) I only 
b) II only 
c) None of the above 
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 (Read out the following and record answers in the blank spaces) 
 
4. Based on your understanding of beneficiation, please specify the potential benefits the 
implementation of the beneficiation policy offers to your organisation, institution or 
company? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5. In your organisation’s view, what are the potential disadvantages in the implementation 
of the beneficiation policy? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Following your organisational objectives, please indicate which ONE of the following 
categories best describes your organisation/company/ institution’s level of interest in the 
beneficiation policy?  
Very high 
 
 
High 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Very Low 
 
 
7. Please specify which ONE of the following categories closely describes your opinion on 
the policy.  
 
a) I strongly oppose it 
 
                   
b) I somewhat oppose it 
 
                   
c) I do not oppose it nor support it 
 
                   
d) I somewhat support it 
 
                   
e) I strongly support it 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
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- Note to interviewer: 
 
 If respondent answer is c, d or e, continue to question 9, (skip questions 14, 15, 16 and 
move on to question 17 to continue questionnaire). 
 If respondent answer is a or b, move to question 14 and continue with rest of 
questionnaire. 
 
8. Which of the following aspects of the beneficiation policy do you support? 
 (Read out the following and mark with a circle over letter; multiple answers are allowed)  
 
a) Promoting the creation of decent employment in South Africa. 
b) Enhancing the overall competitiveness of the economy by increasing the quantity and 
quality of exports. 
c) Promoting broad-based socio-economic empowerment. 
d) Diversification of the economy away from raw material dependence. 
e) Promotion of the green economy. 
 
9. For those aspects of the beneficiation policy that you support,  
a) In what manner, if any, do you demonstrate this support? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
b) Do you have material and or non-material resources to dedicate to supporting the 
beneficiation policy? If yes, please specify the resources (material and non-material) 
you will dedicate to the implementation of the policy. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
10. When it comes to implementing the policy, do you view your organisation/ 
institution/company as an actor who can influence (see below) the process in that regard? 
 
♦ Influence here is understood as your ability to shape policy outcomes so that they are in 
alignment with your organisation/ institution/company policy preferences. Influence 
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includes your capacity to control the resources such as money that can be committed to 
bring about your organisation/ institution/company policy preferences. 
 
Yes                  
 
No               
 
a) Briefly tell me you main reason/s for believing your organisation/ institution/company is 
an influential actor? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In your response, please specify which ONE of the following categories best describes 
your organisation / institution’s level of influence in the policy.  
 
Very high 
 
 
High 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Very Low 
 
 
 
 
12. In the first round of interviews in this project, the following actors have been identified 
as part of the beneficiation policy network. 
 
 Provide respondent with the list of the beneficiation policy network stakeholders 
gathered from the telephonic interviews. 
a) With which of these organisations do you strategize, cooperate or share viewpoints 
regarding the beneficiation policy? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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13. Which of the following aspects of the beneficiation policy do you agree with? 
 (Read out the following and mark with a circle over letter; multiple answers are 
allowed.)  
 
a) Beneficiating South Africa’s minerals will not lead to the creation of  decent employment 
b) Beneficiating South Africa’s minerals will not enhancing the overall competitiveness of 
the economy, instead it will decrease the  quantity exports 
c) Beneficiating South Africa’s minerals will not promote Broad-Based Socio-economic 
Empowerment 
d) Beneficiating South Africa’s minerals will not diversify the economy away from raw 
material dependence 
e) Beneficiating South Africa’s minerals will not promote the green economy 
 
14. For those aspects of the beneficiation policy that you do not support (if any), which 
aspects of the policy have to be amended in order for you to change to a position of 
supporting the policy?  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
15. In the first round of interviews in this project, the following actors have been identified 
as part of the beneficiation policy network 
 Provide respondent with the list of the policy network stakeholders gathered from 
telephonic interview 
 
b) Which of these organisations do you strategize, cooperate and share viewpoints 
points 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
16. Based on the list from the previous round of interviews, please identify stakeholders with 
the potential to influence the policy’s outcome and implementation? 
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___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
- Once the respondent has identified the actors, move onto the question below 
 
17. Please rank the actors identified above according to their level of influence where 
1= very low level of influence to 5= very high level of influence 
 
  1 
Very low  
  2 
Low   
3 
Medium  
  4 
High 
5 
Very high 
 
 Actor 
name:________ 
 
     
 Actor 
name:_________ 
 
     
 Actor 
name:_________ 
 
     
 Actor 
name:__________ 
 
     
 Actor 
name:_________ 
 
     
 For the actors that have scored the intensity responses of 3, 4, or 5, continue to 
question 19. 
 
 For the actors that have scored the intensity responses of 1 or 2, move to question 20. 
 
18. What factors, such as material resources, information or authority account for the actor’s 
level of influence? 
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 Fill in the name of the actor next to the number. 
 
- Actor 1 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
- Actor 2 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
- Actor 3 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
- Actor 4 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
- Actor 5 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. What factors such as material resources, information or authority account for the actor’s 
low level of influence? 
 
- Actor 1 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
- Actor 2 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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- Actor 3 
___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
- Actor 4 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
- Actor 5 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
21. Please describe to me the ‘structure’ of the beneficiation policy network 
a) Do all the network actors work in one group or are there coalitions within the bigger 
policy network? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
b) Which are the central and which are the smaller networks? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
c) If present, how do they link with one another? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
22.  If you interpret this network, can you identify one or two particular organisations/ 
institutions/ individuals that are clearly the leaders of this network? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
a) Or would you say all network actors operate on an equal footing? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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23. To conclude, after we have now considered this network as it exists (from your perspective, 
if you were asked to redesign this network, please tell men what are a few of the most important 
changes you would make? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to answer my questions. 
 
 
 
 
